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Southern Illinois University Press publishes a collection of John Dewey’s 
complete works in 37 volumes. They are separated into three sections: The 
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Naturalism in the Philosophies of Dewey and Zhuangzi:   
The Live Creature and the Crooked Tree  
 
Christopher C. Kirby 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation will compare the concept of nature as it appears in the 
philosophies of the American pragmatist John Dewey and the Chinese daoist 
Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)1 and will defend two central claims. The first of these is 
that Dewey and Zhuangzi share a view of nature that is non-reductive, 
philosophically liberal, and more comprehensive than the accounts recurrent in 
much of the Western tradition. This alternate conception of nature is non-reductive 
in the way that it avoids the physically mechanistic outlook underwriting much of 
contemporary Anglo-American thought. It is philosophically liberal in that it 
accepts a more generous and progressive position than predominant Western 
orthodoxies. And, it is more comprehensive in scope insofar as it draws as much 
from the social sciences as it does from the natural sciences.  
The second claim defended will be that the synoptic vision gained from such a 
comparison offers a new heuristic program for research into the philosophical 
position known as naturalism, a program that can, at once, avoid the scientistic 
tendencies of the current, mainstream treatment of nature and reconnect with 
earlier, more inclusive models. Where Dewey’s and Zhuangzi’s ideas converge, one 
                                                 
1 Pronounced “jwong-dzuh” 
iv 
 
finds similarities in the prescriptions each made for human action, and where they 
differ, one finds mutually complementary insights. Finally, this heuristic will be 
used to refute various interpretations of Dewey and Zhuangzi that tend to understate 
or ignore the importance of nature within their schemes. 
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Preface: West Meets East 
 
Dewey and Zhuangzi – not two names one finds regularly in the same 
sentence. What basis is there for comparison of two thinkers so divided by time and 
place, between one who was a leading advocate of democratic ideals and one who 
preferred to drag his “tail in the mud?” In spite of the obvious differences, these 
thinkers actually held quite a bit in common – particularly when it comes to the way 
they viewed the relationship between human beings and nature. A point-by-point 
comparison may serve to illustrate.  
 The most important similarity between Dewey and Zhuangzi is that they 
defined nature in terms of a relational field of which change was a chief 
characteristic. As Dewey wrote, “Man finds himself living in an aleatory 
world…The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable.”2 
Zhuangzi put it similarly, “With open fields, bits of dust, and myriad creatures 
mutually oscillating and breathing, doesn’t nature take on a mainly deep, dark blue-
green appearance?”3 But, in spite of nature’s precariousness, both Dewey and 
Zhuangzi believed that one could not merely survive, but flourish, in such a world if 
only one were able to get out of one’s own way and find attunement with the 
surrounding world.  
                                                 
2 EN, LW 1:42 
3 Zhuangzi. “Chapter Two – Qiwulun.” [My translation]  
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This led each to posit similar descriptions of the human being. Instead of 
appealing to disembodied reason or depicting humans as political animals, Dewey 
and Zhuangzi offered far less anthropocentric models. For Dewey, human beings 
were just one type of “live creature” among many. For Zhuangzi, a human being, 
like any of the myriad things, was a point of focus, or dé [德], that was inextricably 
linked to the field of nature. Both Dewey and Zhuangzi would have agreed that the 
entities of nature are not merely interconnected but interpenetrate one another – they 
are what they are because of the various relationships within the field.   
Their advice for how one ought to comport oneself, given this view of nature, 
held many similarities as well. Each argued, in his own way, for a “live and let live” 
type of mutual respect. Each argued that happiness was achievable once human 
beings stopped trying to bend nature to their will and instead found a way to live in 
harmony as a member of a community. For Dewey, this was what democracy as a 
way of life entailed. For Zhuangzi, it was wandering at ease in spontaneity, or wù 
weì [無為]. This is where many critics might see the comparison begin to break 
down. It is said of Dewey that his affinity for instrumentalist and pragmatic 
explanations leads directly to a crass opportunism, and that his focus on human 
experience prevented him from making deep metaphysical insights. Likewise, there 
are two main objections leveled against Zhuangzi – that his emphasis on non-action 
is an excuse for quietism, and that his mystical inclinations underwrite radical 
skepticism and/or jejune relativism. So, among their commentators, Dewey comes 
off as a superficial weasel and Zhuangzi, a frivolous hippie. Through juxtaposition, I 
believe it will become obvious that these interpretations are unwarranted, that 
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Dewey’s philosophy is actually metaphysically rich and communally oriented, and 
that Zhuangzi provides both a manual for leadership and a via media between 
dogmatic absolutism and skeptical relativism. 
The comparative points of this project, however, will serve us only if they are 
situated within a broader philosophical and historical context. After all, comparison 
can only be useful to philosophical inquiry when emphasis is placed not merely on 
pairing up concepts from disparate traditions and finding their similarities, but rather 
on the hope of finding insights about the methodology and conceptual schemes 
employed in each, as well as the problems toward which any similarities can be 
applied. Comparison for comparison’s sake is at best uninformative and at worst 
intellectually irresponsible.  
Dewey and Zhuangzi are not just conceptually linked, however. They both 
were at the cutting edge of what became a school of thought – pragmatic (or 
humanistic) naturalism for Dewey, and Daoism for Zhuangzi. Each suffered a 
subsequent misinterpretation of their ideas, too, by both their critics and supporters. 
In the centuries after his death, Zhuangzi’s work was co-opted by superstition and 
folk religion and became part of the canon of religious Daoism. Dewey’s work was 
largely eclipsed by analytic philosophy, which usurped Dewey’s brand of naturalism 
with its scientifically reductionist view of the world.     
The confusion about the meaning of naturalism that resulted from the rise of 
analytic thought requires that a comparison of naturalism between these two thinkers 
begin from a contemporary context. Much ink has been spilled over the philosophies 
of these men and if we hope to come to a clear understanding of the ideas they share, 
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we must first distinguish those ideas from the wrong-headed views that directly 
result from years of interpretation and appropriation. Otherwise, we stand in danger 
of falling prey to a selective emphasis that has rendered the concept of naturalism 
nearly impenetrable to contemporary readers. In that regard, this project will extend 
outward from the comparison of Dewey and Zhuangzi on two fronts. The first must 
address the frameworks into which each thinker’s ideas fit. Toward this end, there 
seem to be at least four questions of major concern.  
1) How does the view held in common by Dewey and Zhuangzi compare with 
other views that have worn the moniker of “naturalism?  
2) What were the philosophical problems to which Dewey and Zhuangzi were 
responding?  
3) What was part of Dewey’s intellectual equipment prior to his China visit and 
what can we attribute to his time there?  
4) How did the landscape of ideas change in China because of Dewey’s visit?   
 
Were this a full-length manuscript, each of these questions would certainly warrant a 
complete chapter, and their answers are undoubtedly complex and rich enough to 
call for such a treatment. However, the scope of a dissertation will not allow for such 
a detailed analysis. Instead, my main focus will be the first two questions. I will only 
address the latter two questions wherever rigorous exegesis may call for them. As 
consolation, I offer some contextual and historical information regarding Dewey’s 
encounter with China in the following section of this preface.  
The second front upon which a worthwhile comparison must extend has to do 
with its application. I believe there are several directions in which naturalism, à la 
Dewey and Zhuangzi, can be useful. Philosophically, as I will contend, their mutual 
approach seems to help alleviate some of the metaphysical hang-ups that have 
plagued Western philosophy for over two millennia. Their views can also be seen as 
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a means of reconciling philosophy with recent work in the environmental and 
biological sciences as well as suggesting a normative theory that takes a broader 
view than previous moral philosophies and thus seems to link up ethical life with the 
rest of human experience, offering inroads to new political ideas. Unfortunately, 
forays into these topics will again be limited by the scope of a dissertation. 
Therefore, I will mostly treat the ethical and political ramifications of the Dewey-
Zhuangzi comparison, as it is these that are most appropriate to traditional 
philosophical concerns. 
This facet of Dewey’s thought, which could be seen as the unification of nature 
with morality, is uncannily similar to the general Chinese view. The books of the sì 
shū 四書, the “Four Confucian Classics,” each illustrate the intermingling of 
ontology with morality in Chinese thinking, and a view of the human self into which 
Hume’s dictum about reason being a “slave to the passions” would never fit.4 The 
lack of the Western distinction between nature and a “moral agent” is even apparent 
in the Chinese language, where the nearest correlate to the Western concept of 
‘mind’ – the lynchpin of ethical agency – is xīn [心], which is more closely related to 
the body (particularly the heart) than it is any transcendental or supernatural entity.  
Comparisons of Dewey with the Confucian school of thought are relatively 
common in recent scholarship. Book length treatments of this comparison have been 
offered by David Hall and Roger Ames in The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, 
Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China (1999), and by Joseph Grange in 
John Dewey, Confucius and Global Democracy (2004). Because Zhuangzi’s 
                                                 
4 cf. Ames, Roger T. & Hall, David. Thinking From the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in 
Chinese and Western Culture. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997.) 
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philosophy was largely a reaction to Confucianism, the prima facie concern might be 
that such a comparison with Dewey’s political philosophy is inappropriate. Rather 
than a complete rejection of Confucian precepts, however, I will argue that 
Zhuangzi’s ideas were more of a redirection thereof, with a special regard given to 
nature. This would place Zhuangzi right in line with Dewey.   
Dewey’s Encounter with China 
 
In 1919, Dewey began a tour of China and Japan that he would later consider a 
professional rebirth. The lectures he gave while at Tokyo Imperial University were 
turned into a book under the title Reconstruction in Philosophy, of which Dewey 
would remark in a letter to his Columbia colleague John Jacob Coss that, “I tried to 
sum up my past in that, and get rid of it for a fresh start.”5 But, his experience in 
Japan marked only the beginning of what Dewey called his “renewal of youth.”6 For, 
it was the time he spent in China that would lead him to claim “[n]othing western 
looks quite the same anymore.”7 In fact, he was so enraptured by China that he 
petitioned Columbia University to allow him to extend his stay from what was 
originally planned as a mere six-week jaunt to a yearlong teaching post at the 
University of Beijing. And upon the end of that year, he managed to again extend his 
stay. In all, Dewey’s sojourn lasted for over twenty-six months. While there, he 
                                                 
5 Cf. Dewey to Coss, 1920.04.22 in The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 2. Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2005.   
6 Cf. Dewey to Coss, 1920.01.13 in The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 2. Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2005. 
7 Ibid. 
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published 30 articles concerning China and gave over 120 lectures (of which less 
than a third have been recovered) to a variety of institutions all over the country.8  
In order to understand why Dewey was so compelled by China, a recapitulation 
of the events leading up to his visit must be offered. The era in which Dewey 
encountered China was unlike any other, past or present, in the nation’s history. 
During this time, China was at a cultural, political, and philosophical crossroads. The 
old ways of the Qing dynasty, which had prospered since the mid-17th-century, were 
beginning to break down in the face of western industrialization. On one hand, there 
were older intellectuals and officials who had been educated in the neo-Confucian 
tradition of dào xúe [道學] (the Learning of the Way), a system which had so 
entrenched itself as the orthodox Chinese belief that from the year 1313 until the 
beginning of the 20th-century it was the basis of civil service entrance 
examinations.9 On the other hand, a large portion of the younger literati had been 
educated abroad, mainly in British and American universities (of which Dewey’s 
Columbia held the largest contingent). This difference contributed to an uneven 
image of China both at home and abroad, which culminated in the events that 
transpired during the decade surrounding the turn of the century. If ever there were 
an individual who embodied the welfare of an entire nation, then that figure was Li 
Hongzhang – China’s eldest and most respected statesman of the era.10 
                                                 
8 cf. Dewey, John. Lectures in China, 1919-1921. ed. by Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen Ou. 
(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1973) 
9 Cf. Wing-Tsit Chan’s A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1973) p. 589 
10 For an excellent monograph on Li Hongzhang, cf. Chu, Samuel C. and Kwang-Ching Liu, ed. Li 
Hung-Chang and China's Early Modernization. (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe) 1994. 
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Li Hongzhang was born in Hefei, Anhui – which is historically significant 
because Anhui and its neighboring province, Hunan, comprise the area once 
inhabited by the state of Song during the ‘Warring States’ period of China (480-222 
BCE). The name Song was carried down by descendants of this state and was twice 
used to name dynasties, first in 420 C.E. and then again, five hundred years later 
from 960 to 1279 CE. It was during the latter that dào xúe, or Learning of the Way, 
was established by the philosopher Zhu Xi. Although dào xúe was, at its core, a neo-
Confucian system, Daoist and Buddhist precepts so heavily influenced Zhu Xi that 
his thought should best be classified as an amalgam of the three. Li Hongzhang was 
an adept student of dào xúe, which was alternately known as the school of Song, and 
at the age of twenty-four he passed the civil service examination toward the rank of 
jìnshì – the highest of the three titles in the dào xúe system. As part of the highest 
level of gentry, and due to his superior military cunning, Li was quickly promoted to 
rank of general. On all accounts he was a model Chinese citizen.   
 So it was that in 1895, the 73-year-old Li journeyed to Japan to negotiate a 
treaty. His mission was to sate Japan’s imperialistic binge, which had already laid 
claim to Chinese tributaries in the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Korean 
peninsula during the short-lived Sino-Japanese war. Under the Meiji rule (1868-
1912), Japan had already been largely westernized and was in a position, both 
economically and militarily, to make stringent demands on the struggling Qing 
dynasty in China. The image of this meeting, with the elderly Li and his group of 
traditionally dressed Chinese attendants paying tribute to the much younger Japanese 
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officials in their western garb, left a lasting impression on the European military 
powers.  
China’s apparent weakness in this affair was enough to pique the interest of 
several European imperial nations. Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russia all 
vied for control in many Chinese provinces. In the north, Germany took Jiaozhou 
and Russia gained Liaodong; while, in the south, France acquired Guangzhou Bay 
and Britain leased several territories around Hong Kong – which it had occupied for 
nearly fifty years since the first Opium War. Of the European entrants, only Italy 
was successfully turned away by the Qing government. The more concessions the 
Qing government made to the imperialists, the more outraged the Chinese public 
grew, and by the end of 1898 a secret society comprised of farmers, villagers, and 
several scholars in the provinces of Shandong and Hebei had formed in opposition to 
Qing cooperation with foreign interests. This group, which consisted of mostly 
young men who had been displaced by the changes that imperialism introduced, 
called their society ‘The Righteous and Harmonious Fists’ and combined principles 
of martial arts and mysticism in their doctrines.  
In 1898, intent on ousting what they believed were the Qing traitors, the ‘Fists’ 
organized a small skirmish that would later develop into a full-scale revolt. Although 
the ‘Fists’ were defeated in this initial encounter, they gained vast support from 
many other areas in China affected by the European incursion. Thus began what 
became known as the ‘Boxer Rebellion.’ Sensing the growing discontentment of the 
people, and under the advisement of several scholars, the young Qing emperor, 
Guangxu, issued a series of reform edicts known as the ‘Hundred Days Reform’ 
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which promised educational, economical, and political improvements. However, his 
efforts were thwarted from within his own court when his aunt and predecessor to 
the throne, the Empress Dowager Cixi, seized control of the palace and had many of 
Guangxu’s aides executed. Rather than decentralize the power of the ruling family, 
the Empress Dowager sought to use the Boxers to strengthen the Qing government 
by playing them off against the Europeans. She sent military support to the rebels, 
who had now turned their attention towards foreign embassies, missions, and 
factories.  
This strategy failed, and in 1900 the European governments, now joined by 
Japan and the United States, declared war against China and organized a combined 
force of 20,000 troops to march against the rebellion. When it was clear that the 
allied forces would be victorious, the Empress Dowager fled. Li Hongzhang, with 
his health failing, was again called upon to negotiate on behalf of China. In his 
journal, he wrote,  
August 8. – A sick man has been appointed Peace Plenipotentiary to 
treat with the Powers. How can I hold my head up and demand 
consideration in this matter when my limbs are almost too weak to 
support my body? … Oh, if my own hand were not so weak, and 
my cause so much weaker! The Court is in hiding, and the people 
are distracted. There is no Government, and chaos reigns. I fear the 
task before me is too great for my strength of body, though I would 
do one thing more before I call the earthly battle over. I would have 
the foreigners believe in us once more, and not deprive China of her 
National life…11 
 
After a month of protracted negotiations, Li was able to arbitrate the 
withdrawal of the foreign troops. However, the indemnities that China would pay in 
                                                 
11 Foster, John W. (ed.) The Memoirs of the Viceroy Li Hung Chang. (London: Constable and 
Company Ltd., 1913) pp. 253-254 
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return crippled the already weakened economy. On the 7th of November in 1901, 
nearly two months after he had ensured peace, Li Hongzhang died.  
This time, it was Li’s death that represented China’s demise to global 
onlookers. Though it re-established itself for a few years afterward, the Manchurian-
established Qing dynasty had lost much of its moral authority and nearly its entire 
former international splendor, and without leaders like Li Hongzhang, the older 
gentry began to lose even more ground against the undercurrent of change. Younger 
intellectuals had already begun a program of translating liberal tracts from the West, 
which only gained steam in the years following his death. Between 1898 and 1909, 
one such scholar, by the name of Yan Fu, introduced Darwinism to China and 
translated several major liberal treatises, including Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, J.S. Mill’s On Liberty and Logic, Herbert 
Spencer’s A Study of Sociology, and Baron de Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws.12 
Educated revolutionaries, including the well-known Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen), 
rallied at home and traveled abroad to garner support for an uprising. Eventually, in 
1912, the Sun-led Revolutionary Alliance, which espoused democratic-socialist 
ideals, capitalized on a small, unrelated revolt by negotiating the abdication of the 
Qing emperor. Sun drew up an interim constitution and elections were scheduled. It 
appeared as though democracy was nearly within China’s grasp.  
Unfortunately, the fledgling government was quickly overthrown by the 
military action of Yuan Shikai, the former Qing general and one time Revolutionary 
Alliance collaborator, who disputed the legitimacy of the election (his party had lost) 
                                                 
12 cf. Ebrey. Patricia B. The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) p. 262 
 12
and declared himself the next emperor. Oddly, Yuan died the following year (1915) 
and China was once again thrown into a tumultuous power struggle. The 
Revolutionary Alliance, which had by then renamed itself the “Nationalist Party” 
still held significant influence, but spent much of the next ten years stamping out 
various warlords who had gained power in the disorder. The intellectual elite also 
stayed very busy during this time. Along with the continued support of liberal ideals, 
Marxist theory had also begun to gain popularity, particularly after the witnessed 
success of Bolshevism in the Russian revolution.  
This was clearly a time ripe for reform, and Dewey’s arrival occurred directly 
in the middle of the thirteen-year period between Yuan Shikai’s death and the 
eventual realization of a Nationalist government toward the end of 1928, by Sun’s 
successor Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Upon Dewey’s entrance, the country had 
settled into pockets of influence, ruled either by warlords who were remnants of the 
Qing-established Beiyang army, or else by foreign merchants and ambassadors. This 
raised resentment of foreign interference to a fevered pitch, and the Chinese youth 
began to question traditional values, particularly Confucian ones, in ever more 
poignant ways. The campaign that resulted from this public outcry was called the 
‘New Culture Movement’ and was spearheaded by several of Dewey’s former 
students at Columbia, including Menglin Jiang, the Chancellor of Beijing University; 
P.W. Guo, the founder of Nanjing Teachers College; and Hu Shih, who was 
probably the most influential intellectual in China during the first half of the 20th-
century. Hu and Menglin collaborated on a scholarly/cultural journal, called ‘The 
New Youth,’ that was aimed at political reform.  
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When the Beiyang warlords agreed to enter World War I on the side of the 
allies, the Chinese public expected to recover the lands that Germany had occupied 
for several decades. However, the decision of the allies in Versailles was to award 
those territories to Japan, which had sent troops to the war effort, whereas China’s 
contribution had been 100,000 unskilled workers. On May fourth, just three days 
after Dewey’s arrival, over three thousand students took to the streets of Beijing in 
protest. It was clear that change was immanent, and Dewey was looked upon by the 
Chinese youth as the symbolic, if not the factual, leader of that change. 
There have been three books that focused of this period in Dewey’s life. The 
first appeared in 1973 and was little more than a collection of addresses Dewey gave 
while in China, edited by Robert Clopton and Tsuien-chen Ou and published under 
the title Lectures in China, 1919-1920. Clopton and Ou added an introduction, but 
this addition was primarily informative, not philosophical. The second book to treat 
Dewey’s encounter with China was Barry Keenan’s The Dewey Experiment in 
China, which appeared in 1977. These early works advanced the claim that Dewey’s 
influence in China was singularly in the realm of education. However, a more recent 
volume written by a Chinese scholar, Jessica Ching-Sze Wang disagrees. In her 
work, which is titled John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn (2007), she 
states, “Dewey’s response to the May Fourth movement was more than enthusiastic; 
the social energies being released galvanized him…Indeed, the May Fourth 
movement was China’s gift to Dewey.”13 Wang claims that the idea that Dewey was 
so well received because he was seen as a “Second Confucius” – as one who 
                                                 
13 Wang, Jessica Ching-Sze. John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn (SUNY Press, 2007) p. 5 
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emphasized family and community loyalty – is a misconception. Although he did 
hold these similarities with Confucianism, she writes, “In fact, Dewey was well 
received because he was thought to represent an alternative to Confucianism.”14 Of 
course, this is a role that Daoism, and specifically Zhuangzi, had occupied for 
centuries. Dewey seemed aware of this relationship between Confucianism and 
Daoism when he wrote to his family:  
Laotze over here in China was another one, “Be a useful citizen and 
somebody will use you; be worthless and useless, and you’ll do 
something, because you will be let alone and have a chance.” This 
isn’t advice, merely a net quotation from Mr. Laotze who is the real 
philosopher of China as Confucius is of the ruling class.15   
                                                 
14 Ibid. p. 7 
15 Dewey to Dewey Children, 1920.02.20 in The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 2. (Carbondale, 
IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005) 
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Chapter One: What is Naturalism? 
  
“Just as children plunged into darkness tremble and fear every little thing, so we sometimes 
dread in the light things that are not one jot more to be feared than the imaginings of 
children shuddering in the blackness. This terror, this darkness of the mind, must be 
scattered, not by the rays of the sun and glistening shafts of daylight, but by a dispassionate 
view of the inner laws of nature.” [Lucretius16] 
 
In 1944, Columbia University Press published a collection of essays edited by 
Yervant Krikorian entitled Naturalism and the Human Spirit. Most of the 
contributors in that volume were associated with the department of philosophy at 
Columbia, which, by then, was led by Herbert Schneider, J.H. Randall, Jr. and Ernest 
Nagel. The first essay of the volume was authored by John Dewey, who was semi-
retired, but had taught most of the other contributors of the volume alongside F.J.E. 
Woodbridge. Woodbridge and Dewey were mainstays at Columbia from the time 
Dewey arrived in 1905 until Woodbridge’s death in 1940. Naturalism and the 
Human Spirit represented the culmination of nearly forty years of work at Columbia 
and was a clear expression of their brand of naturalistic philosophy. Though 
Woodbridge had died four years before its publication, his influence was made clear 
through the number of references to his thought found throughout the work. One of 
the things that Woodbridge had been most fond of telling his students was that he – 
like the ancient Greeks – preferred to speak the “language of being,” while his 
colleague Dewey preferred to speak the “language of experience.” The Columbia 
school of naturalism might best be described as a marriage of these two ways of 
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speaking – a combination many have summed up as “pragmatic naturalism” – 
though this designation may not be as informative as Dewey’s own “humanistic 
naturalism.” It is important to note that the Columbia school was not the only 
naturalism vying for the American consciousness during the twentieth century. Thus, 
if a comparison of naturalism in the philosophies of Dewey and of Zhuangzi is to be 
achieved, it is essential at the outset of this investigation that the features which set 
apart this brand of naturalism be distinguished from those of its rivals – for it is this 
brand of naturalism which resonates most distinctly with Zhuangzi’s version of 
Daoism. In what follows, I will offer a sort of taxonomy of theories that have been 
associated with various strains of naturalism.    
Naturalism and the Organic Point of View 
 
The word naturalism has popped up again and again throughout the history of 
ideas. The style of the Pre-Raphaelites in the arts, the literary themes of the novelists 
Émile Zola and Charles Dickens, and even the school of sociology inspired by 
Auguste Comte have all donned the moniker. It seems the ambiguity of such a term 
renders it practically meaningless. Of course, this project is aimed at explicating the 
philosophical position known as naturalism. Yet, even this designation sheds little 
light on the issue since ambiguous jargon is often the hallmark of academia, and 
particularly in professional philosophy, “naturalism” is one of the most ambiguous 
terms of all. Before an adequate account of philosophical naturalism can be given, it 
will be helpful to first determine what it is not. But, even this negative approach to 
defining philosophical naturalism requires a few caveats.  
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The first is to note that various thinkers treat the concept of nature differently. 
For some, nature is completely synonymous with reality, for others it is only a 
subcategory of reality. Consequently, it is essential to bear in mind that, whilst 
naturalism is a philosophical position about reality, not all philosophical positions 
about reality are naturalistic. The second is to remember that philosophical 
naturalism is not coterminous with a “philosophy of nature”, either. For, the history 
of philosophy is rife with speculations about nature, many of which fall outside of 
the scope of what should properly be considered “naturalistic.” In fact, it was simply 
philosophy at large that commenced when human beings began to look for 
explanations of the natural world around them. As Wilfrid Sellars once put it, “The 
aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest 
possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.”17 
The third caveat I should offer is to be attentive to how the word naturalism is 
applied to traditions and thinkers that did not explicitly regard themselves as such. It 
is one thing for a thinker to present “naturalistic themes” in his or her work, but it is 
quite another to be a self-proclaimed naturalist. 
This last point is perhaps the most salient for distinguishing philosophical 
naturalism. Simply put, it is the glossing over of differences between various kinds 
of naturalism to such an extent that it appears as if one term fits them all. This has 
sometimes been a stumbling block for even the most careful of thinkers. For 
instance, Barry Stroud once remarked in a presidential address to the Pacific 
Division of the American Philosophical Association that,   
                                                 
17 Sellars, Wilfrid. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in Science, Perception and Reality 
(Ridgeview Pub Co.,1991) p. 1 
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The idea of “nature,” or “natural” objects or relations, or modes of 
investigation that are “naturalistic,” has been applied more widely, 
at more different times and places, and for more different purposes, 
than probably any other notion in the whole history of human 
thought. The earliest turns towards naturalism that I have heard of 
was in the fifth century B.C. And they seem to have been happening 
every so often ever since.18 
  
By the end of that address, Stroud concluded naturalism, “by now is little more than 
a slogan on a banner raised to attract the admiration of those who agree that no 
supernatural agents are at work in the world.”19 Three weeks later, Michael 
Friedman began his presidential address to the members of the Central Division of 
the same group thusly,  
I want to discuss a tendency of thought which has been extremely 
widespread within Anglo-American philosophy during the last 
twenty years or so - but which now, if I am not mistaken, has 
reached the end of its useful life. This tendency of thought… I will 
call “philosophical naturalism.”20 
 
Both Stroud and Friedman were calling for the eclipsing of what they took to be 
“philosophical naturalism” by a more precise and useful phrase. However, the 
ambiguity of naturalism seems to come from just this kind of blanket use of the term. 
This shows that even in such narrow philosophical circles as these, naturalism is in 
dire need of disambiguation, as it has been used to refer to any number of 
epistemological, metaphysical, or ethical positions throughout the annals of 
philosophy.  
As Stroud implied, some of the earliest positions to which the term naturalism 
has been applied sprung up during the fifth century B.C.E. around Greece and Asia 
                                                 
18 Stroud, Barry. “The Charm of Naturalism.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, Vol. 70, No. 2. (Nov.,1996), p. 43. 
19 Ibid, p. 54. 
20 Friedman, Michael. “Philosophical Naturalism.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, Vol. 71, No. 2. (Nov., 1997), pp. 7-21. 
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Minor. This was the cradle of Western philosophy, where thinkers like Thales, 
Pythagoras and Heraclitus began to speculate about what constituted φύσις. At first 
glance, such a concept may appear to correspond completely with our notion of 
nature, and it is often translated as such. However, as we shall see, what this concept 
entailed for the Greeks puts it sharply at odds with a contemporary understanding of 
nature, and hence the speculations of these early philosophers should not be 
considered coextensive with philosophical naturalism. Instead, the view that they 
shared, which did not sharply distinguish between the human and natural realms, 
could be called – following Werner Jaeger – an “organic point of view.” As he put it, 
the ancient Greeks in general, always had “an innate sense of the natural,” wherein,  
The concept of ‘nature,’ […] was without doubt produced by their 
peculiar mentality. Long before they conceived it, they had looked 
at the world with the steady gaze that did not see any part of it as 
separate and cut off from the rest, but always as an element in a 
living whole, from which it derived its position and meaning.21 
 
According to Jaeger, this point of view filtered into every aspect of Greek life. Even 
philosophers who held a dualistic view of reality did not make their distinctions 
along the lines of the organic versus the human.  
 That the default understanding for the Greeks was an organic one is an 
important insight for two reasons. The first is that the Greek conception of nature, or 
φύσις, implies organic growth – obviated by its role as the root concept of 
contemporary words such as “physics,” “physiology” and “physique.” Because of 
this dynamic, growth-oriented view, one of the main philosophical dilemmas for the 
early Greeks concerned primacy between the notions of change and permanence. 
                                                 
21 Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture Volume I: Archaic Greece: The Mind of 
Athens. (Oxford University Press,1986) p. xx 
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Some, like Thales, argued that all change could be reduced to the motion of one all-
pervasive element, such as water. For the Pythagoreans, permanence was found in 
the principles of mathematics. Heraclitus simply denied permanence altogether, 
while Parmenides denied change. The atomists Democritus and Empedocles claimed 
that both change and permanence were occurring simultaneously through the 
movement of unchanging particles in motion. Regardless of how the question was 
worked out, the underlying assumption was always that human understanding was 
part and parcel of this larger picture, not separated from it.  
Plato was the first to formulate a systematic reconciliation of these ideas, and 
many later self-proclaimed naturalists would blame his distinction – between the 
“apparent” reality of change and the “true” reality of permanent forms – for the 
contemporary dualisms that have prevented a thoroughgoing naturalism from being 
realized. Friedrich Nietzsche once called this legacy, “Plato’s embarrassed blush.”22 
But, it may be a bit unfair to lay the burden of this “error” (as Nietzsche called it) 
solely on the shoulders of Plato. After all, if Alfred North Whitehead’s claim that 
Western philosophy is just “a series of footnotes to Plato” carries any truth, then it is 
worth questioning how much responsibility should be placed on these footnotes for 
rending reality, as Whitehead would put it elsewhere, into “two natures, [where] one 
is the conjecture and the other is the dream.”23 
The second reason to remember that the Greeks saw things organically is that it 
demonstrates how different their view of experience was from our own. The word 
                                                 
22 cf. Nietzsche, F. “How the True World At Last Became a Myth. The History of an Error.” In 
Twilight of the Idols. (1889) 
23 Whitehead, A.N. Process and Reality. (Free Press: NY, 1979) p. 63 & The Concept of Nature. 
University of Cambridge Press: London, 1920. p. 30  
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the Greeks used to indicate the function that organized the yields of sensory 
perception was “εμπειρία,” which is a combination of a prefix that meant “in” or 
“on” and a root that meant “to try” or “to attempt,” and is also where we derive our 
word “empirical.” This etymology also lays bare the sea-faring culture of the Greeks, 
as it employs the same root as the one used in our words “peril” and “pirate.” In this 
sense, “experience” for the Greeks was the way that the trials of the sea could be 
read on the faces of the sailors who had survived them. Thus, it could be said that the 
Greeks’ way of thinking hung on a fairly prosaic understanding of the world around 
them, one that took things at “face value.”24 They would not have spoken of 
erroneous “experiences,” in the sense of that which is abstracted “out of” πειρία, 
taking place within a mind cut off from its surroundings. Instead, they spoke in terms 
of existences. Though Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle may have disagreed 
about the make-up of the world around them, the one element common to their 
thought was that experience was a natural event, generated by that world. In this 
way, it could be said that the Greeks spoke a “language of Being.” 
While this organic point of view certainly draws upon naturalistic themes, as 
we shall see in more detail later, it too should not be conflated with philosophical 
naturalism – in spite of the tendency among contemporary scholars to do so. Perhaps 
Max Weber’s way of describing the world as “disenchanted” would be closer to 
what these early Greeks had in mind. Certainly these thinkers would not have 
referred to themselves as “naturalists” in the same sense as the audience members 
addressed by Stroud and Friedman would use the term. This is especially noteworthy 
                                                 
24 For instance, Thales’ belief that water produced all other substances can be attributed to the fact 
that Miletus was located in the floodplain of a river that deposited large amounts of silt. Thales 
literally witnessed the growth of nearby islands out of the sea during his lifetime.   
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in light of the fact that the use of the term “naturalism” to apply to such schools of 
thought did not occur prior to the seventeenth century.25 
 
Nature and the Language of Experience 
 
Now that it is more apparent how the organic point of view held by the early 
Greeks is not synonymous with the philosophical position known as naturalism, we 
must seek an historical account of how it came to be that contemporary naturalists do 
not speak in the same terms as their philosophical forbears. It has already been noted 
how one might say that the early Greeks spoke a language of Being, in which human 
beings were seen as part of an organic whole. By contrast, many of their successors 
during the Medieval and Modern periods rejected the presuppositions of the 
Ancients and moved toward an account of the human-world relationship that turned 
on epistemological, rather than ontological, notions. This is most obvious in the 
philosophy of René Descartes, who claimed that the non-intelligent aspects of reality 
were simply dead matter and that human perception was too unreliable to offer a 
ground for knowledge of that world. He thus posited “innate ideas” as the basis for 
most of what we know. These innate ideas were similar to Plato’s forms insofar as 
they allegedly transcended ordinary, mundane appearance; they differed in that they 
were seen as wholly subjective and thus outside of the organic world. In Descartes’ 
words, “[W]hat should be noticed is that perceiving is not a case of seeing, touching 
or imagining, nor was it ever such although it seemed that way earlier, but it is an 
                                                 
25 In his “A Note on Smith’s Term ‘Naturalism.’” (Hume Studies, XII: 1, 1986. pp. 92-96)  Joseph 
Agassi argues that Pierre Bayle probably coined this usage. [cf. p. 93]     
 23
inspection of the mind alone…”26 This marked a complete shift from the language of 
Being to what may be called a “language of experience,” a conceptual revolution 
that led to the interpretation of εμπειρία as “ex-”perience – i.e. as that which is 
distilled out of everyday life.   
This shift from being to experience was a gradual one, however, which merely 
reached its critical mass with Descartes. One of the first major contributing factors 
can be traced back to the way Roman thinkers interpreted the Greek notion of φύσις. 
As stated, this was a primarily growth-oriented concept for the Greeks, but the 
Romans used the word natura to translate it and their terminology has since been 
handed down to the European traditions. Natura is problematic, however, because it 
replaces connotations of growth with that of birth, as it comes from natus, the past 
participle of nasci (to be born). So, for the pagan Romans, nature was what had 
already been birthed; it was “Mother” nature. This picture of nature as a genesis 
principle antecedent to the human realm was later amplified by the medieval 
dispersion of Christianity.  
Another major ingredient in the formulating the language of experience was 
Aristotelianism. While Aristotle was, by many accounts, the most “organic” of the 
early Greek philosophers, it is worth restating that even his system should not be 
confused with philosophical naturalism as it will be defined in what follows. 
Aristotle upheld the views of the pre-Socratics, and like Plato hoped “to set forth 
what they should have been doing” in their accounts of φύσις. But, he was forced to 
walk a tightrope between the prevailing ideas of his day – viz. the idealism of Plato 
                                                 
26 Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Ed. by Roger Ariew (Hackett, 2000) p. 107 
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and the atomism of Democritus – and his thoughts on nature offered a middle path 
between these competing theses. If it is true that the Greeks in general spoke a 
language of Being, then it could be said that Aristotle perhaps more than any other 
ancient thinker, spoke a language of “Becoming” that married permanence and 
change in the notion of an unfolding ουσία. But, his balancing act led to the 
appropriation of his work in two opposite directions, and today scientific and 
religious institutions simultaneously hail him as a patriarch. There are many reasons 
for this, but perhaps the most salient is simply the practical limitation on empirical 
investigation during Aristotle’s day. Because such inquiries were limited to what 
could be gleaned by the unaided senses, Aristotle’s philosophy was vulnerable when 
it came to questions of genesis. These limitations led him to the conjecture of an 
“unmoved mover,” a concept pilfered by Catholicism in support of a divine, super-
natural creator. 
These legacies were handed down to the moderns in a way that made the 
philosophical treatment of nature a daunting task, even to those who were 
sympathetic to a more organic view. For instance, gifted thinkers like Spinoza and 
Leibniz made valiant attempts at reconciling a growth-oriented view with the 
Christian versions of Aristotelian thought, the result of which were two of the most 
abstruse systems in the Western canon. Spinoza saw through the Roman concept of 
nature to posit a distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans.27 Leibniz 
offered a hylozoistic harmony between “Nature and Grace” through concepts like 
                                                 
27 Cf. Spinoza, B.  Ethics. Translated by Shirley (Hackett, 1992) 
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pre-established harmony and plenitude.28 Moreover, the scientific gains met after the 
Renaissance had done much to render many of Aristotle’s ideas all but useless. 
Astronomers had revolutionized the understanding of our solar system, chemists had 
begun to work out contamination and sterilization, and physicists had discovered the 
laws that governed gravity and the motion of bodies. With these advances, 
Aristotelian notions such as cosmological spheres and spontaneous generation had 
been rendered utterly useless and it seemed quite plausible that his views on nature 
should be jettisoned as well. Once again, the only viable alternatives seemed to be 
Neo-Platonic idealism or an updated form of Democritean atomism. Nature was 
viewed either as an empty dream or a dead machine. Philosophers were left 
floundering for a description of reality within this new epistemological framework. 
The success that Newton had in grounding science in abstract laws, allegedly derived 
from reason alone, seemed very attractive to these philosophers, and they quickly 
adopted a similar method for their inquiries. Thus, the Moderns turned the tables on 
the Aristotelian project of first philosophy, and it was their notion of “metaphysics” 
– i.e. the Cartesian quest to ground understanding in abstract, unchanging reason and 
recast nature as a system of mechanistic presence, devoid of purpose – that has 
become a major cornerstone of Western thought since.29 
Not until the advent of Darwinism would the Greek view of permanence 
through change finally be relevant again in Anglo-American thought. By suggesting 
that a species need not be viewed as an antecedent “Form” or “potentiality” 
                                                 
28 Cf. Leibniz, G.W. “The Principles of Nature and Grace.” in Philosophical Essays. Trans. by Ariew 
and Garber (Hackett, 1989) 
29 Both Dewey’s assault on the “quest for certainty” and Derrida’s on the “metaphysics of presence” 
are responses to this legacy – albeit toward different ends. 
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(something that had stymied Platonists and Aristotelians for ages) but rather as a 
dynamic, emergent, and transient, organic structure, Darwin seemingly provided the 
groundwork for a new naturalistic philosophy to take root, one that could forego 
grand teleological explanations and provide an organic point of view without re-
instituting the old language of Being. However, the language of experience had by 
then become pervasive and too deeply entrenched in the halls of academia. Rather 
than resuscitate Greek notions, most philosophers sought to work out ways of giving 
accounts of knowledge couched in the language of experience. 
Naturalism, most generally and in its most recent instantiations, could be 
understood as just one of the various attempts for Western thought to make its way 
back to an organic point of view in light of the language of experience produced by 
Modernity. One of the biggest stumbling blocks to such a project was always the 
way in which religious institutions twisted the concept of nature. But, this is really 
only half the story. What of naturalism as a thoroughgoing philosophy? In what 
follows we shall see how the legacy of the language of experience has been as much 
of a hindrance to the development of philosophical naturalism since the scientific 
revolution as religion was before it. This hindrance is what has led to the 
multifarious use of “naturalism” among contemporary philosophers.  
Naturalistic Strategies in Philosophy 
 
As we have seen, naturalism is a common term in contemporary philosophical 
parlance, but the problem is that it “means many different things to many different 
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people.”30 For some, naturalism is just the attempt to offer an account of reality that 
does not make reference to a supernatural or divine realm. Others see it as nothing 
more than an adoption of the scientific method as the only legitimate method for 
gaining knowledge. While a few argue it is primarily an endeavor to make 
normativity seem less “queer.”31 These are the general themes motivating 
contemporary philosophical references to naturalism. Simply stated, they are:  
A) Ontological – an omission of supernatural, transcendent or mystical 
existents  
B) Methodological – assertion of scientific method as the only means of 
gaining knowledge 
C) Ethical – normative concepts can be wholly expressed in non-normative 
terms. 
 
While most allusions to naturalism will maintain one or two of these themes, 
very few adopt all three. The organic point of view would be one example of how 
one could hold an A)-type view without accepting something like B). In this way, 
one could call the conjectures of Thales regarding water, or those of Democritus 
regarding atoms, “natural” explanations in the sense of A) but not B) because they 
were not the result of any empirical observation. Perhaps less obvious, though, is 
how one could hold a B)-type view without subscribing to something like A). Such a 
position would inevitably have to take an epistemological turn, wherein it is asserted 
that science is the only means of knowing the supernaturally created universe – à la 
the Cartesian assertion that the Divine must be the foundation for science, lest 
human belief be nothing but deception. This is the move that gave rise to what I’ve 
been calling the language of experience. Yet, when the implications of such a 
                                                 
30 Sklar, Lawrence. “Naturalism and the Interpretation of Theories,” Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association 75 (2001): p. 1 
31 This was the way J. L. Mackie often referred to objective moral values. 
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position are drawn out, it seems inevitably to foster either a radical skepticism or an 
arrant idealism. On one side is the argument that nature is permanently out of reach 
and therefore all we have to rely on are the habits of experience. On the other side is 
the notion that the furniture of the world actually subsists in mind only. Thus, when 
we look at the history of Anglo-American philosophy, which has largely operated on 
the assumptions of the modern era, we should not be surprised to discover numerous 
forays into each of these extremes.32 
If it is true that the one thing these views have in common is the desire to 
“discover a new balance between the philosophy of being of the Greeks and the 
philosophy of experience of the moderns,” then the multiplicity of allusions to 
naturalism should not be surprising.33 For, there are many ancient concepts that the 
moderns misunderstood or rejected, just as there are modern concepts about which 
the ancients were ignorant. One of the stickiest of sticking points between the two is 
the notion of a Cartesian mind and its contents. Philosophers with a naturalistic bent 
have tried to ease these tensions in various ways. One of the easiest ways to 
determine the difference between various strains of naturalism within philosophy is 
to first look at the method each uses in “naturalizing” such contentious concepts, i.e. 
how they redefine supposedly transcendent, supernatural, or divine concepts in 
natural terms.  
In their recent collection of essays on contemporary naturalism Mario De Caro 
and David Macarthur have identified four major naturalization strategies employed 
in philosophy. They claim,  
                                                 
32 E.g. the transcendentalism of Emerson et al., the Neo-Hegelians of St. Louis, or the Humean-cum-
Moorean skepticism of American ethicists.  
33 Anton, John. American Naturalism and Greek Philosophy. (Prometheus, 2005) p. 9 
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Projects of naturalization have typically been conceived as 
substantive semantic projects in which the concepts of apparently 
nonnatural discourses must be: 1) reduced or reconstructed in terms 
of naturalistically respectable posits, i.e. the posits of the natural 
sciences; or 2) treated as useful fictions; or 3) construed as playing a 
non-referential or non-factual linguistic role; or 4) eliminated 
altogether as illusory manifestations of "pre-scientific" thinking.34 
 
The differences between these four methods of naturalization are perhaps more 
subtle than De Caro and Macarthur let on, and often two or more are applied 
simultaneously. For our purposes, then, it will be best to treat the first and fourth 
approaches prior to looking at the second and third. Furthermore, De Caro and 
Macarthur’s list should not be seen as comprehensive, as there at least two other 
ways that non-natural concepts may be redefined in natural terms.  
The first strategy mentioned by De Caro and Macarthur could be called 
reductionism. It is a method has been around for quite some time. The Greek 
atomists were reductionists concerning the cosmos, as was Descartes when it came 
to lower, non-thinking animals, or “automata.” Simply stated, reductionism is the 
attempt to show that complex hypotheses not readily apprehensible can be broken 
into smaller components. Of course, this is not really a philosophical invention at all 
but, rather, a common practice. Harry Ruja and Monroe Shapiro once put it this 
way… 
When the layman… reports that what he thought was a bear turns 
out sometimes to be only a stump, he is performing just like a 
metaphysician… Here are two "experiences" –the stump experience 
and the bear experience. We can refuse to distinguish appearance 
from reality and say simply that it is a bear from a distance and it is 
a stump close by. If that does not make sense (and to the layman it 
does not), then we can "reduce" one experience to the other by 
                                                 
34 De Caro, M. and Macarthur, D. “Introduction – The Nature of Naturalism.” Naturalism in 
Question, eds. De Caro, M. and Macarthur, D. (Harvard University Press, 2004) p. 7 
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saying either that it is a bear, but only looks like a stump close by, 
or that it is a stump but looks like a bear from a distance.35 
 
The reductionist believes that philosophers who seek reconciliation between the 
language of experience and an organic point of view have similar options. They can 
either reject outright one model for the other or else they can say one is “truer” and 
reduce everything to that position. In the example of the Cartesian mind, many 
philosophers simply claim that sensations, ideas, and the like are nothing more than 
the manifestation of electro-chemical reactions among the neurons of the brain. In 
other words, they appeared to be mental states then, but now upon closer inspection, 
it is revealed that they were really brain states all along. In this way, reductionists 
argue that what is needed to understand human mental life is a full classification of 
the structures of the brain.  
When it is extended to ontology and the concept of nature, reductionism 
follows a similar path. An ontological reductionist would claim, given the great 
successes of reductive approaches in physics and chemistry that all modes of inquiry 
should follow a similar model. This amounts to a form of physical monism – or 
physicalism – which holds to the assumptions that only physical things exist and that 
nature is such that it can be carved at its joints by scientific inquiry. Simply stated, 
this position holds that, physical “science is the measure of all things, of what is that 
it is, and of what is not that it is not.”36 Of course, there are many obstacles to 
following such a line of thought. For one, it is often a daunting task to show that one 
                                                 
35 Ruja, Harry & Shapiro, Monroe. “The Problem of Pluralism in Contemporary Naturalism.” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 10, No. 1. (Sep., 1949), p. 67-68 
 
36 Sellars, Wilfrid. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” in Science Perception and Reality 
(Routledge, 1963), p. 173 
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type of thing is reducible to some other type of thing, and despite many advances in 
neuroscience, the link between mental states and brain states is still not an obvious 
one. Likewise, in studies of nature, notions such as ecosystem stability have proven 
resistant to reductive analyses. Subjects of inquiry like nature and the mind may yet 
prove to be too complex to fall easily into the conceptual pigeonholes of the 
reductionist. Moreover, if it turns out that operations in nature, or in the brain, do not 
follow strictly linear causal pathways, or that mapping out the structures of reality 
and consciousness continue to leave us with impoverished predictive models, then 
reductionism must be ruled out as the best means for achieving a full-bodied 
naturalism.  
A more hard-line form of this kind of strategy is known as eliminativism. Like 
reductionism, this has been a popular strategy among philosophers of mind. But, 
where a reductionist claims that a complex field of study can be reduced to more 
basic claims, or that complex properties and functions of any entity are nothing more 
than a careful ordering of the sum total of its parts, the eliminativist claims that such 
notions are not only untrue but harmful insofar as they impede full scientific 
understanding. Thus, it is argued that such ideas need to be eliminated from 
intelligent discourse. While reductionist approaches at least entertain the use of non-
natural concepts, eliminativist ones reject such notions outright. While each 
approach hangs on a form of ontological materialism (wherein anything not solely 
comprised of matter is ruled out of court) as well as an unshakable confidence in the 
reach of scientific inquiry, it seems eliminativism is even more open to criticism 
because it has no internal mechanism for accommodating new evidence in unsettled 
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areas. Where reductionism has at least a potential for inclusiveness and self-
corrective inquiry, eliminativism does not. 
Another alternative for the would-be naturalist might be to claim the illusory 
concepts that seem resistant to reductive approaches are simply useful fictions. This 
approach (which may be termed semanticism) suggests that there is a certain 
meaning derived from non-natural terminology that cannot be achieved through 
adherence to strictly physical statements. This was the tack taken by George 
Santayana regarding religious terminology, which he proclaimed to be “certainly 
significant…but not literally true.”37 He argued that religion was a vital institution 
for any society because of its role as a purveyor of cultural symbols. On this 
approach, the significance of such symbols is not reducible to physical terms but 
these symbols are nonetheless “natural” because they come from human institutions. 
This was Santayana’s nod to the Jamesian notion of “the will to believe,” and 
although he disagreed with James about the veracity of religious statements, he 
agreed that religious iconography was essential to a fully human existence due to its 
uniquely mythological, poetic elements. The problem in employing this method of 
naturalization instead of another is that one is forced to show that these non-
reducible ways of speaking are the only avenue for attaining the meaning in 
question. Simply put, the burden of proof is on she who deems the fiction useful. For 
example, in Santayana’s case, it seems true that if the meaning he prizes can be 
supplied from some other, non-religious institution, then his strategy for 
naturalization is at best superfluous and at worst fawning.    
                                                 
37 cf. Santayana, George. The Life of Reason. (Prometheus, 1998) p. 179 
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A more extreme version of this method, which holds that what we take to be 
true is what works best within whichever language game we happen to find 
ourselves immersed, may be regarded as the strategy of constructivism. Like the 
semantic approach, this form of naturalization does not require one to find a means 
for reducing mental states to brain states, nor for reducing nature to the laws of 
physics. Instead, it simply posits that concepts are social creations; facts are made, 
not found. In this way, there are no non-natural entities because there are no purely 
objective facts, and thus there is only one realm, the realm of subjectivity. When 
employed toward questions of knowledge this position leads to a form of 
“epistemological behaviorism,” wherein science is seen as the method of choice for 
acquiring knowledge about the world, not because it provides the best access to 
some underlying reality, but because it yields the most successful behavior. Unlike 
semanticism, constructivism need not appeal to some essential meaning or value 
(like the purveyance of culture) to accommodate the use of non-natural language, but 
can simply grant that these non-reducible ways of speaking are requisite for a robust 
theory, and though not literally true, provide us with a means of filling in the gaps in 
our conceptual scheme. This is a line of reasoning embodied by Richard Rorty’s 
dictum that everything is “interpretation all the way down.” As Rorty has put it, the 
difference between the constructivist and the reductionist is “between those who 
think our culture, or purpose, or intuitions cannot be supported except 
conversationally, and people who still hope for other sorts of support.”38 However, 
when taken to this extreme, constructivism leans toward a form of idealism in which 
                                                 
38 Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism.” In Consequences of Pragmatism. 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1982) p. 167 
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“there is nothing outside the text” becomes the battle cry.39 Such a position 
obviously undermines the naturalist sentiments from which it arises. 
Each of these strategies has its strengths and weaknesses, but all of them suffer 
from a need to work within the parameters of the language of experience because 
each implicitly accepts the subject/object distinction. Whether one adopts a 
reductive/eliminative approach or a semantic/constructivist approach, the result is a 
selective emphasis of one side of the distinction. Those in the former camp reject 
subjectivity, but rest confident that there is a purely objective perspective from 
which to make such a rejection – just as the layman in the above example would 
confidently select the experience of the stump as the “true” one. And, when it comes 
to bears and stumps, this is not a problem. For more complex concepts, however, 
those in the opposite camp rightly point out that such an Archimedean point of 
inquiry is not actually attainable. Yet, they tend to slide directly into an idealistic 
rejection of objectivity. What we learn by looking at these approaches side by side is 
that, although the language of experience cut the subject away from the object, it 
borrowed the knife from society. Simply put, we learn that when giving a full 
account of anything (including nature), context, culture, and community matter.  
This point about context is illustrated nicely by an anecdote told by G.E.M. 
Anscombe in An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. As she recounts the story,  
He [Wittgenstein] once greeted me with the question: ‘Why do people 
say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather 
than the earth turned on its axis?’ I replied: ‘I suppose, because it 
looked as if the sun went round the earth.’ ‘Well,’ he asked, ‘what 
                                                 
39 cf. Rorty, “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism.” In Consequences of 
Pragmatism. (University of Minnesota Press, 1982) 
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would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on its 
axis?’40 
 
What is different in the two points of view is not the way things appear, but the 
assumptions that underwrite them – assumptions that come from a greater 
understanding of the context. This pulls the rug out from under the subject-object 
distinction. What changes with such a gestalt shift is the situation – itself a 
combination of the environing conditions and the way they are acted upon. It would 
thus be incorrect to say that it just is the case that the Earth orbits the Sun. Instead, it 
would be more accurate to say that, given our current data, it is likely that the Earth 
orbits the Sun. But then, this is just what science says. This is an upshot of the 
language of experience worth salvaging – viz. that we sometimes make poor 
judgments about the world around us. In this sense, philosophy would do well to 
emulate science in seeing its theories as on permanent probation. This is especially 
true regarding its treatment of nature. The insight that we are sometimes wrong 
about the world around should lead us to fallibilism, not skepticism.    
None of the above strategies seem equipped to foster a philosophical 
naturalism that steers clear of the subject-object distinction. There are two that may 
be able to do so, however. The first may be called emergentism. “Emergence is a 
process of complex patterns forming from simpler rules.”41 On an emergentist 
strategy, non-physical entities emerge out of various combinations of physical 
entities and are novel to, but not separate from, the material realm. Nature, according 
to the emergentist, is layered. The upshot of this strategy is that it allows for the type 
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41 I am indebted to Professor Robin Wang of Loyola Marymount University for this succinct 
description of emergence. 
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of fallibilism found in the best scientific inquires. However, unless an account is 
given of how emergent properties do not occupy their own distinct realm of 
existence, emergentism runs the risk of falling into a type of dualism, which could be 
antithetical to its naturalistic goals. There are two ways of addressing this concern. 
The first is to claim that emergent properties are supervenient upon physical 
properties, i.e. a change in any set of physical properties will result in a change in 
any set of properties that emerges from it. This avoids the problems of simple 
reductionism by suggesting that while non-physical entities are not identical or 
reducuble to physical ones they are still dependent upon them – just as the reflection 
in a mirror is dependent on the object being reflected but not simply reducible to the 
object. Consequently, it is claimed that these properties neither have causal efficacy 
on physical properties, nor on each other. The downside to this position, then, is that 
it does not allow for the possibility of emergent properties causally changing 
physical properties – a phenomenon for which there seems to be at least some 
evidence, e.g. the arguable claim that positive thinking can heal the body, or the less 
controversial idea of behavioral feedback loops.42 The alternative is to simply claim 
that emergent properties do have causal efficacy over the set of physical properties 
from which they derive. An elegant example of this is the flocking behavior of birds. 
The flight pattern of the flock emerges from the flight of each individual, which in 
turn changes (or feeds back into) the flight of each individual. The flock itself is an 
ongoing transaction between the whole and its parts. In this way, emergence can 
accommodate the language of experience without falling prey to the subject-object 
                                                 
42 Stock markets are an excellent example of a feedback loop wherein the emergent property (market 
value) can effect the physical properties (investor behavior) of the system. 
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distinction since experience, on such a view, would not be a passive, receptive state, 
but would instead be considered “transactional,” insofar as it is emergent from, but 
not reducible to, a matrix of psychophysical combinations.     
Another naturalist strategy, related to emergentism, is what has come to be 
known as functionalism. Though employed in many disciplines, functionalism is 
perhaps most familiar in the context of psychology, wherein it is the claim that every 
mental process is to be understood only in terms of its usefulness in helping an 
organism adapt. In this vein, functionalism was the strategy of choice for William 
James’ work on psychology and the mind, but as Darwinian evolution gained a more 
mainstream acceptance during that era, functionalism became a more broadly 
applied strategy. As the renowned American neurologist C. Judson Herrick once put 
it, any phenomenon…      
…may be looked at in various ways, of which two require more 
special treatment. (1) It may be viewed in longitudinal section, i.e., 
as taking place in time. Here the running sequence, the fluidity, 
brings into strong relief the dynamic elements, and we see the 
process as function. (2) It may be viewed in cross section, i.e., as 
extended in space. Eliminating the temporal factor, as in an 
instantaneous photograph, the static elements more clearly appear 
and we term it an object, a structure. It must be noted that the thing 
under consideration is neither the structure nor the function, though 
it is both. This distinction does not exist in reality; it is artificially 
produced in our attempt at analysis. But the artifact is a necessity by 
reason of the limitations of thought and of language.43 
 
Here, Herrick describes the difference between a functionalist and reductionist 
strategy. The functionalist strategy pays certain dividends that reductionism cannot. 
The most obvious of these would be the way a functionalist method is able to 
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incorporate the growth-oriented view of nature. Since it defines things in terms of 
they way they work, it is more inherently fallibilistic and avoids the type of selective 
emphasis that can lead to dualistic and foundationalist philosophies.  
When functionalism is coupled with the type of emergentism that allows for 
causal efficacy among emergent properties and the physical world, the resultant 
strategy leads to a unique kind of philosophical naturalism. One where,  
 
Every finite existence may be said to involve a polarizing of being 
into a focal point or center (which is not fixed, but progressively 
changing its character and trend) and a relatively more fixed field 
throughout which the energy involved plays (and which to this 
extent at least must be active). The thing existing is not the focus 
nor the field, but the total situation.44 
 
This brand of naturalism places a premium on the continuity between an object and 
its surroundings. Stated more precisely, it emphasizes the reciprocal relationship 
between a functioning “focus” and an emerging “field.” On such a view, the field is 
understood as partially constitutive of the way a particular focus functions, while at 
the same time, the sum total of all functioning foci constitutes that field. This is 
illustrated in the way that a change in one bird’s flight pattern can have a ripple 
effect on the entire flock.  
Just as physiology differs from anatomy in medicine, an emergent/functional 
philosophical naturalism differs from reductive/eliminativist models insofar as it 
asks why-questions rather than what-questions. And, just as expertise in anatomy 
without physiological understanding prevents the proper care for an organism’s 
health, so does reductionism without understanding of emergence and functionality 
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prevent a synoptic philosophical naturalism from being fully realized. Instead, we 
are left with a fragmented collection of theories. A full-bodied philosophical 
naturalism may very well prove to be the best therapy for the ills of humanity. In the 
following chapter, I will further examine the upshots of this type of philosophical 
naturalism, how it is preferable to the brands of naturalism recurrent in contemporary 
philosophy, and why it is the only form deserving of the name. As J.H. Randall, Jr. 
put it in his epilogue to Naturalism and the Human Spirit,  
Whatever the label, however, the major fact stands out: the “new” 
or “contemporary” naturalism these writers are exploring stands in 
fundamental opposition not only to the all forms of supernaturalism, 
but also to all types of reductionist thinking which up to this 
generation often arrogated to itself the adjective “naturalistic,” and 
still is suggested by it to the popular mind… the richness and 
variety of natural phenomena and human experience cannot be 
explained away and reduced to something else.45   
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Chapter Two: Scientistic vs. Humanistic Naturalism 
 
“Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms and categories. 
They are habits, predispositions, deeply ingrained attitudes of diversion and preference.”  
[John Dewey46]  
 
In the preceding chapter hope was expressed for the realization of a more 
synoptic naturalism that could offer an account of human life fully integrated in the 
natural world. Toward this end, it was suggested that a naturalism that adopts a 
strategy attentive to emergence and functionality within the natural realm would be 
most preferable. However, such claims run the risk of cutting too far in the other 
direction, wherein reductionism becomes “a dirty word, and a kind of ‘holistier [sic] 
than thou’ self-righteousness has become fashionable.”47 But, just as a physician 
who did not have an understanding of both anatomy and physiology would be an 
ineffective one, a naturalism that did not include both reductive and holistic 
strategies would be entirely useless. It may be helpful, then, to consider a distinction 
between a reasonable kind of reductionism that seeks to eliminate conceptual lacuna 
and theoretical appeals to mystery with the kind that rejects outright the Aristotelian 
notion that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts – a kind which Daniel 
Dennett calls “greedy reductionism.”48 As he puts it,  
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In their eagerness for a bargain, in their zeal to explain too much 
too fast, scientists and philosophers often underestimate the 
complexities, trying to skip whole layers or levels of theory in their 
rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the foundation. That 
is the sin of greedy reductionism, but notice that it is only when 
overzealousness leads to falsification of the phenomena that we 
should condemn it.49  
 
This line of reasoning often leads to the assertion that the methods of physics, 
chemistry and biology – or the classifications and objects recognized in these fields – 
form the only appropriate elements in understanding nature. The result is a 
naturalism that is too scientistic. 
The best example of a theory that is reductionist in a non-greedy way is 
Darwinian evolution, which reduced the complexity of life to an elegantly recursive 
process of genetic drift and natural selection. A particular species, on Darwin’s view, 
emerges from its journey through that process, rather than from some antecedent 
creative intelligence or principle. In this way, a creature’s form is shaped by its 
function; it is what it does. But, his idea does not stop there, for the form and 
function of any creature depends on the forms and functions of surrounding species. 
Darwin understood this type of interdependence early on, an instance of which is his 
prediction of the night-flying hawk moth (xanthopan morgani praedicta). As the 
now famous story goes, Darwin was studying the orchids of Madagascar when he 
surmised that there must be a moth endemic to the island that had a proboscis long 
enough to reach the nectar at the bottom of the spur of a type of comet orchid. This 
prediction was met with skepticism among his peers until 1903, twenty-one years 
after his death, when the hawk moth was discovered.50 This illustrates that a full 
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50 Cf. Stamos, David. Darwin and the Nature of Species. (SUNY, 2006) p. 246  
 42
understanding of evolution must include notions of functionality and emergence. As 
Dennett states, a “realistic fear is that the greedy abuse of Darwinian reasoning 
might lead us to deny the existence of real levels, real complexities, real 
phenomena.”51 In what follows I will trace the development of two major forms of 
naturalism in the United States, one that followed Darwinian reasoning and one that 
greedily abused it.   
The Development of Naturalism in the United States 
 
The elusiveness of the term naturalism in contemporary philosophy is a 
byproduct of several philosophical responses to the intellectual revolution of which 
On the Origin of Species was the climax. Prior to this, philosophy had been, in some 
way or another, conceived of as providing a foundation to the natural sciences. That 
both Aristotle and Descartes used the phrase “first philosophy” (albeit toward vastly 
different ends) to describe their work, speaks to the longevity of this idea. Of course, 
this notion had already begun to be challenged in English speaking countries even 
before Darwin, by the likes of David Hume, and on the continent in the work of 
Immanuel Kant. By the first half of the nineteenth century, nearly every American 
philosopher worked within a Humean, Kantian, or Hegelian framework. Even 
thinkers like Emerson and Thoreau, who were interested in studies of nature and 
who fancied themselves representatives of American intellectual independence, were 
largely beholden to European idealism and romanticism, and thus failed to realize a 
true naturalistic philosophy. Yet, after Darwin demystified the ascent of Aristotle’s 
rational animal from the primordial soup, philosophy’s “inquiry after absolute 
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origins and absolute finalities” seemed untenable and its relationship to science 
appeared irrevocably reversed.52 
In the United States, naturalism developed in three major waves. The first 
occurred just after the release of On the Origin of Species in 1859. The theoretical 
shift presented by Darwin was sharpened by an event in American history which 
provided ostensible proof that abstract ideas, if unchecked by practical implications, 
could wreak havoc on the real world, viz. the American Civil War. This led to two 
trends among young American intellectuals, of which the first was a greater push 
toward a suspicion of metaphysical speculation. The second was a renewed 
confidence in scientific method. The former marked the inception of American 
naturalism while the latter was the beginning of a school of thought known as 
pragmatism. Many of the leading thinkers in these two movements were involved in 
some way or another with a series of informal meetings that took place among young 
scholars in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1872. The group facetiously named itself 
“The Metaphysical Club” as a jab at American Hegelianism.  
For most of the thinkers who identified themselves with either or both of these 
camps, naturalism was viewed as a metaphysical position underwritten by a 
suspicion of dualistic ontology, whereas pragmatism was most often understood, 
though its main proponents sometimes disagreed about the specifics, as a method for 
making philosophical thinking relevant to concrete practice.53 In these ways, each 
line of reasoning was a reaction to products of enlightenment philosophy. Naturalism 
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aimed at meliorating the ontological questions that arose out of the impasse between 
rationalism and empiricism. On a naturalist’s view, rationalism failed because it 
could not account for how innate ideas and the a priori were knowable without 
making an appeal to some notion of perception. On the other hand, empiricism failed 
because it could not account for how a stream of sense datum provides intelligibility 
without positing some sort of mind. American naturalists of this period, influenced 
by Darwin, sought a way out of this dilemma by positing a more dynamic view of 
reality that emphasized the temporal aspects of the universe over the spatial ones. In 
this respect, it could be argued that Aristotelian and, to a lesser extent Kantian, 
themes were instrumental in the development of early American naturalism.  
Pragmatism shared a similar debt, although it was perhaps informed more by 
Kant than Aristotle. Of particular interest to the early pragmatists was Kant’s 
rejection of philosophy as the “queen of the sciences.” It is now a commonplace that 
C.S. Peirce (b. 1839), the recognized founder of pragmatism, expressly attributed the 
pragmatic method to Kant’s critical work. In an unpublished paper Peirce remarked, 
“Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused 
pragmatist.”54 An eminent scientist in his own right, Peirce’s primary concern was 
finding a scientific means of streamlining the acquisition of knowledge, and so for 
him pragmatism was first and foremost an epistemological method, but one always 
directed towards clarifying ontology. In a passage reminiscent of Aristotle’s claim in 
the Metaphysics that to know something truly is to know the “why” of it, Peirce 
advised:  
                                                 
54 Peirce, C.S. “Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism.” The Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce Vols. I-VI. Ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1931-1935) Vol. 5 p. 525 
 45
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, 
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the 
object.55  
 
This statement became known as “the pragmatic maxim” and illustrated how 
Peirce’s version of pragmatism was primarily a criterion for rigorously clarifying 
concepts.  
Neither Peirce nor William James, who helped bring Peirce’s thought to a more 
general audience, could properly be called a naturalist, however. It was not until the 
work of their successors – John Dewey and George Herbert Mead – that the 
ontological upshots of naturalism would be wedded to the epistemological insights 
of pragmatism.56 Dewey and Mead taught together at the Universities of Michigan 
and Chicago from 1891 to 1904 and helped found what is now known as the 
“Chicago school” of pragmatism, but, it was their shared interest in naturalistic 
explanations that really brought the two of them together. Dewey came to his 
naturalism through the neo-Hegelianism of George Sylvester Morris, his teacher at 
Johns Hopkins. Morris’ brand of Hegelianism was unique in that it rejected the 
dialectic of Geist in favor of a more biological description of the dynamism of 
nature. In other words, the traditional “subject” in epistemology became redefined as 
an organism fully immersed in and interacting with a dynamic, organic environment 
– i.e. one that incorporates the organism. This move, which was vital to Dewey’s 
later thought, came to Morris from his University of Berlin mentor F. A. 
Trendelenburg, who had been sharply influenced by Aristotle’s notion of εντελέχια 
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and Darwin’s theory of evolution. Trendelenburg synthesized these two ideas into 
what he called “constructive motion” which he saw as the common link between 
thought and being. On one hand, thought moves from potentiality to actuality, per 
Aristotle, as it becomes the object that is thought, on the other hand, being moves 
from potentiality to actuality, per Darwin, through natural selection. This reading 
renders the notion of telos a type of biological end in both organisms and nature at 
large.57 Dewey’s teacher, Morris, in turn, appropriated these ideas in his own work 
as he aimed at detailing the meaning of existence and the undermining of dualisms. 
Mead’s naturalism was crafted during his time abroad at the University of 
Leipzig, where he studied primarily under the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt. From 
Wundt, Mead learned that psychology should be approached as a science of 
“actuality and potentiality acting upon the organism from within itself.”58 This is 
what Mead called having and “inside.” The outside, on the other hand, is contingent 
upon the social and environmental matrices in which the organism finds itself 
immersed. Mind, on such an account, arises from the interaction of an organism with 
its surroundings; hence, Mead claimed that consciousness was a social matter.   
Dewey and Mead eventually dropped the term pragmatism in reference to their 
own work, Dewey preferring to call his thought instrumentalism, while Mead called 
his interactionism. When Dewey left Chicago for Columbia in 1904, both thinkers 
were emphasizing the naturalistic elements of their systems over and above the 
pragmatic ones. It was at Columbia that this form of naturalism seemed to take hold. 
There, Dewey joined Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, who had studied at Berlin after 
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Trendelenburg’s death but shared a similar affinity for Aristotelian thought. He 
described his naturalism as “a synthesis of Aristotle and Spinoza, tempered by 
Locke's empiricism.”59 Together, Dewey and Woodbridge helped solidify naturalism 
as a school of thought and influenced several generations of self-proclaimed 
naturalists, including John Herman Randall, Sidney Hook, Ernest Nagel, Herbert 
Schneider and Justus Buchler. Though it would be inaccurate to suggest that these 
thinkers shared a completely unified vision, what held them together was: 1) a 
shared acceptance of non-reductive realism, 2) a confidence in scientific method for 
yielding reliable knowledge and 3) an assertion of continuities among all realities. 
When taken together, these premises amount to a form of naturalism that could be 
called pragmatic naturalism (though only a handful of its proponents would assent to 
both) because it holds that genuine concepts are those that yield scientific gains for 
the improvement of human life. As such, the naturalism shared by these thinkers 
operated simultaneously as an ontological, epistemological and ethical position.  
The next wave of naturalism came to America from the British revolt against 
idealism exemplified in the “new realism” of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. 
Russell’s realism, which held that only scientific entities were genuine, was more 
reductive than that of many American naturalists of the period. He claimed that all 
statements about the world, including mathematical ones, were reducible to formal 
logic. This was the inception of a new analytic style of philosophy and was one of 
the corner stones of the “linguistic turn” that occurred in Anglo-American 
philosophy during the middle of the twentieth century. Similarly, Moore held that 
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complex concepts could best be understood by breaking them into simpler parts. As 
he wrote, “A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed [sic] into its 
constituent concepts.”60 
This led Moore to claim in his Principia Ethica that value was not open to 
analysis. According to him, the concept of good is an indefinable, non-natural one, 
and any attempt to reduce it to naturalistic terms committed what he called the 
“naturalistic fallacy.” In his words,  
Good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong 
to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any 
definition, in the most important sense of that word. The most 
important sense of definition is that in which a definition states 
what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in 
this sense good has no definition because it is simple and has no 
parts… And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are 
those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But 
far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those 
other properties they were actually defining good; that these 
properties, in fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and 
entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the 
naturalistic fallacy and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.61 
 
Moore’s ethical non-naturalism, coupled with Russell’s logical realism, undercut 
many of the presuppositions of the earlier pragmatic naturalism and led many to 
reject the notions of morality and continuity ascribed to it. Many took Moore’s 
thought to be a more precise expression of Hume’s is-ought distinction in A Treatise 
of Human Nature, which is often called “the guillotine.” Prima facie, the similarities 
seems obvious, as one of Hume’s passages reads,  
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In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I 
am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same 
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it.62 
 
Many Anglo-American thinkers took the combination of these views to be 
incontrovertible evidence for a real distinction between facts and values. But, in 
actuality these positions are incommensurable. On the one hand, Moore’s Open 
Question argument takes a foundationalist approach because he believed “good” was 
a simple concept that could not be further analyzed. On the other hand, Hume’s 
approach was anti-foundational insofar as he believed any foundations for ought 
statements would be ultimately unknowable and thus he posited the contingent habits 
of community approbation and censure as the crux morality.63 Moreover, such 
comparisons of Moore to Hume fail to take into account Moore’s declaration that, 
“The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of 
its parts.”64 This suggests that Moore understood, at least in principle, the idea that a 
whole could be more than the sum of its parts, a key component in the notion of 
emergence. Nevertheless, the influx of British ideas led to a more piecemeal 
naturalism that depended on reductive analysis.  
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The stage was set, and when the United States became the new home for 
European academics seeking refuge from Nazi internment camps, Anglo-American 
thought received its third wave of naturalism. This brand of naturalism was closely 
tied to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the young Wittgenstein. This 
school of thought, like Hume before them, argued that metaphysical statements were 
meaningless and thus sought to eliminate from philosophical discourse any statement 
that was not “verifiable” through empirical inquiry. When added to Moore’s work, 
this view led to the idea that human behavior could be studied scientifically as a 
system of mechanical impulses and responses. The behaviorism of Skinner, which 
sought to exclude subjective introspection as unjustifiable and focus on physically 
mechanistic explanations, is one result. Although later American thinkers like 
W.V.O. Quine and Thomas Kuhn would make assaults on the assumptions of this 
form of naturalism, what was retained even in their criticisms was the view that 
philosophy was reducible or subservient – like a “handmaiden” – to the natural 
sciences.  
While each wave of naturalism discussed above successfully navigated 
between the Charybdis of skepticism and the Scylla of idealism in its own way, the 
two later versions tended to trade one set of problems for another. On the one hand, 
the logical atomism of Russell et al does indeed overcome the denaturalization of 
experience brought on by the language of experience of Modernity, but it does little 
or nothing to disabuse philosophy from the mechanistic view of reality that the 
language of experience created. On the other hand, the verification principle of the 
positivists lays out a rigorous litmus test for what counts as evidence for any claim, 
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but when taken to its conclusion, it appears as though the only unassailable 
statements are those of physics, chemistry, and biology. What is left when one takes 
either or both of these lines of thought seriously is the belief that the methods of 
natural science, or the classifications and objects recognized in natural science form 
the only appropriate elements of any philosophical inquiry. Again, Daniel Dennett 
has bemoaned the scientism that resulted from this kind of “greedy reductionism,” 
which he sees has consequence of a rush to fasten everything to foundations.65  
Avoiding the short shrift of theoretical complexity was a primary concern 
under the more traditional vintage of naturalism. On their account, nature is a 
broader philosophical concept than existence and is therefore not the exclusive 
dominion of natural science. As Roy Wood Sellars wrote in 1927, 
Materialism is distinctly an ontological theory, a theory of the stuff of 
reality. Its polar opposite is usually taken to be mentalism of some kind. 
Naturalism, on the other hand, is a cosmological position; its opposite is 
supernaturalism in the larger meaning of that term. I mean that 
naturalism takes nature in a definite way as identical with reality, as 
self-sufficient and as the whole of reality. And by nature is meant the 
space-time-causal system which is studied by science and in which our 
lives are passed. The whole nature of nature may not be exhaustively 
known, but its location and general characteristics come under the 
above categories.66 
 
Rather than taking nature to be comprised exclusively of matter or merely of that 
which can be perceived, it would be preferable here to think of nature as a closed 
system, i.e. a complex, of interrelated elements comprising a unified whole, within 
which the totality of causal relations must be restricted to the natural realm. Of 
course, it could be the case that there are non-natural entities, and on such a topic the 
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naturalist would have to remain silent, but on such a view there can be no super-
natural entities in the sense of a non-natural subject or object with causal efficacy 
over that which is natural. 
The difference, then, between the scientistic, epistemically-centered naturalism 
en vogue today and the naturalism advanced by that first wave of thinkers can be 
understood as turning on four central theses. They are:    
1 Natural phenomena have objectively determinable traits. 
2 The traits of natural phenomena are knowable. 
3 The process of inquiry is necessarily conditioned and perspectival. 
4 Human interaction with the rest of nature, cognitive or otherwise, is active 
and creative.67 
 
The American naturalists of old subscribed to all four of these statements, whereas 
newer forms of naturalism hold only to the first two. Many public intellectuals in the 
sciences (figures like Steven Weinberg, Alan Sokal, and Richard Dawkins) have 
publicly denounced defenders of the latter two statements and philosophical 
naturalists of the more recent stripe have embraced this condemnation. Conversely, 
post-modern theorists in the humanities and literary criticism (e.g. Bruno Latour, 
Alan Bloom, and Steve Fuller) have publicly rejected the former two theses. This 
division often leads to the kind of mistrust and “speaking past one another” among 
scientists and humanities professors of which the “Science Wars” of the nineteen-
nineties is a prime example. The naturalism of the first wave variety would not have 
run up against such a problem because it saw scientific inquiry as occurring from 
within the complex of nature. While this older naturalism employed science, it 
would not have invoked the kind of greedy reductionism that Dennett decries, nor 
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would it have run in the other direction to propose, as many postmodern thinkers 
have, that everything must be interpretation, “all the way down.”68 As one first wave 
naturalist, Morris R Cohen, put it: "Science is a flickering light in our darkness, but it 
is the only one we have and woe to him who would put it out.” 
Humanistic Naturalism 
Implicit in a view that accepts all four theses is the assumed continuity between 
intelligence and nature. Nature is intelligible not by virtue of some intelligent 
creator, or some ghost in the machine, or even because of some primordial set of 
principles, but rather because the process of life’s trials and tribulations have 
rendered it so. Knowledge is redefined under such a view as what satisfies a need 
and reference to disembodied reason is supplanted by embodied intellection. On this 
view, there is not a sharp delineation between propositional knowledge (episteme), 
intuitive understanding (noesis) and practical wisdom (phronesis). Inquiry, then, is 
not a retreat to a “view from nowhere,” but rather an integrated part of experience 
that seeks to maximize commerce with one’s surroundings. Mentalism and 
subjectivism vanish under such a view, and consciousness is seen as a function of 
biological survival in the same sense as digestion or respiration.  
The logical extension of such an idea leads to the prospect that human beings 
are continuous with their surroundings, that they are experiencing fields immersed 
within an environing field.69 In other words, they are always already “in the soup.”70 
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This type of polarity, wherein human experience and the environing world are seen 
as two sides of the same realm, flies in the face of many of the dualisms of the 
Western philosophical canon – particularly that of mind and body. The main 
assumption undergirding these dualisms is the notion of “substance.” The classical 
American naturalists rejected this notion and, in its stead, posited an ontological 
position hinged upon concepts like process, field, and complex.71 At the bottom of 
these is the view that reality has a relational quality, that all things are co-
constitutive. But, theirs was an ontology that went beyond the Anaxagoran claim that 
“everything is in everything,” because it was informed by Darwinian insights and 
required no appeal to νόος as an organizing principle.      
In terms of method, this suggests that the social sciences, arts and humanities 
fill in our understanding of natural processes in ways that physics, chemistry and 
biology cannot account for on their own. According to the naturalist, science should 
be understood as just one more type of human behavior. As such, it is fallible and the 
truths it renders probabilities, not absolutes. Hypotheses are instrumental insofar as 
they function in inquiry as a means of overcoming some difficulty, whether practical 
or theoretical, and are to be judged by their consequences. In this way, science takes 
on an inter-subjective element, wherein the community of inquirers determine the 
warrant of hypotheses based on how they match up with repeated observational data. 
Hypotheses, therefore, remain on permanent probation in the face of the possibility 
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of counter-evidence. Yet, in accepting this we need not reject the “central aim of 
science… to discover laws and causal connections” among natural phenomena.72 
This nomothetic aspect of science is essential for making accurate predictions and 
without it the entire practice would break down. However, this function of science 
should not lead us to the mistaken notion that naming some object or behavior fixes 
it permanently. Rather, these “laws” serve as guideposts for further inquiry, not 
unassailable rules closed to possible revision.  
Building upon this assertion, this kind of naturalism sees meaning and 
language as contextual, revisable and intimate. Language is tied to experience and 
conduct and is therefore continuous with the other biosocial processes that bring us 
into closer contact with the world around us. This is where the early American 
naturalists were most significantly influenced by pragmatism. Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim had showed them that meaning was inherently instrumental. However, 
without some kind of anchor in the real world, this maxim treads precariously close 
to a kind of crass opportunism, wherein something is only meaningful or “true” if it 
works. The “linguistic turn” of the mid-twentieth century was precipitated by 
thinkers like Quine, Wilfrid Sellars and Donald Davidson who adopted a view 
similar to this in their assault on the correspondence pictures of language introduced 
by Russell and the positivists. Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism is a direct result, 
wherein everything is regarded as mere metaphor and the task of the philosopher is 
to create ways of speaking that direct culture toward their ends – whatever those 
may be. The first wave naturalists, and Peirce too, would have balked at a claim that 
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subverts ontology in favor of semantics. Under the naturalist view, ontology and 
semantics are continuous and the crude, contemporary representation of the 
pragmatic mantra as “truth is what works” would have to be inverted. Rather, a 
statement “works” if it is meaningful; like a hypothesis, its truth is discovered only 
after it is tested. But “to work” in the sense that the early naturalists and their 
pragmatist counterparts understood it was not a minimalist concept. Instead, they 
claimed that a statement was most meaningful and truest when its result settled a 
need with as little blowback or collateral damage as possible. Truth, by this account, 
is something that lies at the end of inquiry, not at its beginning. 
Likewise, no action is ever antecedently true. We find its truth only in a fully 
retrospective act of inquiry grounded in the context of the environment. What this 
means for ethics, accordingly, is that an agent should be in the practice of building 
up a repertoire of actions that are repeatable – just as the best experiments are 
repeatable. In other words, the naturalists believed that if human beings observe, 
through experimentation, what actions are best, they will be in a position to form 
"good laboratory habits." As Dewey explained it, in his Democracy and Education 
(1916), responding to the uncertainty of a problematic situation is brought about by 
the desire, which all organisms share, to alleviate indeterminacy. This “natural” way 
of dealing with the facts that arise in a problematic situation is always in terms of 
value, i.e. these facts either have positive or negative value with regard to escaping 
indeterminacy. According to the naturalist, value is a product of this type of inquiry. 
There is nothing – no fact, object, or entity – that has “intrinsic” value prior to 
whatever purpose commerce between the experiencing and environing fields has 
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brought to the table.73 In short, the naturalists saw no need to institute a firm 
distinction between facts and values; instead, they suggested the difference be 
viewed as one of degree, not of kind. 
In this way, the moral philosophy of the first wave naturalists was unique. For 
them the most basic units of ethical evaluation were moral characters – understood 
only as repertoires of good laboratory habits – rather than individual ethical 
decisions. They rejected the “big moment ethics” of the Moderns in favor of a moral 
philosophy centered on notions of self-realization and self-fulfillment that harkened 
back to the Ancients. Moral life, on this view, consists in the cultivation of both 
public and private virtues toward the mutual flourishing of an individual, her 
community, and the natural world. It is simply life, in general – wherein ethical 
decisions do not occur in series, but in chorus. In other words, morality reflects 
ontology insofar as it is digital, not analog; many inputs can often lead to only one 
output, and vice versa.74 In this way, these thinkers turned their backs on the 
theoretical discreteness in much of the Western ethical tradition, a tradition wherein 
self-realization was reinterpreted as avoidance of sin, and ethics was believed to 
have little or nothing to say about life between ethical dilemmas. The trouble is, 
when this traditional approach is followed to its conclusion, it seems these 
theoretical lacuna leave us with “an ethical free-play zone, in which one can do 
whatever one likes.”75   
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In summary, the general features of naturalism as it was expressed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by figures like Dewey, Mead, Woodbridge, 
and their cohorts could be expressed in terms of five continuities: 
1. Noetic Continuity (no rift between intelligence and the intelligibility of nature) 
2. Ontological Continuity  (commitment to mobility of being through process) 
3. Theoretical Continuity (science seen as fallible and progressive)  
4. Semantic Continuity (language and meaning continuous with biosocial 
processes) 
5. Axiological Continuity (no sharp division between facts and values)76 
 
Together, these five theses point toward a view of experience as a product of 
interaction with the world, not as perception. Experiences are “had” only in the same 
sense as scars or habits. Simply put, experience is wholly organic and contiguous 
with nature. In this respect, human beings are responsible for shaping their own 
experiences – i.e. it is up to them to make the types of inquiries which yield the most 
successful and universally applicable habits. The first wave naturalists would likely 
have assented to Kant’s claim that: 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding 
without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed 
when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of 
resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere 
Aude! [dare to know] "Have courage to use your own 
understanding!"--that is the motto of enlightenment.77  
 
This type of philosophical outlook, which posits the ability, dignity and worth of all 
people, is often referred to as “humanism.” One further distinction may be of service 
here, however, viz. that between the saeculum and the aeternum. The former 
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indicates the duration of a lifetime, while the latter indicates eternity. The type of 
humanism that is relevant to naturalism is of a secular variety insofar as it rejects 
transcendent, eternal explanations. Thus, the brand of naturalism at the heart of this 
analysis may, most appropriately, be called “humanistic naturalism.” This 
philosophy suggests that it is only from beneath the great security blanket of 
ignorance that the secular view of nature appears so frightening.78 
Two Examples of Humanistic Naturalism 
 
Humanistic naturalism may generally be defined as the view that “human 
affairs, associative and personal, are projections, continuations, complications, of the 
nature which exists in the physical and pre-human world. There is no gulf, no two 
spheres of existence, no ‘bifurcation’.”79 This was the way John Dewey described 
his naturalism, and according to Hu Shih, a preeminent Chinese philosopher of the 
20th century, this outlook was endemic to China as well. As he put it,  
Our [China’s] first great philosopher was a founder of naturalism; 
and our second great philosopher was an agnostic… Laotze [sic.] 
and Confucius were teachers of a naturalistic attitude toward 
religion. The former taught us to follow the course of nature; the 
latter, to abide by fate.80 
 
Those already familiar with American philosophy during that period may not be 
surprised to find that Hu Shih earned his philosophy doctorate at Columbia 
University, under the tutelage of John Dewey. 
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There are a multitude of reasons for making an inquiry into the similarities 
between Dewey and Chinese thought. Most generally, as Wing-Tsit Chan once 
noted, 
If one word could characterize the entire history of Chinese 
philosophy, that word would be humanism – not the humanism that 
denies or slights a Supreme Power, but one that professes the unity 
of man and Heaven. In this sense, humanism has dominated 
Chinese thought from the dawn of its history.81 
 
While Daoism retains the general humanistic tenor of the other three major Chinese 
schools of thought – Confucianism, Moism, and Legalism – its emphasis on 
harmonizing with nature is perhaps its most notable contribution to Chinese thought. 
And, of the major daoist thinkers, Zhuangzi’s view is the most radically naturalistic 
of any Chinese figure.  
A comparison between Dewey and Zhuangzi has historical significance insofar 
as each lived during a time of political turmoil. Dewey’s life spanned from just 
before the American Civil War to just after World War II, while Zhuangzi lived 
during one of the most war torn epochs in China’s long and often bloody history. 
The writings of each seem geared toward an audience making its way through 
tumultuous times – i.e. each offered a philosophy born out of crisis. This link is even 
more important in light of the time Dewey spent in China from 1919 to 1921. But, 
the possibility of practical application is the best reason for choosing these two 
thinkers. Since each offered a model for how to develop human potential through 
attunement with one’s surroundings that had deep ramifications on their cultural and 
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political milieus, this aspect of their writings might have ramifications for our own 
tumultuous times.   
The view of the world that each thinker advanced was steeped in tradition. By 
the time Dewey was writing, naturalism – which could trace its ancestry to the time 
before Socrates – had been torn asunder and repaired so many times that the name 
was nearly meaningless. And, while Dewey and others, like G. Santayana, F. 
Woodbridge and J. H. Randall, Jr., attempted to reconnect the philosophical 
terminology with its roots, it should come as no surprise that today there are so many 
strains of thought bearing the same name. In the East, Zhuangzi built upon the 
cosmology of the Yì jīng [易經] (the “Book of Changes”), the practical humanism of 
Confucius, and the mysticism of dàojiā [道家] (the school of the Way) to form a 
philosophy that emphasized being “at ease” with nature. The overarching 
theme found in both Dewey's and Zhuangzi's philosophy is that human 
understanding and nature reside on a continuum, actuated in an evolutionary-like 
process wherein inquiry can break the crust of convention and promote collective 
flourishing.
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Chapter Three: Dewey’s Naturalism – The Live Creature 
 
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous 
system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy. And 
when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but as events are in 
history, in a moving, growing never finished process. [John Dewey82] 
 
John Dewey was born in Vermont, to a Burlington grocer and his wife in 1859, 
the same year that Darwin’s On the Origin of Species was published. This is an 
interesting coincidence insofar as Dewey was the American naturalist to make the 
most use of Darwinian evolution in his own work. He believed that Darwin, 
“introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of 
knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics, and religion.”83 Dewey saw 
this as a revolution of Copernican magnitudes – one in which human reason would 
no longer be seen as the center of gravity in moral and epistemological queries, or 
the crowning achievement in metaphysics. As he put it,  
A philosophy that humbles its pretensions to the work of projecting 
hypotheses… is thereby subjected to test by the way in which the 
ideas it propounds work out in practice. In having modesty forced 
upon it, philosophy also acquires responsibility.84 
 
With the publication of nearly 600 articles, 30 original book-length 
manuscripts and innumerable reviews, syllabi, and encyclopedia entries, Dewey is 
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one of the most fertile minds ever to hail from the United States.85 Many regard 
Dewey as one of the most notable ‘philosophers’ this country has ever produced, 
though he would have probably rejected that title in favor of being seen as an 
“intellectual-at-large.” Dewey was a world philosopher – in two senses of that 
phrase. Unlike most philosophers, his work was internationally heralded even during 
his lifetime. He also spent a great deal of time and resources lecturing in Europe, 
Latin America, the Middle East and the Far East. He would often assert that it was a 
philosopher’s responsibility to be just as concerned with public issues as she was 
with esoteric ones. The most succinct expression of this sentiment can be found in 
the oft-quoted passage from his “The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy” (1917): 
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing 
with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, 
cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.86 
 
It is this insistence on practicality that has been a main cause for including 
Dewey’s work among the philosophical school known as “pragmatism.” This, 
however, may be a misnomer.  Since, as A.O. Lovejoy pointed out in his infamous 
send up of “The Thirteen Pragmatisms” (1908), nearly every philosopher believes, to 
some degree or another, that philosophy should have practical consequences. And, 
when most philosophers hold such a belief, we are left to wonder what difference it 
makes to call someone a “pragmatist.”87 Although Dewey identified himself with the 
likes of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James early in his career, it is perhaps 
unfortunate that Dewey adopted the designations they made for their thought. In 
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spite of whatever debts his thought owes to pragmatism (which are no doubt 
substantial) the liberal use of that moniker by Dewey scholars since, has led to the 
gross mischaracterization and over-simplification of his contribution. Late in life, 
Dewey himself seemed remorseful of this connection, as he wrote in a letter to 
Corliss Lamont,  
I have come to think of my own position as cultural or humanistic 
Naturalism – Naturalism, properly interpreted seems to me a more 
adequate term than Humanism. Of course I have always limited my 
use of "instrumentalism" t[o] my theory of thinking and knowledge; 
the word pragmatism I have used very little, and then with 
reserves.88 
   
Regardless of whether or not Dewey’s thought should be considered pragmatic, 
he certainly took the role of public intellectual seriously. In fact, he commented so 
often on popular issues that, by the end of his career, a public controversy was by 
and large considered unsettled until Dewey had weighed in on it. His more notable 
public ventures included: presiding over the Leon Trotsky hearings in Mexico, 
collaboration on the founding of the NAACP, sponsorship of the ACLU, and serving 
as president of the national teachers union. Though he was considered the foremost 
intellectual in the country when he was alive, very few understood his philosophical 
position, even in academic circles.  
With this in mind, it should be noted at the outset that any attempt to 
summarize such a prodigious body of work would prove extremely difficult. Yet, if 
one were pressed to give such a concise account, Dewey’s emphasis on the 
continuity of nature with human experience would be the best point of departure. 
For, there is an unmistakable tendency to offer philosophical explanations rooted in 
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natural and social patterns, running throughout most of his writings. This lifelong 
inclination is probably most overt, as Richard Bernstein has pointed out, in 
compositions from the last thirty years of Dewey’s life.89 While others have tried to 
give a unified account of Dewey’s thought, it is Bernstein’s claim that Dewey’s 
work should be divided into three distinct periods – viz. the idealistic, the 
experimental and the naturalistic – that has been adopted by the rest of the scholarly 
community at large, as evidenced by the subsequent division of his collected 
writings into “Early,” “Middle,” and “Late” works. Bernstein has recommended that 
the appearance of Dewey’s Experience and Nature (1925) be recognized as the 
beginning of his final, naturalistic period. And, by designating that volume as the 
first of seventeen in Dewey’s “Later Works,” the press at Southern Illinois 
University, which has gathered and published Dewey’s collected writings since 
1972, has solidified this view.  
However, the antecedents to Dewey’s alleged “shift” in emphasis are 
perceptible in several of Dewey’s manuscripts and lectures from the years leading up 
to the release of Experience and Nature. Thus, Bernstein’s insight may be as 
misleading as it has been instructive. After all, it is rare when any thinker’s work can 
be so neatly packaged, and often the lines of classification are arbitrarily drawn over 
an otherwise unbroken series of life events in the name of convenience. In order to 
avoid the confusions that can arise from this kind of rigid classification, it may be 
helpful to look at the developments in Dewey’s thought before his so-called shift. 
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One significant feature of this period is that Dewey spent a great deal of time abroad, 
particularly in the Far East. 
The “Subject-Matter” of Philosophy 
 
Dewey was certainly not the first philosopher to stress the importance of 
experience to philosophical study; he was not even the first with pragmatist leanings 
to do so. In fact, both Peirce and James believed experience played a vital role in the 
application of the pragmatic method. In “The Development of American 
Pragmatism,” Dewey attributed the origin of pragmatism to a passage in Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals, happened upon by Peirce, wherein,  
Kant established a distinction between pragmatic and practical. The 
latter term applies to moral laws which Kant regards as a priori, 
whereas the former term applies to the rules of art and technique which 
are based on experience and are applicable to experience.90 
 
As Dewey rightly pointed out, experience was a crucial element in pragmatic 
thought. But, when Dewey used the word experience in his own writings, he meant 
something different than the earlier pragmatists. Any analysis of Dewey’s notion of 
experience, however, must start from an explication of these positions, for it was 
Peirce’s idea that applicability is crucial to meaning and James’ sentiment that 
philosophical quandaries are often differences of perspective that were the greatest 
influences on Dewey’s thought. 
On the one hand, Peirce – whose pragmatism was based on realism and a 
commitment to the clarification of concepts – saw experience as a litmus test for 
clarity. On his account, if an object or idea can be dealt with in everyday experience, 
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then it has passed muster for some minimal type of clarity. Likewise, if a definition 
of it can be given in abstraction from any particular experience, then it is even 
clearer. Finally, if its practical effects are understood in such a way that it can be 
used intelligently to improve everyday experiences, then it has fulfilled the 
pragmatic maxim and is clearest. These three levels boil down to a tripartite 
distinction between familiarity, lexical knowledge, and applicability. In this way, 
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim came very close to the verificationism of the positivists, 
and his notion of experience operated mostly in the sense of empirical observation.91 
Like Peirce, William James hoped to identify philosophical investigation with 
an “empiricist attitude” that “unstiffens” theories and sets inquiry “at work” within 
the stream of one’s experience.92 He dubbed his position “radical empiricism” and 
wrote, contra Peirce, that for those who would adopt it “the crudity of experience 
remains an eternal element [of the world] thereof. There is no possible point of view 
from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact.”93 Simply put, where 
Peirce was a realist who saw raw sensory input as a starting point for knowledge, 
James was a nominalist who believed that sense data is something we cannot get 
behind, i.e. experience is all we have and there is nothing real outside of it. And, 
although James’ view of experience was broader in scope than Peirce had originally 
seen it, it was based on a similar rejection of the Cartesian view that saw experience 
as the locus of interaction between the objective world and the subjective perceiver – 
a distinction Dewey also rejected. As Dewey put it, 
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What has been completely divided in philosophical discourse into 
man and world, inner and outer, self and not-self, subject and 
object, individual and social, private and public, etc. are actually 
parties in life-transactions. The philosophical ‘problem’ of trying to 
get them back together is artificial.94 
 
But, Dewey went beyond Peirce and James insofar as he saw experience not merely 
as “the first step toward genuine knowledge,” à la Peirce, nor simply a useful tool 
for “settling metaphysical disputes,” per James, but rather, as the entire subject 
matter of philosophy. He hoped that he could save philosophy from itself by 
removing the various artifices of dualism and, in this regard, his work on experience 
could be seen as a type of “prolegomena” to any future epistemology. Thus, what 
Dewey meant by the term “experience” differed significantly from the various ways 
his predecessors and contemporaries had used it, i.e. as the influx of sensory data.  
In several of his early essays, Dewey laid the foundation for the more robust 
interpretation of experience, exemplified by Experience and Nature (1925) and Art 
as Experience (1934), which he hoped would redeem the term by having it “returned 
to its idiomatic usages.”95 But here, idiom is not tantamount to vulgarity or 
simplicity. Rather, Dewey sought a return to thinking about experience in less 
dissected, philosophically abstract terms. Terms that could avoid many of the 
conceptual eddies that had plagued philosophy for centuries. For him, the progress of 
philosophy had been obstructed by those eddies, and he hoped to reconstruct it by 
reminding us “that philosophy must not be a study of philosophy, but a study, by 
means of philosophy, of life-experience and our beliefs about and in this 
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experience.”96 In short, Dewey returned, through a Darwinian lens, the notion of 
experience to its Greek roots, conceived of as that which emerged out of the trials of 
life. 
Dewey’s life project was aimed at this goal, and he sought to accomplish it by 
showing how experience is inextricably linked with the context of nature. By his 
lights, experience sets the stage for understanding nature, i.e. a proper illustration of 
experience can disclose or “lay bare” natural frameworks. Of course, in order to 
demonstrate such a thesis, more clarification of Dewey’s account of experience and 
what he meant by the term nature are needed. I am confident that once these 
concepts are clear, we will see that experience is best understood as the opening up, 
or engendering, of contextual transactions with nature. However, first it may be 
helpful to recount some of the major movements in Dewey’s thought that led to the 
development of the first measure of his naturalism, i.e. the recasting of intelligibility 
in terms of the interaction between organisms and environments.   
Reforming and Transforming Experience 
 
When it came to the notion of experience, Dewey could be seen as a type of 
reformer, in the fullest sense of the term – someone who wants to return to the 
original form or to re-form something for the needs of a particular time. While his 
account of experience could be characterized as a decisive break from previous 
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outlooks, as illustrated above, it did not arise in a vacuum. Throughout his lengthy 
career, Dewey absorbed many different views, including Kantian criticism and 
Hegelian idealism, German romanticism, and British empiricism. Even in his later 
years, he would tackle any new idea with great enthusiasm, and proved adept at 
gleaning much from foreign schools of thought. However, the last twenty-five years 
of his life, the period in which he most completely conveyed his mature naturalism, 
moved beyond any single influence. Briefly stated, Dewey’s naturalism hinged upon 
the notion that human beings can best be understood through their relationships with 
their surroundings. The upshot of this is the belief that thought and action are two 
parts of a single process and that “mind” and “world” name philosophical 
abstractions rather than existent entities. As he put it, “The nature of experience is 
determined by the essential conditions of life. While man is other than bird and 
beast, he shares basic vital functions with them and has to make the same basal 
adjustments if he is to continue the process of living.”97 In what follows, I sketch 
some of the major developments in Dewey’s thinking towards this position.   
Dewey first came to naturalism through an epistemological lens. As an 
undergraduate at the University of Vermont, Dewey had been impressed with Kant’s 
philosophy. His earliest publication, “The Metaphysical Assumptions of 
Materialism”(1882), reflected the Kantian tendency to convert metaphysical 
problems to epistemological ones when he criticized materialists for being logically 
inconsistent, viz. that “They claim to possess a certain kind of knowledge, but are 
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unable to explain the derivation of that knowledge on a strictly materialistic basis.”98 
However, Dewey soon began to move beyond this affinity for epistemologically 
grounded philosophy when he was introduced to Hegel as a graduate student at 
Johns Hopkins University. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the Hegelianism 
he received there was fused with Darwinism. Dewey would echo this biologized 
Hegelianism of Trendelenberg-cum-Morris more than forty years later in Experience 
and Nature, with passages such as,  
If we consider the form or scheme of the situation in which meaning 
and understanding occur, we find an involved simultaneous 
presence and cross-reference of immediacy and efficiency, overt 
actuality and potentiality, the consummatory and instrumental.99 
 
During these early stages in his career, Dewey’s move from Kant to Hegel can best 
be characterized as a shift from epistemology to ontology. The difference is the way 
he dealt with the relationship between mind and world, viz. a shift from a dualistic 
view to a more holistic one. 
In 1903, Dewey published Studies in Logical Theory, which is commonly 
taken to be his definitive break from idealism toward experimentalism. However, the 
foundations for this volume were worked out gradually over the course of the 
preceding years teaching at the University of Michigan as Hegelianism less 
captivated Dewey. The two largest contributing factors in Dewey’s empirical turn 
were his work at Johns Hopkins with the psychologist G. Stanley Hall, who showed 
him how scientific analysis could be applied to the humanities, and his later 
collaboration with J.H. Tufts at Michigan. Dewey left Michigan to join Tufts at the 
                                                 
98 Boisvert, Raymond. Dewey’s Metaphysics. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988) p. 17 
99 EN, LW 1:143 
 72
University of Chicago and it was there that he developed a philosophical approach 
that coalesced a pragmatic psychology with his Darwinian leanings, viz. 
instrumentalism. Over the following ten years, Dewey flourished in this environment 
as he worked out – alongside his colleague G.H. Mead – the implications of 
combining Peirce’s pragmatism, James’ radical empiricism and Darwinian evolution 
with a scientific approach. Briefly stated, the upshot of combining these three 
schools of thought was that while nature was in constant change, human beings 
could still act in their environment by testing their beliefs and adapting them 
according to environmental needs. 
Dewey’s work is unique insofar as it took these already established ideas, 
assimilated them with others, and built upon them an outlook that, when understood 
properly, coalesced the seemingly disparate functions of experience, inquiry, and 
learning. In other words, Dewey saw no rift between experience and knowledge. As 
such, it could be argued, his mature view of experience (exemplified by Experience 
and Nature and Art as Experience) aimed at giving insight into what it means to be 
alive. Furthermore, when it came to the intelligibility of nature, Dewey saw no need 
for antecedent principles, nor for final ends. Instead, he argued that intelligibility was 
a product of a situation, i.e. a transaction between an organism and its surroundings. 
As he put,  
The situation as such in short is taken for granted. It is not stated or 
expressed. It is implicit, not explicit. Yet it supplies meaning to all 
that is stated, pointed out, named. Its presence makes the difference 
between sanity and insanity. We may say if we will that it is 
ignored. But the ignoring is not the ignorance of denial. Ignoring 
means "understood," assumed as a matter of course as the 
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background and foreground which gives intelligibility and state-
ability to what is explicit, expressly pointed out.100   
 
Two early essays in particular laid the foundation for the noetic continuity Dewey’s 
view held between intelligence and the intelligibility of nature.  
When the first of these essays, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” 
appeared in 1896, it marked “one of the truly important turning points in the study of 
human behavior.”101 There, Dewey attacked the mechanistic view of stimulus and 
response that dominated the psychological research of the period. On his view, the 
reflex arc concept only mimicked an older, and erroneous, mind-body dualism by 
placing stimulus in opposition to response. He wrote,  
 …we still incline to interpret the latter [i.e. response] from our 
preconceived and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between 
sensations, thoughts and acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, the 
central activity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the 
motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third. As a result, 
the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a 
patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied 
processes.102 
 
In this regard, Dewey complained, the reflex arc was inaccurate because it placed the 
parts of an act prior to the whole. It failed to recognize that stimulus, movement, and 
response only made sense as an interpretation of an event after it had occurred. 
Moreover, he claimed, that the notions of stimulus and response were non-existent 
entities that only gain meaning once placed in relation to one another. Simply put, 
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Dewey argued that the reflex arc was an instance of the empiricist’s fallacy of 
placing the parts prior to the whole.  
Dewey offered a more naturalistic account, one that viewed stimulus and 
response in less mechanistic terms, i.e. as parts of a single process. On such a view, 
the reflex arc does not run in a linear direction from stimulus, through response, to 
movement. Rather, multiple stimuli, responses, and movements arise simultaneously 
and are experienced, in chorus, as a singular, unbroken act, “which is as experienced 
no more mere sensation than it is mere motion,” and thus, when analysis dissects the 
reflex arc into separate states, “we have, only the serial steps in a co-ordination of 
acts.”103 Simply put, before an act can be divided into parts, its quality as a whole 
has to be explicated. But, the reflex arc concept offered no such explanation.     
It was not until after the appearance of his “Reflex Arc” paper, as he began to 
embrace pragmatism, that Dewey became enamored with James’ radical empiricism 
and began to formulate his own version, which, by 1905, he had dubbed “immediate 
empiricism.”104 His essay, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” which 
appeared in July of that year, reveals James’ early influence on his thinking. Therein, 
Dewey’s postulate was aimed at framing all philosophical debate in terms of 
experience, on the one hand, and eradicating the notion that experience needs to be 
grounded in a transcendent reality or a transcendental truth absolutely free from time 
and contingency, on the other. As he put it, “things – anything, everything, in the 
ordinary non-technical use of the term “thing” – are what they are experienced 
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as.”105 To illustrate this, Dewey described a situation where a person, sitting in a 
dark room, might hear a noise that frightens them. When the lights are turned on and 
the harmless source of the noise identified, rather than saying that the noise 
appeared frightful and was really harmless, Dewey suggested that we ought to 
identify the noise as truly frightful when first heard, and later – because more 
information is available to apply to the gross experience – it is truly harmless. 
Saying the latter would be more useful than positing, as someone who used the 
former explanation would, a distinction between appearances and reality. Dewey 
wanted to make it clear that the experienced noise was just what it was experienced 
as at that time, namely frightening. On this account, “if one wishes to describe 
anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being.”106 Compare this 
with a passage from James’ The Meaning of Truth (1909):  
Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate… that the only 
things debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in 
terms of experience…. The generalized conclusion is that therefore 
the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations 
that are themselves parts of experience.107 
 
This passage, on the one hand, illustrates the parallel between these two thinker’s 
views. On the other hand, insofar as James had adopted Dewey’s reference to a 
postulate, it may suggest the admiration that Dewey felt for James was probably 
mutual. In any case, what is clear is that by the release of the “The Postulate of 
Immediate Empiricism” Dewey’s thought had come into its own.  
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 Another example that Dewey used in that article was “Zöllner’s illusion” – an 
optical illusion displaying lines that appear to be convergent, yet are “truly” parallel. 
 
 
Opponents of Dewey’s view might use this picture as an example of how describing 
something in terms of “experiencing as” does not do justice to the reality of the 
experienced object. To this Dewey responds,  
That experience is that two lines with certain cross-hatchings are 
apprehended as convergent; only by taking that experience as real 
and as fully real, is there any basis for or way of going to an 
experienced knowledge that the lines are parallel. It is in the 
concrete thing as experienced that all the grounds and clues to its 
own intellectual or logical rectification are contained.108 
 
The last sentence of this passage reveals that Dewey agreed with James that the 
generalized conclusion of this postulate was that “[t]he directly apprehended 
universe needs… no extraneous transempirical connective support.”109 Simply put, it 
need not appeal to anything beyond the range of experiential knowledge. However, 
the difference between his view and the one James upheld, is that Dewey meant 
experience to refer to the change that was a result of transactions between a living 
organism and its environment. Jim Garrison, for one, has emphasized this unique 
aspect of Dewey’s thought that bridges the gap between Peirce’s realism and James’ 
nominalism. In his words,  
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For Dewey scientific inquiry (thinking), was a process engaged in 
by some natural existences, including human beings…As Dewey 
saw it, we are participants in an unfinished universe rather than 
spectators of a finished universe. That is why our action, our 
behaviors, our social constructions, deconstructions, and 
reconstructions have ontological significance.110 
 
A primary concern for Dewey, then, was the tendency of philosophers of every stripe 
to break experience into two levels – the immediate experience of perception and the 
mediated experience of cognition. This concern could still be found in Dewey’s 
work twenty years later when he wrote, in the first chapter of his Experience and 
Nature, “When objects are isolated from the experience through which they are 
reached and in which they function, experience itself becomes reduced to the mere 
process of experiencing, and experiencing is therefore treated as if it were also 
complete in itself.”111 
The appearance of the Postulate paper laid the foundation for Dewey to reject 
the subjective, psychical view of experience and to develop a transactional view of 
experience that did not divide knower from known. On his mature view, experience 
is seen to operate in a sort of evolutionary fashion. Singular experiences are not had 
in the way that classical empiricism would suggest – i.e. as bundles of sensory input 
– but rather can be identified in the changed habits of the organism. Just as evolution 
is an ongoing process from which biological diversity emerges, so is experience an 
ongoing process from which behavioral diversity emerges. The avenues for success 
in each are innumerable, yet any success involves an increase in complexity. Thus, 
in Dewey’s thought human nature is seen as just an outgrowth of nature itself; 
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perception and cognition are only different in degree. In this way, reason is not 
something over and above nature, but is immersed within it. Reason is not native, it 
is achieved, and it is not always operative in human beings. In Dewey’s words,  
…reason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of 
science, and used in the creation of social arts; it has something to 
do. It liberates man from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance 
and accident hardened into custom. It projects a better future and 
assists man in its realization. And its operation is always subject to 
test in experience.112 
 
This somewhat deflationary view of reason was advanced by many of the 
naturalists.113 However, Dewey came to it from a different direction. Instead of 
positing reason as the tenant of a reified mind, as naturalists like Santayana seemed 
to do, Dewey argued that the intellect was a function that emerged from the 
transaction of experiencing natural events (or “organisms”) from within the context 
of other natural events surrounding them (or “environments”) toward working out 
unstable situations – it was, in a word, instrumental.  
Calling the intellect instrumental left Dewey, and pragmatism at large, open to 
charges of opportunism and relativism. This was particularly true after the second 
World War and the Holocaust, when instrumentalism was associated with fascist 
expediencies and largely seen as the enemy of reason, in the traditional sense. This 
was a line of criticism that is related to the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school, 
especially Horkheimer and Adorno.114 However, the criticism of pragmatism in their 
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work, and later in the work of Marcuse, was aimed largely at a straw man. 
Horkheimer and Adorno were mostly concerned with the shift from “magical 
culture” to “scientific culture” and the attendant reductionism that characterized the 
mechanistic thinking of the Industrial Revolution. But, for reasons already discussed 
in previous chapters, Dewey himself balked at reductionist models of the world and 
of socio-political matters. Dewey’s ideas were closer to Critical Theory than those in 
the Frankfurt school realized. When Marcuse later called Dewey’s work an example 
of “one-dimensional thought” he was parroting the kind of criticism that had first 
been leveled against Dewey by Russell and Santayana.115 Dewey tried repeatedly to 
defend his work from such caricatures, one example of which can be found in the 
1932 re-issue of Ethics:  
To due reflection, things sometimes regarded as “practical” are in 
truth highly impolitic and shortsighted. But the way to eliminate 
preference for narrow and shortsighted expediences is not to 
condemn the practical as low and mercenary in comparison to 
spiritual ideals, but to cultivate all possible opportunities for the 
actual enjoyment of the reflective values and to engage in the 
activity, the practice, which extends their scope.116 
 
It is likely the persistence of these lines of criticism that later led Dewey to distance 
himself from the monikers pragmatism and instrumentalism. Of course, the 
Frankfurt schools’ suspicion of technology and the attendant transformation of 
Reason into the technical form of rationality which they saw as enslaving, presented 
its own internal difficulties for the New Left. The question regarding the domination 
of technology that these thinkers failed to address was: Whom or for what political 
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end does such domination serve? If one takes technology to be the villain, to be “the 
political power,” as Marcuse and the New Left did, then those who employ it are, in 
a sense, let off the hook in terms of moral responsibility.117    
By calling the intellect instrumental, Dewey endorsed neither a relativistic 
thesis that suggests there are no real grounds by which to compare courses of action, 
nor an opportunism in which the satisfaction of immediate desires is the ultimate 
objective of rational thought. Instead, he sought to eradicate the association of reason 
with spiritual ideals, or supernatural ones, and put an evolutionary understanding of 
such mental faculties on the gold standard. If one accepts Dewey’s account, the 
classical question of “what separates us from the brutes” is turned on its ear – the 
answer is nothing more than a complexity which is the result of the contingencies of 
evolutionary process. As he would put it in Experience and Nature,  
…thought, intellect, is not pure in man, but restricted by an animal 
organism that is but one part linked with other parts, of nature… 
Thought and reason are not specific powers. They consist of the 
procedures intentionally employed in the application to each other 
of the unsatisfactorily confused and indeterminate on one side and 
the regular and stable on the other.118        
 
In short, reason is an adaptation to problematic situations which forms habits out of 
the plasticity of human capacities. Other philosophers went wrong, according to 
Dewey, precisely because they failed to realize that, “Man is a creature of habit, not 
of reason nor yet of instinct.”119 In this way, Dewey’s thought made no appeal to 
originative principles of intelligibility, nor did it hang on teleological notion of 
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intelligibility as a final end, but rather saw intelligibility as contextual, functional, or 
operational within nature and, by extension, experience. 
Nature as the “Affair of Affairs” 
 
In the spring of 1918 Dewey gave a series of lectures at Stanford University on 
a topic suggested to him by the R. F. West Memorial Foundation – Human Conduct 
and Destiny. However, in the three lectures he delivered Dewey made no mention of 
destiny, choosing instead to focus on the place of habit, impulse, and intelligence 
within human conduct. These essays were intended for publication upon Dewey’s 
return from a short trip to Japan the following year. However, as circumstance would 
have it, that trip ended up being extended by more than two years when Dewey was 
invited to visit China by his former Columbia student Hu Shih. As such, the Stanford 
lectures did not appear in print until 1922, under the title Human Nature and 
Conduct. This is important insofar as the published volume was a much larger 
project than the lectures as they had been delivered. Upon his return from the far-
East Dewey decided to not only add an introductory and concluding chapter, but also 
to rewrite and expand “considerably” the three Stanford lectures. In the finished 
work Dewey took great steps toward showing that nature was best understood as a 
system of relations and that human nature, rather than being essential, was an 
emergent outgrowth of this system. Dewey believed that understanding the place of 
habits in the formation of intelligent conduct was the key to understanding nature 
itself. As he put it,  
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All that metaphysics has said about the nisus of Being to conserve 
its essence and all that a mythological psychology has said about a 
special instinct of self-preservation is a cover for the persistent self-
assertion of habit. Habit is energy organized in certain channels. 
When interfered with, it swells as resentment and as an avenging 
force. To say that it will be obeyed, that custom makes law, that 
nomos is lord of all, is after all only to say that habit is habit.120 
   
Dewey had learned this from Peirce, who handed down two important theses to his 
student. The first was synechism, the idea that there are real continuities in nature – 
such as space and time – which cannot be fully understood in terms of constituent 
parts. Peirce believed that this was an essential heuristic hypothesis to all scientific 
progress. The second was tychism, which was the thesis that chance was a 
fundamental aspect of reality, and which Peirce believed directly followed from 
synechism. As he saw it, “our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it 
were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy. Now the doctrine of 
continuity is that all things so swim in continua.”121 In other words, continuity 
implies fallibilism insofar as precision is impossible when measuring the values of 
continuous quantities and hence the laws of nature are probabilistic rather than 
absolute – i.e. they express the tendencies or habits of things. From this, Peirce 
proposed an evolutionary cosmology of which the upshot was: from irregularity, 
regularity emerges. This view, according to Peirce, could account for increasing 
complexity and diversity insofar as it always allowed for possible deviations and 
derivations from any established rule.  
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In his later years, Peirce followed this line of thought to objective idealism. 
Toward the end of his life, he would write, “The one intelligible theory of the 
universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits 
becoming physical laws.”122 While Dewey agreed that the growth and change of the 
natural realm was exemplified in the growth and change of human intellection, he 
took this connection to be a bio-social one. This is illustrated in the subtitle of his 
published Stanford lectures – “An Introduction to Social Psychology.” Years later, 
Dewey would try to bring Peirce’s idea closer to his own by teasing out the societal 
implications of Peircean semiotics: 
For wherever there is generality, continuity, there is habit. And even 
a casual reader of Peirce should be aware that habit on his view is 
first a cosmological matter and then is physiological and biotic--in a 
definitely existential sense. It, habit, operates in and through the 
human organism, but that very fact is to him convincing evidence 
that the organism is an integrated part of the world in which habits 
form and operate. As to the “sociological” factor, it is easy to quote 
many passages from Peirce in which whatever is entitled to the 
names “logical” and “cognitive” is brought specifically and 
explicitly within the societal. So far is he from penning the 
sociological, along with the biological, within "phenomena that 
occur in the functioning of signs," that he sticks to the observed fact 
that language and linguistic signs are modes or forms of 
communication, and thus are intrinsically "social." In so many 
words he says “Logic is rooted in the social principle.”123  
 
Dewey, like Peirce, took Darwinian evolution philosophically, and as such believed 
that there can be neither absolute natural conditions nor absolute human responses to 
these conditions (or problematic situations) in which transactions take place. Both 
also saw the scientific method as an effective way of dealing with this continuous 
process of reconstruction. But, Dewey believed that there were political and aesthetic 
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means of doing this as well. Of course, in an evolutionary cosmology, there are only 
temporary stabilities, not absolute ones. Dewey suggested that social institutions, and 
ipso facto culture, were the stable outcroppings of the co-adjustment between the 
habits of organisms and the habits of environments. On this view, culture is simply 
formalized experience and is contiguous with nature. As Dewey would write in 
Experience and Nature,   
To insist that nature is an affair of beginnings is to assert that there 
is no one single and all-at-once beginning of everything. It is but 
another way of saying that nature is an affair of affairs, wherein 
each one, no matter how linked up it may be with others, has its 
own quality. It does not imply that every beginning marks an 
advance or improvement; as we sadly know accidents, diseases, 
wars, lies and errors, begin. Clearly the fact and idea of beginning is 
neutral, not eulogistic; temporal, not absolute.124  
 
When nature is seen as consisting of affairs instead of objects the picture of 
reality as a machine comprised of dead matter drops away and one is left questioning 
the Cartesian assumptions drawn from that picture. Though many American 
naturalists of the era rejected Cartesian substance ontology, what made Dewey 
unique among them was how he rejected it.  As he put it,  
…what we call matter is that character of natural events which is so 
tied up with changes that are sufficiently rapid to be perceptible as 
to give the latter a characteristic rhythmic order, the causal 
sequence. It is no cause or source of events or processes; no 
absolute monarch; no principle of explanation; no substance behind 
or underlying changes--save in that sense of substance in which a 
man well fortified with this world's goods, and hence able to 
maintain himself through vicissitudes of surroundings, is a man of 
substance. The name designates a character in operation, not an 
entity.125   
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In Dewey’s view, “Every existence is an event.”126 He based this position on the 
philosophical insights he had drawn from Peirce and Darwin. On the substance-
oriented view, Dewey complained,  
The conception of είδος, species, a fixed form and final cause, was 
the central principle of knowledge as well as of nature. Upon it 
rested the logic of science. Change as change is mere flux and 
lapse; it insults intelligence… Since, however, the scene of nature 
which directly confronts us is in change, nature as directly and 
practically experienced does not satisfy the conditions of 
knowledge. Human experience is in flux, and hence the 
instrumentalities of sense-perception and of inference based upon 
observation are condemned in advance. Science is compelled to aim 
at realities lying behind and beyond the processes of nature, and to 
carry on its search for these realities by means of rational forms 
transcending ordinary modes of perception and inference.127  
 
Dewey saw change as the occasion for intelligence, rather than an offense to it. As 
such, he believed the rift between sense perception and inference was an imaginary 
one that could be overcome by seeing how they are interdependent in practical life. 
Knowledge, on the traditional view, is either something found in the world or else it 
is in the mind. For Dewey, though, knowledge is the outcome of an inquiry wherein 
habits transform indeterminate situations into determinate ones. In other words, all 
knowledge – even that which has been traditionally termed “propositional” – is 
essentially a skill, one acquired through developing successful habits.  Nature is 
wholly knowable through science only as long as science does not fall prey to the 
presuppositions of philosophers. As Dewey continued… 
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There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. We must either find 
the appropriate objects and organs of knowledge in the mutual 
interactions of changing things; or else, to escape the infection of 
change, we must seek them in some transcendent and supernal 
region. The human mind, deliberately as it were, exhausted the 
logic of the changeless, the final and the transcendent, before it 
essayed adventure on the pathless wastes of generation and 
transformation. 128 
  
Just as Darwin had shown that a species was not a static είδος, pre-ordained by some 
unmoved mover, Dewey sought to prove that what we take to be individual objects 
are actually confluences of significance and what we take to be an individual 
intelligence is merely a concresence of habit – both cultural and experiential. In 
other words, experience is how we “in-habit” nature; nature is our “habit-at.”  
Experience and Nature 
 
Dewey meant for the 1925 publication of Experience and Nature to be the 
fullest expression of his “metaphysical” view that the relationship between nature 
and humanity “was the standing if not always the outstanding problem” of 
philosophy.129 This, however, warrants a caveat, as it was, on the eve of his 90th 
birthday, that Dewey vowed never again to use the word ‘metaphysics’ with regard 
to his own position because of its association with the classical tradition. We may be 
better served, then, to look to the first paragraph of that text, which reads, “the 
philosophy here presented may be termed either empirical naturalism or naturalistic 
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empiricism, or, taking ‘experience’ in its usual signification, naturalistic 
humanism.”130 
That statement is one of the most controversial in Deweyan scholarship. Some 
have interpreted Dewey’s use of ‘empirical’ as revealing an underlying commitment 
to the British tradition tracing back to Mill and Locke. However, Dewey’s utilization 
of experience throughout the text reveals that he had something other than sensory 
impressions in mind for his philosophy. Many scholars, even those sympathetic to 
Dewey’s overall view, have bemoaned his choice of words. For instance, Richard 
Rorty’s reading dismisses Dewey’s positive account of experience, especially as it is 
found in Experience and Nature (1925) and Art As Experience (1934), in favor of his 
“therapeutic” analysis of philosophy’s problems. As Rorty put it, 
Throughout his life, [Dewey] wavered between a therapeutic stance 
toward philosophy and another, quite different, stance – one in 
which philosophy was to become “scientific” and “empirical” and 
to do something serious, systematic, important, and constructive. 
Dewey sometimes described philosophy as the criticism of culture, 
but he was never quite content to think of himself as a kibitzer or a 
therapist or an intellectual historian. He wanted to have things both 
ways.131 
 
It is true that Dewey often spoke about philosophy in various senses. This led to a 
peculiar sort of ambiguity in Experience and Nature, particularly in the first chapter, 
“Experience and Philosophic Method.” But, it is precisely the centrality of 
experience – understood in the specialized sense that Dewey used it – to his project 
of reconstructing philosophy that is crucial to understanding his variety of 
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naturalism. In Dewey’s words, “the assumption that nature in itself is all of the same 
kind, all distinct, explicit and evident, having no hidden possibilities, no novelties or 
obscurities, is possible only on the basis of a philosophy which at some point draws 
an arbitrary line between nature and experience.” 
Unfortunately, many have failed to grasp the sense in which Dewey employed 
the term experience. This misunderstanding hounded Dewey throughout his life. He 
was never fully satisfied with the way he had conveyed his ideas in that all-important 
first chapter and re-drafted it on three separate occasions (only one of which was 
published during his lifetime). Towards the end of his career he had apparently given 
up trying to save his notion of experience from the assault of his critics when he 
wrote, in 1949,  
Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would 
entitle the book Culture and Nature…because of my growing 
realization that the historical obstacles which prevented 
understanding of my use of “experience” are, for all practical 
purposes, insurmountable.132 
 
The central aim of the text was to map out the “generic traits” of the 
connection between experience and nature. Doing this, Dewey believed, would 
render a coherent account of nature without spinning off into metaphysical 
abstractions. This is precisely where Dewey has most often been misunderstood. In 
mapping out the generic traits of experience, Dewey has been accused of either 1) 
hypostatizing perception, or 2) idealizing ontology. Those who read Dewey in light 
of the former (which includes many of his most vocal advocates) typically regard his 
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position as a “metaphysics of experience.”133 This type of reading was first put 
forward by George Santayana who charged Dewey with being a “half-hearted” 
naturalist because of his alleged enchantment with the “foreground of experience” at 
the cost of the “background of nature.”134 Stated differently, Santayana believed that 
Dewey fell into a naïve-realism, wherein memories, reflection, and abstract reason 
were trampled under a tyranny of the present. 
Those who read Dewey in light of the latter, as Bertrand Russell did, claim that 
Dewey had “no place for quales, primitives, or objects that lie outside of an 
experience. Everything that is must be said to already be a part of an experience.”135 
Furthermore, Russell was concerned that Dewey’s pragmatic and instrumentalist 
tendencies revealed a pernicious relativism that hinged on subjectivity. Russell was a 
hard-nosed realist, in the metaphysical sense. Though he never expressed it in plain 
terms, his worry about Dewey’s philosophy centered on his suspicion that it led 
directly to a full-blown idealism that undermined the analytical status of rational 
principles and logic.136 In his words, “The pragmatist’s position, if I am not 
mistaken, is a product of limited skepticism supplemented by a surprising 
dogmatism… in spite of his skepticism, he is confident that he can know whether the 
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consequences of a belief are such to satisfy desire.”137 The criticisms that Russell 
and Santayana leveled against Dewey helped define the philosophical landscape in 
the English-speaking world for nearly half a century and made Dewey a more careful 
thinker. They certainly warrant a fuller treatment than is possible here. However, 
before we turn our attention to how Dewey responded to these lines of criticism, a 
closer look at the “generic traits” Dewey posited would be appropriate.  
One thing that might strike the casual observer as odd is that Dewey never 
offered an exhaustive list of the generic traits. In fact, he would sometimes 
seemingly create new ones, ad hoc, in order to make a point in various lines of 
argumentation. However, this curiosity may be explained when considered in light of 
the goal Dewey had in mind in introducing these traits. To attempt a comprehensive 
list would undermine the naturalistic conception of experience that Dewey hoped to 
put on the gold standard. After all, if experience is a natural affair, then it must adapt 
to changes in the environment, which would amount to most of its generic traits 
being wholly contingent. With this in mind, I will briefly list only those traits that 
Dewey deemed most central to his notion of experience.  
As we have already seen, the two most important traits of experience and 
nature for Dewey would be change and continuity. He characterized the first as 
being “eventful,” “precarious,” and “hazardous.”  I have chosen “change” as a 
catchall for these descriptions. This, of course, calls to mind the doctrine of universal 
flux attributed to the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus. However, it is important to 
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note that the mantra “One cannot step into the same river twice,” so often associated 
with this doctrine, only partially represents the Heraclitean view. This version of the 
statement lends itself to the interpretation that all things are changing at all times and 
that even those things which appear stable are merely in a slower process of flux, 
one that escapes observation. But, on such an interpretation, since a river is 
constantly changing, one could not even step into the same river once. As recent 
scholarship has suggested, what Heraclitus may have meant when he wrote, “On 
those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow,” (Diels-
Kranz B22) was that although different water flows through a river, the river itself 
stays the same. And, more importantly, it is only by virtue of the flow that there is 
even a river at all instead of a pond or lake.138 There is a governing form, in this case 
that of a river, that bounds the moments of change and connects them. When 
understood this way, the doctrine of universal flux jibes well with Dewey’s notion of 
change within experience and nature. It is only by virtue of the hazards and 
uncertainties that colorize life, that an organism has any experience at all. As Dewey 
put it,  
The doctrine of [Heraclitus], while it held that all things flow like a 
river and that change is so continuous that a man cannot step into 
the same river even once (since it changes as he steps), nevertheless 
also held that there is a fixed order which controls the ebb and flow 
of the universal tide.139 
 
This “fixed order” is what led Dewey to posit continuity as a generic trait of 
experience and nature. On such a view, nature is not at all atomistic, but rather is 
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“pregnant with connections,” i.e. it continuously flows from one part to the next – it 
is not simply a succession of events. This continuity, or “stability,” is of vital 
importance to experience, since without it the moments of change would spill over 
into chaos. As Dewey wrote in Art as Experience, “To overpass the limits that are set 
is destruction and death… In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; 
it would not move toward a close. Stability and rest would have no being.”140 But, 
this order is not fixed in the sense of being static; it is dynamic and rhythmic and is 
“fixed” in the sense of being directed and connective. Again, Dewey wrote, “All 
interactions that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. 
There is ebb and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change. The latter moves within 
bounds.”141 Elsewhere, Dewey likened the notion of continuity to a variable that 
remains constant in a mathematical equation, and as it is in math, he claimed, “so it 
is in nature and life.”142  
However, it is important to note that the movement “toward a close” to which 
Dewey alluded does not signify a move toward some ultimate end. Rather, for 
Dewey, it is a move toward an intermediate “end-in-view” which is itself, along with 
the means to attain it, still a part of nature. In this way, according to Dewey, 
experience is also historical, i.e. it has narrative characteristics which seem to raise 
particular events above the otherwise continuous flow of moments. An averted 
catastrophe, a meal enjoyed in Paris, and a storm passed through on an oversea 
voyage all exemplify the type of event which Dewey called, “an experience.” Such 
an event is historical insofar as, “the points of its incidence shift in successive 
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observations of it… It carries on and is, therefore, instrumental as well as final.”143 
Each of these events has a unique quality that defies communication, some attribute 
that is wholly immediate and therefore not strictly an object of knowledge. Compare 
this with the postulate of immediate empiricism that “things are what they are 
experienced as” and it becomes clear that these qualities are not at all subjective, 
they belong, as Dewey asserted, both to the event experienced and the one 
experiencing them. Dewey claimed that,     
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without 
seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same 
time there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. A river, as 
distinct from a pond, flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and 
interest to its successive portions greater than exist in the 
homogenous portions of a pond. In an experience, flow is from 
something to something.144  
 
Accordingly, nature consists of innumerably intertwined beginnings and endings in 
which these types of affairs may arise. Selective interest allows us to pick out which 
moments we will bundle up together out of the continuous flow to call an 
experience. When this happens, meaning is imparted to the event and it becomes 
communicative insofar as it directs us back to something beyond itself, namely the 
background of surrounding moments. Thus, another generic trait of experience is 
communication, or expression. The immediacy of the event is unified and heightened 
by the stable order of expression. Dewey tells us this is life in its most robust form.  
Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened 
vitality. Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private 
feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with 
the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self 
and the world of objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender 
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to caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration of a 
stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing.145 
 
Dewey refers to these heightened moments as “consummatory experiences.” But, the 
ambiguous verb “to consummate” and its noun derivative “consummation” can be 
misleading. On one hand, these can mean closure in the sense of completion or 
culmination as in “the consummation of marriage.” On the other hand, the verb can 
become an adjective that refers to something that is complete in the sense of needing 
no qualification, as in (pejoratively) “the consummate fool,” and it is this latter 
meaning, i.e. “without qualification,” that Dewey wished to evoke. Elsewhere, 
Dewey referred to this type of experience as a “religious one” but, as he would go on 
to say, a religious experience need not be tied to any god-conception at all. He 
sought to redefine the term “god” to denote “a unifying of the ideal and the actual” 
in human development, which he argued should not be imbued with any of the 
traditional, supernatural qualities.146 A consummatory experience, on his view, is a 
grouping of moments that stand out from the rest of experience, like a great meal, a 
terrible storm, or a beautiful sculpture. Dewey called such a grouping “an 
experience” because it needs no further qualification. It stands alone as a 
representative of the rest of the moments surrounding it. These consummatory 
experiences serve as exemplars that structure our experience into manageable 
components, and since reflecting upon every moment in experience would prove 
impossible, we could not reflect upon anything at all without this ordered structure. 
That is not to say, however, that once an experience reaches consummation, that it 
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has come to an end, but rather, as Dewey claimed, “The time of consummation is 
also one of beginning anew.”147 Consummatory experiences, then, are pauses, not 
breaks, in the continuity of nature. This is how a rhythmic order is established. 
In rhythmic ordering, every close and pause, like the rest in music, 
connects as well as delimits and individualizes. A pause in music is 
not a blank, but is a rhythmic silence that punctuates what is done 
while at the same time it conveys an impulsion forward, instead of 
arresting at the point which it defines.148 
 
But, this rhythmic order is not merely established temporally, “The proportionate 
interception of changes establishes an order that is spatially… patterned,” as well.149 
If musical rhythm is the temporal analog to consummatory experience, then the 
spatial analog might be the rhythm of ocean waves. Each trough delimits each wave 
crest, but to say that waves are separated by troughs would belie fluid dynamics. On 
the micro level, water molecules are all connected in a processional, circular 
movement, on the macro level, troughs flow into waves and call attention to them, 
giving significance to each. If we understand this connection and are able to 
internalize it, we will operate with our surroundings more harmoniously. As Dewey 
put it,  
Contrast of lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of 
adjustment after consummated irregularity, form the drama in 
which action, feeling, and meaning are one… Inner harmony is 
made only when, by some means, terms are made with the 
environment.150 
   
Because these consummatory experiences are dynamic, i.e. they move through 
experience with us, they can always be re-evaluated. The consummatory phase, 
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therefore, is an ongoing process, it has duration and recurrence, and it can rise and 
subside in relation to the flow of experience. This feature of experience, that it can 
be consummatory, illustrates the formation of a context. As Dewey wrote in 
“Context and Thought,” an essay that sits in his career roughly halfway between 
Experience and Nature and Art as Experience, “Context includes at least those 
matters which for brevity I shall call background and selective interest… 
Background is both temporal and spatial.”151 In this way, Dewey believed that 
nature was a general background that had increasingly specific levels of emergent 
context.  
This was one of the biggest bones of contention between Dewey and other 
thinkers of his day. It led Santayana, in a review of Experience and Nature, to call 
Dewey’s position “half-hearted naturalism.” He believed that anyone claiming to be 
a naturalist could make no appeal to what he called “foregrounds,” i.e. “positions 
relative to some point of view,” because nature had no point of view – it simply was. 
This prompted Santayana to make two related charges against Dewey’s work. The 
first was that Dewey’s account of experience was tantamount to a tyranny of the 
present that reflected an American affinity for “philosophy of enterprise.”152 On 
Dewey’s view, he complained,    
Past experience is accordingly real by virtue of its vital inclusion in 
some present undertaking, and yesterday is really but a term 
perhaps useful in the preparation of tomorrow. The past, too, must 
work if it would live, and we may speak without irony of the 
‘futurity of yesterday’ insofar as yesterday has any pragmatic 
reality.153 
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This tendency, Santayana claimed, “flows from [Dewey’s] choice of ‘events’ to be 
his metaphysical elements.”154 Santayana was a staunch advocate of essences in 
nature. He argued, contra Dewey, “If events are to be successive, and fragments of 
the flux of nature, they must be changes in an abiding medium. In other words, an 
event in its natural being, is a mode of substance, the transit of an essence.”155 As 
such, Santayana held on to the presuppositions of a primordial, ordered beginning 
that gave rise to the very Cartesian ontology he deemed so dubious.156 Dewey’s 
event ontology, on the other hand, not only rejected the conception of Cartesian 
substance, but also the Greek notion that there are originative principles of 
intelligibility and organization on which such a conception depended – from which 
ideas such as νούς and λόγος were derived – and thus avoided the need for the 
“language of transcendence” to which Santayana’s philosophy often fell prey. 
Simply put, Santayana believed intelligibility was essential, categorical, or prior to 
experience; Dewey saw it as emergent within experience. By Santayana’s account, 
experience is passive and consciousness is derivative; by Dewey’s, experience is 
spontaneous and consciousness is emergent.157 In response to Santayana’s review, 
Dewey dubbed Santayana’s position “broken-backed,” because he believed it 
indirectly re-instated the various dualisms it sought to destroy.158 
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On the other hand, Dewey never quite understood what Russell found so 
objectionable about his position and made repeated attempts to show that his view of 
logic was not antithetical to Russell’s. Russell, like Santayana, accused Dewey of 
underwriting American predispositions to commercialism. Dewey responded to 
Russell’s claim in a 1922 essay called “Pragmatic America,” 
It is of that order of interpretation which would say that English 
neo-realism is a reflection of the aristocratic snobbery of the 
English; the tendency of French thought to dualism an expression of 
an alleged Gallic disposition to keep a mistress in addition to a wife; 
and the idealism of Germany a manifestation of an ability to elevate 
beer and sausage into a higher synthesis with the spiritual values of 
Beethoven and Wagner.159  
 
The most substantive of Russell’s criticisms, and the one that Dewey seemed to take 
most seriously, was the charge that the latter’s appeal to situations resulted in a 
Hegelian idealism. Dewey responded to this charge as follows,  
Mr. Russell, however, finds that what I write about situations as 
the units of experience springs from and leads directly to the 
Hegelian variety of absolutism. One indirect reason he presents 
for this belief, when it is put in the form of an argument, runs 
somewhat as follows: Mr. Dewey admits not only that he was 
once an Hegelian but that Hegel left a permanent deposit in his 
thought; Hegel was a thoroughgoing holist; therefore, Dewey uses 
"situation" in a holistic sense. I leave it to Mr. Russell as a formal 
logician to decide what he would say to anyone who presented 
this argument in any other context.160  
 
Dewey went on to say in that essay that, while he does hold that the continuity of 
life-process should be taken holistically, he does not lay claim to the idea that there 
is nothing outside of experience. On his view, situations are unique and variegated, 
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but whatever their features, they are the locus of experience and are thus changed by 
that experience.  
The Live Creature 
 
Where Santayana (and Russell), because of ontological commitments to a 
primal order, needed a split-level notion of experience where reason could mediate 
dumb sensory inputs, Dewey sidestepped this proto-dualism by seeing ontology and 
experience as equi-primordial.  The generic traits of an experience are not 
foundations or primitives on Dewey’s view, but rather arise from the commerce of 
organisms and environments; i.e. they arise from the “situation.” As Dewey would 
put it in his response to Santayana,  
Experience, thus conceived, constitutes, in Santayana's happy 
phrase, a foreground. But it is the foreground of nature…Apparently 
he conceives of the foreground as lying between human intuition 
and experience and the background; to me human experiencing is 
the foreground, nature's own. He also may think that the 
background alone is nature to the exclusion of the foreground; I am 
not sure. But I am sure that the foreground is itself a portion of 
nature, an integral portion… So I repeat that while "consciousness" 
is foreground in a preeminent sense, experience is much more than 
consciousness and reaches down into the background as that 
reaches up into experience.161 
 
This view of experience as a foreground of nature can be summed up in Dewey’s 
phrase – “the live creature” – which he made use of in many of his writings. For 
Dewey, the live creature was a designation for organisms that could emphasize the 
relational link to an environing bio-social context while at the same time account for 
cognition. Again, in response to Santayana, Dewey explained this connection thusly,  
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But since I find in human life, from its biological roots to its ideal 
flowers and fruits, things both individual and associational – each 
word being adjectival – I hold that nature has both an irreducible 
brute unique “itselfness” in everything which exists and also a 
connection of each thing (which is just what it is) with other things 
such that without them it "can neither be nor be conceived." And as 
far as I can follow the findings of physics, that conclusion is 
confirmed by the results of the examination of physical existence 
itself. Since experience is both individualized and associational and 
since experience is continuous with nature as background, as a 
naturalist I find nature is also both. In citing Mr. Santayana's denial 
that nature has here, now, and perspective, I found myself in stating 
my own view compelled to use the plural form: heres, nows, 
perspectives. I would not draw an inference from the mere use of a 
word, but Santayana's use of the singular form is suggestive that he 
thinks experience is something sole and private, and so thinking 
attributes a similar view to others who use the term. It is absurd to 
confer upon nature a single here, now, and perspective, and if that 
were the only alternative, I should agree with Mr. Santayana in his 
denial. But there are an indefinite multitude of heres, nows, and 
perspectives.162 
 
The “multitude of heres, nows, and perspectives” Dewey described is the 
philosophical offspring of a Darwinian insight regarding co-evolution which tells us 
consciousness is nothing special. It is merely one evolutionary path among many. 
Various species of plants and insects have co-adapted a complex bio-chemical 
relationship to maintain their niches. It would be an intellectual conceit to insist that 
human understanding is somehow off-limits to such a relationship. Stated 
differently, our preference for roses says as much or more about that species as it 
does our own. Dewey’s concept of the live-creature does not view consciousness as 
the pinnacle of evolutionary achievement, and thus relegates anthropocentric 
perspectives back among the ranks of nature. It leads us to see things from the rose’s 
point of view. It leads us to understand that we are what we are by virtue of that rose. 
                                                 
162 Ibid. p. 80 
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This is a position which might be called biocentrism in contemporary discourse, and 
is a cornerstone of theories such as deep-ecology, land-ethic, and earth 
jurisprudence. As the founder of deep-ecology, Arne Næss, described it as the 
“rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour [sic.] of the relational, total-
field image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic 
relations.”163 This is the sentiment Dewey hoped to capture by dropping the concept 
of man and replacing with the live creature. Through such a conception, experience 
becomes a singular, holistic affair precisely “because the interaction of live creature 
and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living.”164 J. E. Tiles 
sums up Dewey’s view as a sort of “aesthetic ecology,” wherein the live creature and 
its environment “metabolize” each other through a type of continuity that is “never 
cut off from the human being’s moorings in flesh and nature.”165 As Dewey would 
tell us, the outcome of this relationship is a type of harmony, not static or 
mechanical, but instead a process of balance and counterbalance measured through 
overcoming resistance.166 
                                                 
163 Næss, Arne. “The Shallow and the Deep, Ecological Movements. A List on Contrasts.” Inquire 16 
(Spring 1973) [original emphasis]  
164 AE, LW 10:42 [emphasis added] 
165 Tiles, J.E. John Dewey: Critical Assessments. (Taylor and Francis, 1992) p. 239  
166 cf. AE, LW 10:22  
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Chapter Four: Zhuangzi’s Naturalism – The Crooked Tree 
 
Whoever knows the patterns of nature, and also knows the patterns of humans, is fulfilled 
indeed. [Zhuangzi167] 
The Background of Chinese Philosophy 
 
It is traditionally held that philosophy developed in China during the Zhou 
Dynasty, which began in 1111 BCE with the overthrow of the Shang Dynasty. The 
Zhou period marked an advance in Chinese culture insofar as it witnessed the rise of 
written record-keeping and a political system built around feudal farming. The latter 
especially helped shape the way the Chinese would come to philosophize. As Feng 
Youlan has put it, 
To the ancient Chinese their land was their world. There are two 
expressions in the Chinese language which can both be translated as 
the world. One is “all beneath the sky” [天下] and the other is “all 
within the four seas.” [四海] To the people of a maritime country 
such as the Greeks, it would be inconceivable that expressions such 
as these could be synonymous.168    
 
Zhou feudalism differed from western serfdom in that it was based on a land grant 
system, or fēngjiàn [封建]. Under the fēngjiàn, a landlord would allot a small plot of 
land to a single family in exchange for their labor on a community field. The most 
common arrangement in this system was the well-field, or jǐngtián [井田].169 In this 
arrangement, an area of land (usually equivalent to 1000 square paces) would be 
                                                 
167 This is the opening line of “Dà Zōng Shī,” the sixth chapter of the Zhuangzi. (My translation, using 
“Nature” for 天 [sky, heavens, nature] and “pattern” for 所 為 [that which does, governs, acts].)    
168 Feng Youlan. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. (Free Press, 1976) p. 16 [emphasis added] 
169 cf. Joseph Needham, Ping-Yü Ho, Ling Wang. Science and Civilisation in China: Apparatus, 
Theories and Gifts. (Cambridge University Press, 1980) §F-5 
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divided into nine equal sections among eight families. From a bird’s eye view, this 
arrangement would resemble the Chinese character for well [井], or a modern tic-tac-
toe board – and is how it earned its name. The central “square” of the well-field 
would be worked by all of the families together and its yield would belong solely to 
the landlord. In a stable, well-fortified state, one family could work a single farm for 
many generations. This lent a strong sense of connection with the land among the 
early Chinese. It also gave rise to a leisure class of landowners who had time to 
devote to study. Of the four traditional classes in Chinese society (scholars, farmers, 
artisans and merchants), the two most revered were scholars and farmers, as it was 
these classes that dealt with “the root” of society – the land – while the other classes 
were concerned with “the branches” of commerce.  
As such, the Zhou Chinese held an organic view of the universe, but one that 
differed from that of the Greeks because it did not hang on a primordial conception 
of Being. Instead, they viewed Being [yǒu 有] as subordinate to non-Being [wú 無]: 
“The myriad things in the world are born from Being, and Being from non-
Being.”170 But, as Feng Youlan explained, the relationship of wú and yǒu “has 
nothing to do with time and actuality. For in time and actuality, there is no Being; 
there are only beings.”171 Simply put, the Chinese notion of Being was logical rather 
than cosmological, and was meant to show that existence itself is a broader notion 
than an individual existence, and non-existence is broader than existence. For them, 
it would be logically impossible to have something without nothing. Where the 
Greeks witnessed quick and violent changes in their maritime environment, the 
                                                 
170 Laozi Daodejing. Chapter 40 [my translation]  
171 Feng, p. 96 
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Chinese witnessed change on a much slower, geological scale; this is perhaps why 
the Greeks sought ontological stability while the Chinese looked for more holistic 
answers. 
Several pre-philosophical notions grew out of this agrarian world-view that 
would become mainstays of Chinese culture. The first of these was the idea of tiān 
mìng [天命], a principle of ruling legitimacy invoked by the early Zhou leaders to 
justify the overthrow of their Shang predecessors. While this principle is often 
translated as “The Mandate of Heaven,” it should not be equated with the western 
notion of the divine right of kings. Tiān mìng was not a birthright, but instead a 
moral currency built up through wise leadership, which for the Chinese meant acting 
in accordance with a natural destiny. The Shang, according to the Zhou proponents 
of tiān mìng, had worked against nature and had thus lost their right to rule – which 
may have been evidenced by natural or political calamities. The other important 
idea, yīnyáng [陰陽], was an outgrowth of Shang divination practices. These 
concepts, which originally referred to sunshine and shadow, came to represent 
feminine and masculine respectively and are the primary principles of polarity in 
Chinese ontology. They are stand-ins for every binary relation and connote a 
dynamic, holistic unity of opposites rather than sharp, static duality.       
Because of this, a dialectical approach proliferated early Chinese philosophy 
from its outset. One of the first things the new student of Chinese thought learns is 
that it is less historically stratified than its western counterpart. Together, the “Spring 
and Autumn” (722-481 BCE) and “Warring States” (480-221 BCE) periods of the 
Zhou comprise the philosophical era known to Chinese scholars as zhū zǐ bǎi jiā (the 
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Hundred Schools of Thought), due to the great number of ideas that developed 
during those years. However, the Chinese term jiā [家] does not imply the same 
intellectual atomism that the phrase “school of thought” connotes in the West, but 
rather implies a specialization in one aspect of a whole. This presupposition has led 
to an amalgamation of doctrines in China, with older ideas often absorbing newer 
ones. Perhaps the oldest, and certainly the most dominant school in Chinese thought 
is Confucianism. In fact, many scholars accept the birth of Confucius (ca. 551 
B.C.E.) as the birth of Chinese philosophy itself. Of the four major “schools” that 
comprise the majority of traditional Chinese thought, the ideas of Confucius have, 
with very few exceptions, been the main philosophical backdrop since their 
inception. This is clearly seen in the name given to Confucian thought by the 
Chinese – rújiā [儒家] – which literally means scholasticism.  
Of the other three, the naturalistic/mystical doctrine of Daoism – or dàojiā 
[道家]– would be the second most important. Although Daoism was originally born 
from opposition to Confucianism, the two were often married in various degrees by 
later scholars. The remaining two major schools of thought are Moism, or mòjiā 
[墨家], named for the thinker Mozi, and Legalism, or făjiā [法家], of which the most 
prominent thinker was probably Hanfeizi. These doctrines, for the most part, 
rounded out Chinese thought by taking up positions that Confucianism and Daoism 
had not touched upon, and I mention them here solely to demonstrate the traditional 
Chinese view that philosophical diversity is beneficial to the state. This conciliatory 
spirit was again evidenced by the arrival of Buddhism from India in the 4th century 
C.E. The Chinese accepted the Indian import and added it to their philosophical 
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canon. This was especially true of Daoism, which, when combined with the tenets of 
Buddhism, produced chán [禪], the brand of Buddhism that was exported to Japan 
and is now known as Zen.172 
Philosophical Daoism 
 
While Confucius is commonly considered to be the most influential figure in 
Chinese society and thought, and was a humanist par excellence, the widespread 
appeal of Daoism, which placed an emphasis on harmonizing with nature, was just 
as important to Chinese culture. As Confucianism was the school adopted by the 
Chinese elite, Daoism was the philosophy of the people. This calls to attention the 
need for an important disctinction between philosophical Daoism and religious 
Daoism. The latter, which the Chinese call dàojiào [道教], was the byproduct of a 
combination of philosophical daoism with various local superstitions and folklore. 
The conflation of philsophical daoism with religious Daoism has been one of the 
most egregious mistakes in western scholarship and has only very recently begun to 
be rectified.  
The two main tracts of philosophical Daoism are the Dàodéjīng  [道德經] and 
the Nánhuá Zhēnjīng [南華眞經].173 According to legend, the first of these – whose 
title could be translated as “The Classic of Way and Virtue” – was penned by an 
imperial record-keeper by the name of Lao Dan when he was asked to put his ideas 
on paper by a border official in exchange for passage. Whether there actually was an 
historical figure by that name is shrouded in uncertainty, nevertheless, Laozi (or, 
                                                 
172 For a more detailed account of the development of the schools, see Feng Youlan’s third chapter.  
173 These texts are often called by the name of their purported author. I will follow this custom. 
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Master Lao, as he is now known) has become the de facto father of philosophical 
Daoism. His work was a collection of 81 chapters in verse form and is now 
considered the most important book in the daoist canon. The main topics of the text 
are the characteristics of dào [道], or “way,” and how these can be applied in moral 
life to attain “virtue” i.e. dé  [德].174 Commentators have disagreed about which of 
these two components is the main focus of the text. Those who give primacy to the 
former, typically interpret the Dàodéjīng as a mystical document, whereas their 
opponents usually view it as a moral treatise. The origin of the second work, whose 
title might be translated as “True Classic of Southern Flowering,” is only slightly 
less mysterious. The reputed author was a hermit by the name of Zhuang Zhou 
(referred now to as Zhuangzi, or Master Zhuang). While such a person almost 
certainly existed, it is unlikely that he penned all thirty-three chapters of the text that 
now bears his name. It is fairly well established that the first seven chapters (Inner 
Chapters) are attributable to him, but beyond that scholars are at odds. Attributing 
even these first chapters to Master Zhuang is not a certainty, but seems to be the 
growing consensus. Nevertheless, as Victor Mair has pointed out, the remaining 
chapters (Outer and Miscellaneous) were almost undoubtedly written by later daoist 
scholars of various sects.175  
Competing theories surround the dating of the works of Laozi and Zhuangzi. 
On the one hand is the traditional account that the Dàodéjīng is the older of the two 
texts. On the other is recent scholarship that contends this order should be reversed. 
                                                 
174 As will be seen below, these two key terms cannot be easily rendered into English without some 
loss of information.  
175 Cf. Mair, Victor. Wandering on the Way: Early Daoist Tales and Parable of Chuang Tzu. 
(University of Hawaii Press, 1998) 
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An example of the former can be found in A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy 
(1963) where Wing-Tsit Chan reiterated the traditional view of Laozi as an older 
contemporary of Confucius, roughly placing him in the latter part of the sixth-
century BCE.  One example of the latter can be found in Mair’s introduction to his 
translation of Zhuangzi where he claims that the Inner Chapters were probably 
composed in the latter half of the fourth-century BCE, and the Laozi approximately 
100 years later during with the rise of religious Daoism. Mair cites several reasons 
for this dating. First, he argues that there is no record of a book by “Laozi”, a book of 
5000 characters, or a “Dàodéjīng” to be found in the earliest catalogs of Chinese 
books from the Qin period (221-206 BCE). This is a controversial claim since the 
Zhuangzi seems to quote (or at least paraphrase) the Dàodéjīng in many places, 
although most often inexactly. Mair believes that the explanation for this is that the 
Dàodéjīng was the oral work of sages passed down from the Warring States period. 
In fact, the name “Laozi” is roughly translatable to “old master,” which Mair 
embraces as support for his claim. Another basis for believing Mair’s dating of the 
text would be its length (as the Laozi is also known as the 5000-character classic). 
Mair argues that a relatively low and round number like this points to the oral history 
of the work, since a shorter and precise number of words would be more conducive 
to memorization. Moreover, Mair points to the literary nature of the text – poetic, 
with various tones – as further evidence that the work was passed down from the 
sayings of many sages. While most western scholars tend toward this alternative 
view, contemporary Chinese writers have mostly rejected it, stating that it cannot be 
considered seriously because it is too subjective. Mair is confident, though, that the 
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Zhuangzi was at least partially composed in the late fourth century BCE and did not 
appear in its present form (33 chapters) until the end of the second century BCE. 
Based on a short excerpt from Sima Qian’s historical work, The Grand Scribe’s 
Records (ca. 104 BCE), Mair believes that Master Zhuang lived from 369 to 286 
BCE. Wing-Tsit Chan placed Master Zhuang as living between 399 and 295 BCE, a 
date that could still support Mair’s view. One thing is clear: the ancient Chinese did 
not write treatises intended to be the final word on a topic, neither did they feel 
compelled to aim at such absolutes. For them, great literary works were “living 
documents” of wisdom gleaned over many years and transcribed by many hands. We 
need not be too concerned regarding these discrepancies, since they have little 
philosophical bearing on the text as it has been received. As the noted twentieth-
century sinologist Angus Charles Graham has noted, the Zhuangzi disclosed ideas 
that had been circulating in Chinese philosophical discourse for quite some time – 
regardless of whether they came from, or gave rise to, the figure known as Master 
Lao and the Dàodéjīng.176  
The Zhuangzi is vital to a philosophical study of Daoism. One reason for this is 
its overt concern with the universe and what can be known about it. Where the Laozi 
offers an orphic praxiology within its verses, the Zhuangzi focuses on the ontological 
and epistemological aspects of Daoism more fully. The author(s) of the Zhuangzi 
were first and foremost concerned with questions like, “Does heaven revolve? Does 
earth stand still? Do the sun and moon jockey for position? Who controls all of 
                                                 
176 cf. Graham, Angus. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (Open Court, 
1989) 
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this?”177 The Zhuangzi attempts an in depth description of human life in relation to 
the universe. It concisely articulates the reverence that Daoism places on 
harmonizing with nature. This holistic theme is also seen in the Laozi, albeit in a 
more terse and ambiguous tone. For example, a description of dào in the fourteenth 
chapter of the Dàodéjīng reads, 
Look, it cannot be seen – it is beyond form.  
Listen, it cannot be heard – it is beyond sound.  
Grasp, it cannot be held – it is intangible.  
These three are indefinable;  
Therefore they are joined in one.178 
 
Although the Laozi holds that dào is ineffable, and often avoids mentioning it 
directly, the Zhuangzi alludes to its qualities in a more direct manner. For example,  
So [the person of far reaching vision] has no use [for categories], 
but relegates all to the constant. The constant is the useful; the 
useful is the passable; the passable is the successful; and with 
success, all is accomplished. She relies upon this alone, relies upon 
it and does not know she is doing so. This is called the Way.179   
  
One need not accept this passages as the only instance of defining dào within the 
Zhuangzi. Abundant with analogies and extended metaphors, it describes the dào on 
the grandest of scales, “above the Zenith,” and the smallest, “It is in excrement and 
urine.” That is not to say that the Zhuangzi does not contain its own ambiguities, 
which are instrumental in daoist teaching. The major difference between the 
Zhuangzi and the Laozi is that the latter contains more prescriptive, normative 
elements. As the sixty-sixth chapter states, “If the sage would guide the people, he 
                                                 
177 Mair, p. 130-131  
178 Translated by Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English. Tao Te Ching, 25th Anniversary Edition. (Vintage, 
1997) Chap. 14.    
179 Watson, Burton. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. (Columbia, 1968) p. 81 
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must serve with humility. If he would lead them, he must follow behind.”180 Most of 
the chapters in the Laozi combine metaphysical and moral philosophy in such a 
manner as to direct the actions of a leader. This is where the Zhuangzi is unique. It 
advocates staying out of affairs of state. In fact, a traditional story told of Master 
Zhuang recounts what he said when offered an advisory position in the court of Qu. 
He stated that he would rather be a pig in the mud than a prize ox – because it is the 
ox that would be led to slaughter. Instead of providing advice for the ruler, the 
Zhuangzi addresses how the individual can improve his/her own life. As Feng 
Youlan wrote of the “amusing stories” in the Zhuangzi,  
Their underlying purpose is that there are varying degrees in the 
achievement of happiness. A free development of our natures may 
lead us to a relative kind of happiness; absolute happiness is 
achieved through higher understanding of the nature of things.181 
 
A Note on Translations 
 
The Zhuangzi, perhaps more than any other Chinese classic, is notoriously 
difficult to translate. Part of the reason for this is its unique use of the Chinese 
language. Where other philosophical works of the period were written in the forms 
of sagely sayings (e.g. the works of Confucius and Mencius), topical essays (e.g. the 
work of Xunzi) or poetic verse (the Laozi), the Zhuangzi incorporates prose and 
verse, history and fiction. Because of this unique style Victor Mair has suggested the 
Zhuangzi “is, first and foremost, a literary work and consequently should not be 
subjected to excessive philosophical analysis.”182 This belief clearly guides Mair in 
                                                 
180 Gia-Fu Feng & English, Chap. 66 
181 Feng, p. 105 
182 Mair, p. xlv  
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how he translates the text, as he chooses to maintain the verse structures of many 
sections. However, Mair’s translation (1994) is only one of the more recent 
translations of the full text, and most others would probably disagree with his literary 
affinities. The earliest scholarly translations, by Frederic Balfour (1881) and James 
Legge (1891), demonstrate the difficulty western thinkers – particularly those with a 
Christian frame of reference – had in grasping some alien daoist concepts. These 
translations, and to a lesser extent Herbert Giles version in 1926, view the text 
through a largely religious lens. A handful of translations cropped up in the 1960s, 
among which Burton Watson’s complete version in 1968 is most notable. These 
tended to move away from a fully religious reading and aimed more at a 
philosophical interpretation. A.C. Graham’s translation of the Inner Chapters and 
other selected passages in 1981 is still considered by many to be the most 
philosophical of extant versions. The Legge, Watson and Graham translations are the 
versions most often referenced in philosophical treatment of the Zhuangzi. In what 
follows, I will highlight some of the shortcomings of these translations and, where 
possible, offer alternate readings that illustrate the importance of nature in 
Zhuangzi’s philosophy.  
On Zhuangzi’s Naturalism 
 
One of the most difficult concepts in classical Chinese thought for the 
uninitiated reader to grasp is the ostensible daoist insistence on the ineffable nature 
of dào [道]. This puzzle has led many, especially in the West, to the conclusion that 
Daoism is either a system of loose superstitions and religious folklore underwritten 
by a fundamental supernaturalism, or else it is an arrant rejection of the rational, 
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devoid of any philosophical content. This is particularly true of the daoist classic 
known as the Zhuangzi, which even among Chinese literati, has mostly been viewed 
with suspicion as nothing but “empty talk not based on facts.”183 
Scholarly interest in the collected writings of Zhuang Zhou (c. 4th-century 
BCE) and his followers has arrived relatively late on the western philosophical scene 
as well. The ideas of Confucius, Mencius and the Dàodéjīng have been familiar to 
the West for hundreds of years,184 whereas prior to the mid-twentieth century, the 
Zhuangzi was merely a curiosity to a handful of thinkers who, like Buber and 
Heidegger, viewed the poetic and mythological elements of Zhuangzi’s prose as the 
musings of a religious mystic.185 On such a view, passages in the text which tend to 
question the limitations of perspective appear to advocate communion with an 
unearthly dào. This transcendently mystical interpretation of Zhuangzi has become a 
mainstay in daoist scholarship, particularly since Wing-Tsit Chan first published his 
acclaimed Source Book in 1963. There, Chan made reference to “The Mystical Way 
of Chuang-tzu,” and claimed that the text offers a “broadness of vision” which 
“seems to transcend the mundane world… equalizing all things and all opinions.”186 
Chan’s interpretation has led to a debate, which boils down to one question, viz. 
“Was Zhuangzi simply rejecting the privilege of one perspective over any other or 
did he advocate ascension toward one, all-encompassing perspective?” As most 
                                                 
183 This was the assessment of the great historian, Sima Qian. Cf. Chan, Wing-Tsit. The Source Book 
of Chinese Philosophy. 4th edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) p. 178 
184 Confucius and Mencius were introduced to a Western audience in the 1600s and had gained 
minimal notoriety by the 1680s. An early Latin translation of the Daodejing was first presented 
verbally to the Royal Asiatic Society in 1778.  
185 Cf. Herman, Jonathan. I and Tao: Martin Buber's Encounter With Chuang Tzu. (SUNY, 1996);  
Parkes, Graham. Heidegger and Asian Thought. (Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1987); and May, Reinhard. 
Heidegger’s Hidden Sources. trans. G. Parkes (Routledge, 1996) 
186 Watson, p. 177 [emphasis added] 
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scholars see it, the former leads to skepticism and relativism and the latter, to a 
supernatural brand of mysticism.  
Yet, while the stories found in the Zhuangzi are clearly fantastical, they need 
not lead us, necessarily, to a mystical outlook tantamount to supernaturalism, nor 
should they require a skeptical or relativistic reading of the text. First, it is not clear 
that dào, on Zhuangzi’s view, occupies some higher plane of existence, nor does 
Zhuangzi seem to advocate sloughing off of the physical realm in favor of some 
other – two notions that are typical of mysticism. Instead, Zhuangzi’s tone tends to 
be one of awe in the face of nature’s wonders and his characterization of dào is one 
of immanence, of a “world hidden within the world,” rather than one of 
transcendence. For example, when Zhuangzi is asked in his twenty-second chapter 
where dào exists, he replies, “There is nowhere that it doesn’t exist…It is in the tiles 
and shards…It is in the urine and excrement.”187 In what follows I will offer an 
alternative reading of Zhuangzi as a type of naturalist that, I believe, accounts for 
and improves upon other interpretations by taking heed of the prominence nature 
held within Zhuangzi’s scheme. I contend that Zhuangzi’s mystical inclinations 
involve a process of coalescence rather than dissipation and that his alleged skeptical 
relativism might be better understood as a contextual perspectivism.  
Before we turn our attention to Zhuangzi’s notion of nature, it will be helpful 
to briefly sketch the brand of naturalism I have in mind with regard to him. As we 
have seen in previous chapters, the term ‘naturalism’ has become notoriously 
ambiguous within philosophical circles, and at least since Quine co-opted it for his 
                                                 
187 Ibid. p. 241 
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epistemology, it has been associated with the belief that philosophy is contiguous 
with or subservient to the natural sciences. For obvious reasons, this type of 
scientific naturalism cannot be associated with an ancient Chinese thinker like 
Zhuangzi. Instead, his views can be connected to the underlying beliefs of the type 
of naturalism that I have been calling non-reductive humanistic naturalism – which 
turns on a rejection (or in Zhuangzi’s case, an absence) of dualistic ontology, a 
dynamic view of reality that emphasizes temporality and change, and a commingling 
of ontology with human experience. As we have seen elsewhere, the difference 
between the scientistic, epistemically-centered naturalism advanced in analytic 
circles and the naturalistic themes in Zhuangzi can be seen as hanging on four 
central theses. To reiterate, they are:    
1. Natural phenomena have objectively determinable traits. 
2. The traits of natural phenomena are knowable. 
3. The process of inquiry is necessarily conditioned and perspectival. 
4. Human interaction with the rest of nature, cognitive or otherwise, is active 
and creative.188 
 
As argued previously, the logical extension of such a line of reasoning leads to the 
prospect that human beings are continuous with their surroundings, that they are 
points of focus within an environing field of nature. It seems that the 
misunderstanding of dào among many of Zhuangzi’s contemporary sympathizers is 
directly related to the ways they overlook nature’s place within his philosophy. Even 
those writers who look for alternatives to the widely accepted skeptical and mystical 
interpretations of Zhuangzi generally draw from a mostly western philosophical 
framework that, in the very least, hangs on assumptions rooted in some sort of 
                                                 
188 Cf. Ryder, John. “Reconciling Pragmatism and Naturalism.” In Pragmatic Naturalism and 
Realism. Ed. by John R. Shook (Prometheus, 2003) p. 64 
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dualism. Such characterizations often lead to arbitrary interpretive assumptions, and 
these undermine Zhuangzi’s depiction of dào as a continuity that arises out of the 
flux of nature. In other words, on Zhuangzi’s view, the dào is “an emergent, 
‘bottom-up’ order rather than something imposed, [and] any interpretation of dào 
that would reduce it to preexisting laws or principles that discipline the natural world 
in some necessary way would be problematic.”189 
Likewise, Zhuangzi’s “person of the dào” (which he called the zhēnrén or “true 
person”) would not have her head in the clouds, nor would she doubt everything. 
Rather, she would be so attuned to the natural world around her that life itself would 
be viewed as a reflection of natural change, and as such, she would neither be 
frightened by death nor posit a supernatural afterlife. As Zhuangzi put it,  
The True [person] of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, 
knew nothing of hating death. He emerged [from nature] without 
delight; he went back in without a fuss. He came briskly, he went 
briskly, and that was all. He didn't forget where he began; he didn't 
try to find out where he would end. He received something and took 
pleasure in it; he forgot about it and handed it back again. This is 
what I call not using the mind to repel the Way, not using man to 
help out Heaven [tiān]. This is what I call the True [Person].190 
 
The translator of this passage, Burton Watson, chose to render the Chinese tiān 
[] as “Heaven,” although the meaning in ancient China was more ambiguous than 
this, and operated for the Chinese in a manner akin to the German himmel, the Latin 
cælum or even the Greek στερέωμα. Two of the leading American sinologists, David 
Hall and Roger Ames have noted that there is a “strong association between tian and 
                                                 
189 Ames, Roger. (ed.) Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi (SUNY, 1998) p. 7  
190 Watson, p. 78 
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the natural environment.”191 Likewise, Chan acknowledged in his Source Book that 
the “concept of Nature” held significance in Zhuangzi’s thought and translated tiān 
in light of it, although his choice to capitalize the word throughout his work 
undermined his efforts.192    
Much of the argument for understanding Zhuangzi as a naturalist draws upon a 
reading of Daoism, which could be called the focus-field model, established by Hall 
and Ames in their translation of the writings of Laozi titled Dao De Jing: Making 
This Life Significant (2003). According to this model, daoist cosmology is best 
understood as correlative insofar as it expresses a reciprocal and complementary 
matrix of relations between existent things. They call this framework of significance 
relations a “field,” and the way the field shapes how we interact with the world 
around us they refer to as its “focus.” For the daoist, as they put it, “there is 
ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives.”193 
Experience, then, is considered as continuous with the concrete world and a human 
being is seen as a “quantum of unique experience.”194  
Using the term cosmology to describe the daoist position is somewhat 
misleading, however. The daoist would not agree with Parmenides that, “all is 
Being.” Instead she might posit something like, “all are becomings.” Hall and Ames 
identify in Chinese thought a discernible absence of what they call a “one behind the 
many metaphysics,” and, as such, they argue that there is no Chinese counterpart to 
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the Greek term κόσμος.195 When the daoist wanted to denote the totality of existence 
in their writings, they used the phrase wànwù [萬物] or “the myriad things,” which 
demonstrates how deeply pluralistic Chinese thought must have been.196 Hall and 
Ames call this daoist position “acosmotic thinking.”  
Hall and Ames also identify the Chinese yŭzhòu [宇宙] as the term that is most 
often translated into the English “cosmos.” The etymology of this term is interesting 
insofar as it a compound of the characters for “room” and “time” and is somewhat 
related in meaning to the post-Newtonian term “space-time.” For the Chinese, to 
exist was to exist in time. Theirs was an ontology of events and processes, not 
“objects” in the sense of objectified substances, and this sentiment is succinctly 
expressed in the classical Chinese phrase wùhuà [物化] or “things transform.” In this 
way, “things” (now understood as temporal and changing entities) are inextricably 
tied to their surroundings. Simply put, their context is constitutive. 
The field, then, could be understood as a sort of fabric, rewoven constantly, of 
which the pattern is not some prescribed telos, but rather an emergent property, and 
in which the various threads are relations among its constituents. As Ames put it in 
his Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi (1998), “the myriad things are perturbations 
of hylozoistic energies that coordinate themselves to constitute the harmonious 
regularity that is dào.”197 Simply stated, the order found in such a system is bottom-
up, not top-down. Focus, on such an account, would be the way in which the fabric 
gets bunched up in experience. The locus of experience for the daoist, however, 
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would not be some disembodied mind, cut off from the rest of existence. Rather, the 
Chinese believed that the center of understanding was xīn [心] – a character that 
represented the heart. This is important because a daoist would not have spoken of 
knowledge as involving the “coolness of reason” – because she had no conception of 
the dualism to which such a statement attends; for her, all understanding always 
already comes with contextual strings. Since individuals within the field are 
“mutually implicating,” as Hall and Ames put it, then experience always points back 
to the field. Understood in these terms, experience is not something that passively 
“happens to” but instead is something that is actively “done.” The daoist has 
moments of life-experience, not perceptions. Thus, experience, for the daoist, insofar 
as it is experience, is simply life, intensified. Rather than standing for the 
imprisonment of one’s own inner sensations, it means a lively interaction within the 
field; at its sharpest, it indicates total interpenetration of self and surroundings. In 
lieu of a total yielding to the flux and flow of transformation [wùhuà], it provides the 
only presentation of an order that is neither antecedent nor stagnant but is pulsating 
and evolving, an order that is called dào. In this way, Daoism incorporated insights 
regarding the flux of nature from the ancient text known as the Yìjīng, or “Book of 
Changes.”  According to the Yìjīng, the order manifested in the changes of nature 
shows up as a unity of opposites, as interplay between yīn [陰] and yáng [陽].  The 
daoist believed that everything in nature could be broken down into its respective yīn 
and yáng states, and since these states were understood as being in movement rather 
than held in absolute stasis – anything could be seen as its opposite when viewed 
from an alternate perspective.   
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In light of all this, it seems the supernatural and the relativistic interpretations 
of Zhuangzi’s dào involve difficulties. Passages in the Zhuangzi like the one in his 
second chapter, which states, “Heaven [tiān] and earth were born at the same time I 
was, the ten thousand things are one with me” need not be seen as irrationally 
paradoxical nor as advocating a transcendent mysticism – as many scholars take it to 
represent.198 Instead, it can be understood as an assertion of the type of 
interpenetration of self and surroundings which takes heed of the unity of 
opposites.199 Likewise, statements such as, “A road is made by people walking on it; 
things are so because they are called so. What makes them so? Making them so 
makes them so,”200 as well as the story of the beauties Mao-Ch’iang and Lady Li 
(considered attractive by men but frightening to fish, birds and deer) need not be 
taken as endorsements of an insipid, skeptical relativism.201 This is particularly true 
when read in conjunction with other passages, such as,  
If you want to nourish a bird with what nourishes a bird, then you 
should let it roost in the deep forest… Names should stop when they 
have expressed reality, concepts of right should be founded on what 
is suitable. This is what it means to have command of reason…202  
 
Here, it seems that Zhuangzi is not advocating relativism but rather reminding us to 
look for principles that are appropriate to the environing conditions. This signifies 
the tie to context that all understanding entails within a daoist framework. It seems 
western readers have a tendency to confuse the sound idea that it is often difficult to 
                                                 
198 Watson, p. 43 
199 Contra thinkers like Wing-Tsit Chan and Harold Roth, A.C. Graham and Chad Hansen agree that 
Zhuangzi does not assent to the notion that all things are one. Brook Ziporyn, for one, argues that 
Zhuangzi is not necessarily a mystic, but is a special kind of holist.  
200 Watson, p. 40 
201 Paul Kjellberg and Lisa Raphals are two who advance the skeptical interpretation of Zhuangzi.   
202 Watson, pp. 194-195  
 121
distinguish right from wrong unless one looks at the surrounding circumstances with 
the mistaken notion that both points of view are equally valid and universally 
applicable. Zhuangzi would have assented to the former, not the latter. 
Perhaps the most recognizable passage from Zhuangzi’s work is also the one 
that most commentators cite as evidence of Zhuangzi’s skepticism. It recounts the 
story of when Zhuangzi dreamt he was a butterfly. In all of East Asia, this parable 
has come to be recognized as the Zhuangzi story. From Singapore to Japan, it is 
taught to Asian school children at the earliest of ages and is as deeply rooted in the 
Asian psyche as the story of George Washington and the cherry tree is in ours. It 
goes as follows… 
Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting 
and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. 
He didn't know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and 
there he was, solid and unmistakably Chuang Chou. But he didn't 
know if he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or 
a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Chou.203  
 
Many western commentators see this as an Eastern analog to Cartesian doubt. Yet, 
the passage continues with, “Between Chuang Chou and a butterfly there must be 
some distinction! This is called the Transformation of Things [wùhuà].”204 This last 
line shows that the point of the story is not to advance skepticism about the limits of 
knowledge, but rather to illustrate the dynamic holism of the dào. The fleeting 
distinctions between “myriad things,” such as people and butterflies, indicate fluidity 
in the field of nature and in the focus of experience through a shifting of perspective. 
                                                 
203 Ibid. p. 49 
204 Ibid. 
 122
Because experience is active, and nature, dynamic, then it might seem that, for 
the daoist, socio-ethical actions should require a rigorous and disciplined moral 
training in order to navigate the precarious and changing world around us. This was 
certainly the belief of Confucius – the most prominent of all Chinese thinkers. In his 
collected sayings, Confucius advocated formal study, strict family values, and 
adherence to ritual as means for developing a noble character in the youth. Zhuangzi, 
on the other hand, rejected the Confucian system on the grounds that it was little 
more than a manual for attaining the virtues of a court minister, or a bureaucratic 
official. The coldness of ritual posturing, which Confucianism had fallen into by 
Zhuangzi’s time, was one of his main philosophical targets. Simply put, where 
Confucius sought rigor, Zhuangzi advocated vigor.  
For instance, in chapter thirty-one of the Zhuangzi there is a story about a 
fisherman who confronts Confucius about his teachings. After hearing that 
Confucius prized benevolence and ritual propriety, the fisherman laughed and said,  
As far as benevolence goes, he [Confucius] is benevolent all right. 
But I am afraid he will not escape unharmed. To weary the mind 
and wear out the body, putting Truth [zhēn] in peril like this – alas, 
I’m afraid he is separated from the Great Way by a vast distance 
indeed!205 
 
After a lengthy disputation, an exasperated Confucius finally asks, “Please, may I 
ask what you mean by ‘the Truth.’”206 In his response, the fisherman explains that 
zhēn consists in sincerity, but a sincerity toward one’s self, out of which filiality, 
kindness, appropriateness, loyalty and honesty all grow. The fisherman goes on to 
explain that,  
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Rites are something created by the vulgar men of the world; the 
Truth is what is received from Heaven [tīan]. By nature it is the way 
it is and cannot be changed. Therefore the sage patterns himself on 
Heaven [tīan], and prizes the Truth, and does not allow himself to 
be cramped by the vulgar.207 
 
The daoist concept of zhēn, therefore, is a direct challenge to the Confucian ethical 
system. The author(s) of the Zhuangzi viewed the Confucian emphasis on ritual 
propriety and benevolence as officious and too easily corruptible, thus the comment 
in one passage that these terms seem to be praised most often at the gates of 
oppressive rulers.  
The Zhuangzi, in a Nietzschean fashion, calls for a re-evaluation of all moral 
conventions. The best way for one to attain virtue, we are told, is, 
To be unsnared by vulgar ways, to make no vain show of material 
things, to bring no hardship on others, to avoid offending the mob, 
to seek peace and security for the world, preservation of the 
people's lives, full provender for others as well as oneself, and to 
rest content when these aims are fulfilled, in this way bringing 
purity to the heart - there were those in ancient times who believed 
that the "art of the Way" lay in these things.208 
 
The individual who could achieve this is Zhuangzi’s “person of the dao,” and would 
be called the zhēnrén [真人], or “true person.” This figure is Zhuangzi’s moral 
exemplar and is likely instituted as a foil to the Confucian “noble person,” or jūnzi. It 
is best to understand the genuineness of the zhēnrén as a type of authenticity, or as 
William Callahan has stated it, an “untrammeled” quality.209 
Zhuangzi first introduced his zhēnrén in the sixth of his “Inner Chapters.” As 
he put it, 
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What do I mean by a True [Person]? The True [Person] of ancient times 
did not rebel against want, did not grow proud in plenty, and did not plan 
his affairs. A man like this could commit an error and not regret it, could 
meet with success and not make a show. A man like this could climb the 
high places and not be frightened, could enter the water and not get wet, 
could enter the fire and not get burned. His knowledge was able to climb 
all the way up to the Way like this.210    
 
For Zhuangzi, the zhēnrén reflects the native vitality of the myriad things [wànwù]. 
“[The] goal,” as Chan explained, “is absolute spiritual emancipation and peace, to be 
achieved through knowing the capacity and limitations of one’s own nature, 
nourishing it, and adapting it to the universal process of transformation.”211 In other 
words, the zhēnrén is able to act in a manner that mirrors the constant transformation 
[wùhuà] of the things of the universe – a manner that Zhuangzi referred to as wúwéi 
[無為]. Wúwéi, which is often mistranslated as “non-action,” is a type of effortless 
doing that requires “spontaneity,” or zìrán [自然]. Zhuangzi tells us that in order to 
avoid the confusion that can arise when “this” and “that” dissolve into one, the 
zhēnrén must seek “clarity,” or míng [明]. As A.C. Graham has stated, the person 
who acts from wúwéi in this manner,  
[…] can do so only at one moment and in one way; by attending to 
the situation until it moves him, he discovers the move which is 
‘inevitable’ (pu te yi, the one in which he ‘has no alternative’) like a 
physical reflex. But he hits on it only if he perceives with perfect 
clarity, as though in a mirror.212 
 
Zhuangzi believed that this type of clarity and spontaneity had been leveled down in 
society at large by the conventions of Confucian ethics. The best way to recover that 
verve, according to the Zhuangzi, would be through attunement with nature. By this, 
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he did not mean for us merely to become more conscientious of our natural 
environment, though this was certainly a key element in his thought, but rather he 
hoped that a respect for the nature of all the myriad things could be fostered. This is 
best illustrated in the beginning of the second chapter, wherein it is explained that 
the pipings of earth, man, and nature (tīan) resonate from the blowing of the same 
wind. As the last remark of that passage reads, “When blown, all of these openings 
sound differently, and each shows attunement in its own way; in each case the tune 
chooses itself, but who does the blowing?”213  
One might wonder how we might foster social harmony without a Confucian 
system of ritual propriety. Zhuangzi addressed this in his typical fashion,  
A beam or pillar can be used to batter down a city wall, but it is no 
good for stopping up a little hole - this refers to a difference in 
function. Thoroughbreds like Ch'i-chi and Hua-liu could gallop a 
thousand li in one day, but when it came to catching rats they were 
no match for the wildcat or the weasel - this refers to a difference in 
skill. The horned owl catches fleas at night and can spot the tip of a 
hair, but when daylight comes, no matter how wide it opens its 
eyes, it cannot see a mound or a hill - this refers to a difference in 
nature [xìng].214    
 
The point Zhuangzi wishes to make here is that an understanding of the unique 
character, or xìng [性], of other entities fosters a type of respect, a respect that allows 
them to exercise their own autonomy in becoming what they are. This is a practical 
application of that unity of opposites, put forth by the Yijing, which emerges from 
the flux of nature. Zhuangzi continues by claiming,  
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Now do you say, that you are going to make Right your master and 
do away with Wrong, or make Order your master and do away with 
Disorder? If you do, then you have not understood the principle of 
heaven and earth or the nature of the ten thousand things. This is 
like saying that you are going to make Heaven your master and do 
away with Earth, or make Yin your master and do away with Yang. 
Obviously it is impossible.215 
  
Accomplishing this kind of harmony with nature, according to Zhuangzi, is to 
occupy the “hinge of the Way,” or daòshū [道樞], a place “in which ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
no longer find their opposites. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond 
endlessly.”216 The hinge is the central position from which one can witness 
distinctions dissolving into an alternating wax and wane of a singular dào. Only 
from this position is the kind of effortless action of wúwéi really possible. Among a 
number of appropriate responses to any problematic situation the míngmíng zhēnrén 
(or truly enlightened person) would respond in the most appropriate way, and do so 
without any deliberation. 
But, as Zhuangzi would tell us, such deftness often requires innovation, not 
convention. Throughout his text, there are stories of physically deformed figures, 
particularly crippled men and crooked trees, that exhibit the highest virtue because 
they rest at ease within their own nature. For example, at the end of Zhuangzi’s first 
chapter, we find a thinker from the “Logician School” by the name of Hui Shi 
complaining about the worthlessness of a gourd given to him by the king of Wei. 
Zhuangzi explains to his friend that the problem lies not in the gourd, but rather in 
the uses to which Hui Shih has put it, by relating it to a story of a floss-washer who 
sold an ointment for chapped hands to a stranger. Once the stranger had obtained it, 
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he used the ointment to win the favor of the emperor and gain an estate for himself. 
Zhuangzi states, 
The capacity to protect hands was one and the same. In one instance 
it could not save someone from having to bleach silk, yet, when 
used differently… Now you have a fifty-peck gourd; why not use it 
as a big tub and float around on the rivers and lakes instead of being 
worried about its inability to hold things? Conventional bookworm, 
it’s as if you have brambles for brains!217 
 
To this Hui Shi replies, 
I have a big tree. People call it useless. Its roots and trunk are such a 
gnarled mess that no ink line could be drawn on its surface, its 
smaller branches are swept up and crooked and no ruler could be 
applied to it. Stand it upon the roadside and paint it and still no 
carpenter would give heed to it. It is just like your words, big and of 
no use, and should likewise be discarded by everyone.218 
 
Zhuangzi responds, 
Now you, sir, have a big tree and you worry because it's useless. 
Why don't you plant it in Never-Never Land, or the field of the 
Broad-and-Boundless, relax and do nothing by its side, or lie down 
for a free and easy sleep under it? Axes will never shorten its life; 
the affairs of the world will never harm it. If there's no office suited 
for its use, it may rest comfortably in that office far from distress 
and hardship!219 
 
Similarly, in the fourth chapter, a woodsman has a large holy-tree appear to him in a 
dream (after earlier rejecting it as useless). The tree says to him, “If I had been of 
some use, would I ever have grown this large?” The woodsman awakes and admits 
to his disciples that by judging this tree by conventional standards he was “way 
off.”220 Later in the same chapter another large, useless tree is likened to the sage 
insofar as neither can be exploited. And in the fifth chapter, the story is told of a 
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crippled man by the name of Shu who pays a visit to Confucius, but because of his 
awkward appearance, receives an unkind welcome. Later, when Laozi asks him if 
Confucius can be freed from the shackles of his doctrines, the crippled man 
responds, “When Heaven [tiān] has punished him, how can you set him free?”221  
Of course, Zhuangzi did not advocate unqualified innovation. For impetuous 
innovation can often be more dangerous than the most stifling conventionality. This 
is where his emphasis on self-transformation must be noted. On his view, the 
creative vitality of spontaneity must always reflect back upon itself. This is the key 
element in being a “genuine” person. As Chan put it, the zhēnrén… 
…[h]aving attained enlightenment through the light of Nature… 
moves in the realm of ‘great knowledge’ and ‘profound virtue.’ […] 
In his response to change and his understanding of things, his 
principle is inexhaustible, traceless, dark and obscure, and 
unfathomable.222  
 
The point is to transform oneself toward ever-broader perspectives. To illustrate, let 
us turn now to the opening story of Zhuangzi’s first chapter. This chapter, known as 
“Carefree Wandering Afar” [or Xiāo yáo yóu], begins with the story of a giant fish, 
Kun, which transforms into a bird called Peng and travels “ninety thousand li to the 
south.”223 The smaller creatures like the turtle dove and cicada mock him for his 
efforts and ask, “What’s the use of going ninety thousand li to the south?”224 
Zhuangzi’s answer is a cryptic one,  
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If you go off to the green woods nearby, you can take along food 
for three meals and come back with your stomach as full as ever. If 
you are going a hundred li, you must grind your grain the night 
before; and if you are going a thousand li, you must start getting the 
provisions together three months in advance. What do these two 
creatures understand? Little understanding cannot come up to great 
understanding; the short-lived cannot come up to the long-lived. 
How do I know this is so?225 
 
It is of course difficult to decipher the full meaning of such a metaphorical passage, 
however, what seems clear here is Zhuangzi’s belief that the small creatures are 
limited by small perspective. This, by itself, would be a rather mundane 
philosophical point, yet it becomes more intriguing when taken in conjunction with 
what Zhuangzi says about the view of the giant bird:  
He beats the whirlwind and rises ninety thousand li, setting off on the 
sixth month gale. Wavering heat, bits of dust, living things blowing 
each other about – the sky looks very blue. Is that its real color, or is it 
because it is so far away and has no end? When the bird looks down, 
all he sees is blue too.226 
 
By taking a broad perspective, it seems, the giant bird loses some detail in his view. 
Just as a mountain top view provides a good lay of the land but cannot help you 
navigate through a deep thicket, broader perspectives appear useless to those who 
occupy themselves with the day-to-day. Zhuangzi acknowledges this,  
Therefore a man who has wisdom enough to fill one office 
effectively, good conduct enough to impress one community, virtue 
enough to please one ruler, or talent enough to be called into service 
in one state, has the same kind of self-pride as these little 
creatures.227 
 
But the zhēnrén who occupies the “hinge of the way” would not be helpless in a 
situation that called for one of these more narrow views. Just as the transformation of 
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the giant fish into a bird should be viewed as cyclical insofar as it is said to give rise 
to the seasons, great understanding would always be reflexive. For Zhuangzi, great 
knowledge does not come to an end, does not stagnate, but rather, care-freely 
wanders afar in a realm not constrained by dogmatic parameters, where any situation 
can be evaluated on its own terms.      
According to Zhuangzi, it is better to have a crippled form than to have a spirit 
crippled by convention. When individuals are allowed to develop their native 
vitality, and become zhēnrén, a type of freedom is produced that implements the best 
aspects of individuality and community. As Zhuangzi put it,   
I have heard of letting the world be, of leaving it alone; I have never 
heard of governing the world. You let it be for fear of corrupting the 
inborn nature of the world; you leave it alone for fear of distracting 
the Virtue of the world. If the nature of the world is not corrupted, if 
the Virtue of the world is not distracted, why should there be any 
governing of the world?228 
 
Thus, on Zhuangzi’s view, the zhēnrén does not try to govern the world – which 
includes other people in her community – precisely because its growth is her own. 
By understanding that her environment constitutes who she is, she can achieve 
attunement. Yet, this kind of attunement is only meaningful if such an environment 
is both immanent and knowable. As such, the most important aspect of being a 
zhēnrén, and what Zhuangzi believed led to the realization of the sage, is the insight 
that knowledge does not stagnate, that growth is a life-long process toward ever-
broadening understanding. As long as the myriad things continue to transform, this 
endeavor has no final end or “ultimate” perspective. As long as we continue to 
transform ourselves, there is no limit to what we can know.
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Chapter Five: Transformation and Democracy as a Way of Life 
 
You dare to be pleased in your human form. But that human form of yours has countless 
changes that never reach a final end, so joys are really incalculable! [Zhuangzi229]  
 
Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It 
is the idea of community life itself… The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its 
implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. [Dewey230] 
What Dewey and Zhuangzi Share 
 
The suggestion of a valuable comparison between minds from what are, 
seemingly, quite dissimilar philosophical milieus is sometimes met with incredulity. 
Perhaps ideas can be found in Dewey that also appear in Zhuangzi and which bring 
him into closer proximity with Chinese thought in general, but why should we regard 
the mere fact of such a similarity as anything more than philosophical curiosity?  
Before such a question can be answered, it should be noted, however, that the 
problems facing both men were more alike than one might expect. Most notably, 
each of their philosophies was motivated by crisis. For Zhuangzi, the crisis was more 
immediate and concrete because of the political and social turmoil of the Warring 
States period in which he lived. For Dewey, the crisis was more a matter of value 
and principle, as he lived during a period wherein traditional ways of 
thinking increasingly failed to meet the complexities of practical life. Yet, in spite of 
these bleak beginnings, each thinker offered a surprisingly optimistic outlook rife 
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with practical applications. For Dewey, life itself was a series of problematic 
situations that required clever strategies for survival, while for Zhuangzi, becoming a 
sage entailed being able to wander carefree amidst the tumultuous times of ancient 
China. That each man had a pioneering tone to his thought is a consequence of the 
moral frontier that each found himself facing. As pioneers in this sense, Dewey and 
Zhuangzi each sought an account of his milieu that need not rely on speculative 
flights of fancy or on systematic categoricals. In this sense, Zhuangzi and Dewey 
were not so much metaphysicians as they were cataloguers of nature, not so much 
ethicists as they were moralists, not so much political theorists as they were political 
commentators. In this vein, the worth of such a comparison is not the mere pointing 
out of philosophical convergence, but rather the new light that can be shed on the 
issues at hand by casting them in relief of one another. Such a comparison can also 
have value insofar as it can be used to advance a particular philosophical position. 
To utter Dewey’s name in the same breath as any Chinese thinker already suggests a 
contrast to the typical “American” account of his philosophy. Likewise, discussing 
Zhuangzi alongside a thinker as motivated by practicality as Dewey should be 
suggestive of a take which runs contra the (rather common) hermitic interpretations 
of his thought. Finally, whenever two disparate philosophies encounter one another, 
there is always the potential for philosophical innovation. In this case, Dewey and 
Zhuangzi may, together, provide philosophical naturalism with the shot in the arm 
for which it has such a desperate need. Simply put, precisely because both Dewey 
and Zhuangzi can be characterized as social therapists who sought to break the crust 
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of convention and promote human flourishing, philosophers in our age might do well 
to learn from them.  
The twenty-first century is shaping up to be the most decisive in human history 
as we are faced with ecological, political, and social challenges on the scope and 
severity the likes of which the modern world has never seen. The next one hundred 
years may be humanity’s great intelligence test, in which nothing short of our very 
survival hangs in the balance.231 What we are witnessing is a convergence of 
problems once deemed isolated from one another – a convergence wherein 
environmental, political and social programs become intertwined. As climate change 
speeds up, globalization continues to spread and the exhaustion of key resources 
(e.g. oil) draws near, the possibility of a global crisis looms ever larger on the 
horizon. These are the problems our species faces on a new moral and political 
frontier. That philosophy has, by and large, turned its back on them illustrates just 
how detached from concrete affairs the discipline has become. But, Dewey believed 
that there was an opportunity for philosophy to “recover” in such times – a sentiment 
reflected in the Chinese etymology of their word for crisis, wēi jī [危機], which 
combines the character for danger with the character for opportunity – but the key to 
such recovery, Dewey would argue, is an earnest concern for concrete problems, not 
their philosophical abstractions.   
Dewey’s political philosophy, which might be identified as a type of 
“progressive liberalism,” is often attacked from both sides of the political spectrum. 
To communitarians, Dewey seems to fall among the ranks of classical liberal 
                                                 
231 cf. Schönfeld, Martin. “America’s Darwin Awards and a Philosophy Assignment.” Common 
Dreams News Center, Friday, September 9th, 2005. www.commondreams.org 
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theorists like Hobbes, Locke and Mill. To those who identify themselves with that 
liberal tradition, Dewey appears to over-emphasize the social aspects of political life. 
Part of the reason for this is that Dewey sought to bring these two poles together 
under an evolutionary conception of political life. As such, Dewey redefined 
traditionally liberal concepts like autonomy, individuality, and democracy in terms 
of process. On the other hand, Zhuangzi’s political musings are often superficially 
interpreted either as a form of quietism or as an endorsement of anarchism. The latter 
interpretation has been particularly fashionable of late, especially among those who 
draw comparisons between Zhuangzi’s alleged skepticism and playfulness with the 
ironic tolerance of Richard Rorty’s liberalism.232 One suggestion is that the anarchist 
and quietist themes found in the Zhuangzi feed into one another and support a 
political theory that might be called “libertarian” by contemporary standards. This, 
however, is a mischaracterization. As will be shown, if any anarchist theme can be 
associated with Zhuangzi, it would have to be of the utopian, agrarian kind – an 
anarchism which advocates social cooperation and attunement with the land, not 
free-market competition. I will suggest that, given their naturalistic ontologies, the 
labels “liberal” and “anarchist” only apply to Dewey and Zhuangzi in very specific 
ways.  
In what follows, I will argue that the focus-field view of nature and human life 
shared by Dewey and Zhuangzi leads to a single socio-political end – viz. developing 
a harmonious community of mutually reinforcing autonomous individuals – out of 
                                                 
232 cf. Hansen, Chad. “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi,” in Hiding the World 
in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi. Ed. Scott Cook (SUNY, 2003) and Kwang-Sae 
Lee. “Rorty and Chuang Tzu: Anti-representationalism, Pluralism and Conversation.” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy. (1996) 23: 175-192. 
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which a praxis based on ecological wisdom and social justice emerges. This value 
could be summed up in Dewey’s notion of democracy as “a way of life” or the daoist 
concepts known as the “wu-forms” (e.g. wúwéi 無為, wújĭ 無己, wúzhī 無知, and 
wúyù 無欲). The common theoretical element in the notion of democracy as a way of 
life and the wu-forms is the dynamic character of socio-political life. As we have 
already seen, Dewey and Zhuangzi agreed that neither antecedent principles nor final 
ends were applicable in the operations of nature. Here, I should like to suggest that 
each believed that, as it was in the natural realm, so it was in the political. In order to 
flesh this out completely, however, some attention must be paid to the special 
meaning of the key terms in the foregoing description: development, community, 
autonomy and individual.   
Development and Harmony 
 
As we have seen, both Dewey and Zhuangzi held a view of the universe as 
both “precarious and stable” precisely because it is a hodgepodge of intertwined 
events. The order that we do happen to find in our world, according to them, is a 
byproduct of transactions among events and is not to be taken as universal or 
enduring, but rather, as habit or tendency – taken in a sense over and above the 
typical, behavioral one. For them, it made no sense to talk of reality as fixed – given 
the dynamism of nature as a process. Simply put, their view of reality turned on a 
conception of development, and this idea informed their political thinking, as well. 
Due to Darwin’s influence, development took on a decidedly evolutionary 
flavor in Dewey’s work. As shown in chapter three, Dewey believed that 
evolutionary principles should be used to explicate experience and the process of 
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intelligent inquiry. Where experience could be equated with nature in his thought, 
viz. as its “foreground,” inquiry was equivalent to adjustment – i.e. adjustment 
understood as a combination of organismic accommodation, on the one hand, and 
environmental adaptation, on the other.233 Accommodation occurs when an organism 
submits to the conditioning environment, adaptation when it changes the conditions 
to meet its needs, and adjustment when, “There is a composing and harmonizing of 
the various elements of our being such that, in spite of changes in the special 
conditions that surround us, these conditions are also arranged, settled, in relation to 
us.”234  Yet, when it came to the outcome of this process, Dewey did not distinguish 
between the organismic and environmental, but instead used one simple, catchall 
term – “growth.” On his view, growth applied to the organism insofar as it indicated 
the outcome of habit reconstruction within the field of nature. As it applied to the 
environment, growth meant both the natural processes of change within an 
environment and the changes introduced to it by the organisms that lived within it. 
Because of this duality in usage, growth is another important and highly 
misunderstood aspect of Dewey’s thought, one which ties his philosophy and 
psychology to his politics and pedagogy.    
Dewey believed that the world could be changed for the better, both politically 
and physically. That is one reason why he deemed elementary education so 
important – for what better way is there to build human habits than to start very 
early? This is also why he saw democracy as intimately tied up with this type of 
                                                 
233 ACF, LW 9:1-20 
234 Ibid. LW 9:12-13 
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education, one that could instill the habits of critical inquiry into a whole generation 
of human beings. As Dewey put it in a letter to Clara Mitchell in 1895,  
… the primary end of ‘education’ might be said to be (negatively) 
to hinder the growing-up of those obstacles, those mental barriers of 
imagery & feeling, which now shut off more or less almost every 
adult from nature and his fellows; or, positively, to facilitate the 
greatest freedom (continuity, unity) of growth of nature through 
individual action into social action.235 
 
Many of Dewey’s critics, particularly Russell and Santayana, misunderstood his use 
of growth as a philosophical underwriting of American commerce, but Dewey’s 
view was more fine-grained than many have realized, and while it included growth 
in this industrial sense, it went well beyond it, too.  
James Scott Johnston has identified at least three different ways in which 
Dewey discussed growth in his writings.236 The first, which could be called 
“organismic growth,” has to do with the mutual interaction between an organism and 
its environment. This is the sense of growth humans share with all species, which 
stands for the way one fills an ecological/environmental role (or perhaps fills one’s 
function well) that is called biological maturity and is the sense often employed by 
developmental psychology. But it is the second and third ways in which Dewey 
employed growth that highlight development as a socio-political end. The growth 
that comes from the fund of experience and habits that have been built up through 
inquiry, what Johnston identifies as “the growth of judgments,” offers a way of 
accommodating the conventions of a tradition without loss of practical efficacy. 
                                                 
235 Dewey, John. 
“John Dewey to Clara I. Mitchell.” The Correspondence of John Dewey, Volume 1: 1871-1918. 
(Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 2005) 1895.11.29 (00272) [my emphasis] 
236 cf. Johnston, James Scott. Inquiry and Education: John Dewey and the Quest for Democracy. 
(SUNY, 2006.) 
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After all, if one makes use of the outcomes of one’s own past inquiries in order to 
resolve new indeterminate situations, then it follows that using the outcome of the 
inquiries of one’s forbears can only supplement this fund of experience. Newton’s 
dictum about standing on the shoulders of giants comes to mind here, as does 
Dewey’s own musings about being a link in the ongoing chain of human existence. 
Most importantly, though, is the sense of growth which Johnston calls 
“experiential.”  
To grow experientially is the byproduct of “judgmental growth” insofar as the 
use of this fund of experience allows for deeper and more robust future experiences. 
To illustrate, one could imagine a child, a university student, and a distinguished 
professor of art history standing in the Sistine Chapel, and while each has the same 
sensory perception, it seems evident that the latter’s experience would be the richest 
one, given the wealth of intellectual and experiential habits she has accumulated. As 
Johnston has put it,  
To construct meaningful facts about the world is to expand the fund 
of meaning one has. To expand the fund of meaning one has is to 
enrich present and future experiences. Inquiry is the primary means 
by which growth is occasioned, and inquiry is a habit that is (and 
must be) developed, brought to bear on environmental and social 
situations. To develop this habit is precisely what is meant by 
education.237 
 
According to Dewey, inquiry, and ipso facto the growth that arises out of it, always 
already takes place in the having of an experience.  
So, it would seem that the crux of Dewey’s view – nicely summed up in the 
last line of that letter to Clara Mitchell – is that when education is at its best, it does 
                                                 
237 Ibid. p. 111 
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not drive a wedge between the human and the non-human, but rather fosters our 
native talent for coping with the precariousness of nature through imagination. 
Understanding education in this way leads one to conclude that there is no terminus 
to the process of educational growth, but rather it is a continual pursuit whose only 
telos is more growth. Simply put, Dewey believed that growth was an inevitable 
aspect of life, one that could be nourished and directed, or untended and chaotic. The 
latter form stems from a classically liberal, laissez-faire approach and can lead to 
overgrowth and morbidity. Dewey rejected this approach and instead sought a 
growing together of individuals within a community. Consequently, his view of 
liberty was not a negative one – i.e. “freedom from” – but rather a positive one – i.e. 
“freedom to.” The kind of carefully self-directed growth espoused by Dewey has 
been called by Daniel Savage “the will to harmony” and he characterizes it in terms 
of “the generic inclination of all life toward development and adaptation,” of which, 
“natural selection shows that the law of all life is not bare survival but the 
optimization of each species’ capacities as these capacities are called out by their 
environment.”238 In this way, Dewey believed that our species’ knack for 
imaginative responses to problematic situations could be trusted to foster social 
progress as long as institutions were not allowed to impede its natural development.  
The idea that harmony was possible whenever natural capacities were allowed 
to develop was an idea to which Zhuangzi would have assented. Though it is obvious 
that the ancient Chinese did not have the benefit of reading Darwin, growth operated 
for Dewey in a manner similar to transformation, or wùhuà [物化], for Zhuangzi. For 
                                                 
238 Savage, Daniel. John Dewey’s Liberalism. (SIU Press, 2001) p. 5 
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other ancient Chinese thinkers, transformation was primarily an ontological process, 
but for Zhuangzi, it was also a process of harmonious development among living 
creatures. A passage in the eighteenth chapter illustrates this:   
How many are the seeds? They get water and become active, at 
water’s edge they become the robes of frogs and oysters [like 
lichens]. They sprout on the slopes and become “Hill Slippers.” Hill 
Slippers get rich soil and become “Raven’s Claw.” The roots of 
Raven’s Claw become “Maggot Sties” and their leaves become 
“Butterfly Dewlaps.” The Butterfly Dewlaps get together, 
transform, and become insects that live under the stove; their shapes 
peel off and they are called “Myna Gathers.” After a thousand days, 
the Myna Gathers become birds called “Old Hollow Bones.” The 
spittle of the Old Hollow Bones becomes a Simi [斯彌] and the Simi 
becomes “Pickle Flies.” Yilu are born from the “Pickle Flies,” and 
Huangkuang [  ] from Jiuyu [九猷]. Jiuyu are born from Maorui 
[瞀芮]and Maorui are born from “Rot Worms” and Rot Worms are 
born from “Sheep's Groom.” Sheep's Groom couples with bamboo 
that has not sprouted for a long while and produces “Green Peace 
plants.” Green Peace plants produce leopards and leopards produce 
horses and horses produce people. People, in time, return again to 
the workings. So all the myriad things come out of the workings 
and go back into them again.239 
 
Though the details of this passage run somewhat contrary to our contemporary 
scientific understanding of evolution, and are probably not meant to be taken too 
seriously, there are several themes working here that relate to the growth of a 
Darwin-cum-Dewey variety – viz. perpetual change, taxonomic continuity of species 
and increasing complexity. 
Just as Dewey saw growth as both a natural and social affair, so did Zhuangzi see 
transformation as “the coordinating of the patterns (li ) of continuity that emerge 
and persist in the natural, social, and cultural flux in which we are radically and 
                                                 
239 cf. Watson, pp. 195-6 [interpolated with my own translations] 
 141
resolutely embedded.”240 For Zhuangzi, just as for Dewey, knowledge was 
situational because it was concomitant with the emergence of these patterns in 
nature. Human beings contribute to the formation of the contexts we inhabit through 
interaction with other contributing factors. According to Zhuangzi, this kind of 
transformation can either accord with dào or work against it; it can be either 
harmonious or cacophonous. This is illustrated in the opening passages of 
Zhuangzi’s second chapter, Qí wù lùn [齊物論].  
 
南 郭 子 綦 隱 几 而 坐，仰 天 而 
 ，嗒 焉 似 喪 其 耦. 
 
顏 成 子 游 立 侍 乎 前, 曰: 何 居 
乎? 形 固 可 使 如 槁 木，而 心 固 
可 使 如 死 灰 乎? 今 之 隱 几 
者，非 昔 之 隱 几 者 也. 
 
子 綦 曰：偃， 不 亦 善 乎，而 問 
之 也! 今 者 吾 喪 我, 汝 知 之 
乎? 女 聞 人 籟 而 未 聞 地 籟，女 
聞 地 籟 而 未 聞 天 籟 夫! 
 
子 游 曰: 敢 問 其 方. 
 
子 綦 曰: 夫 大 塊 噫 氣, 其 名 為 
風. 是 唯 作, 作 則 萬 竅 怒  . 
而 獨 不 聞 之 翏 翏 乎? 
 
 
山 林 之 畏 佳, 大 木 百 圍 之 竅 
穴, 似 鼻, 似 口, 似 耳, 似 枅, 似 
圈, 似 臼, 似 洼 者，似   者; 激 
者，謞 者，叱 者，吸 者，叫 者，譹 
者，宎 者，咬 者，前 者 唱 于 而 
Master Qì of Nanguo sat arcanely at a small table; 
he looked up at the sky and sighed in despair as if 
he had just lost his spouse.  
 
Master Yan-cheng Yòu, who stood there tending 
to him, said: “What is it?  What’s made your face 
appear as hard as dry wood, and your heart as 
dead as ash?  Is he who sits arcanely at the table 
now, not the same person who sat there before?” 
 
Qì said: “Yan, that question is a good one! Just 
now I mourned the loss of myself. Do you 
understand? Oh. Perhaps you’ve only heard the 
pipes of man and not yet the pipes of the land, 
perhaps you’ve heard the pipes of the land and 
have not yet heard the pipes of nature.” 
 
Yòu replied: “I dare to ask where you’re going 
with all this.” 
  
Qì continued: “The great glob produced its vital 
breath and its name became ‘wind.’ Sometimes it 
doesn’t blow, but when it does, it resonates loudly 
through countless openings. Have you not heard 
its tremendous roar?” 
 
 
“In great, reverent mountain forests, it surrounds 
the openings and cavities of huge trees – even 
those as large as one hundred spans around – as if 
they were mere nostrils, or mouths, or ears; as if 
they were building squares, or corrals, or mortars, 
or hollows; as if they were puddles; intense, 
                                                 
240 Ames, Roger. “Knowing in the Zhuangzi: ‘From Here, on the Bridge, over the River Huo,” in 
Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. ed. by Roger Ames. (SUNY, 1998) p. 226 [NOTE: This concept 
should not be confused with its homophone lĭ, which means “ritual.”] 
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隨 者 唱 喁. 
 
 
泠 風 則 小 和，飄 風 則 大 和，厲 
風 濟 則 眾 竅 為  . 而 獨 不 見 
之 調 調， 之 刁 刁 乎? 
 
子 游 曰: 地 籟 則 眾 竅 是 已, 人 
籟 則 比 竹 是 已. 敢 問 天 籟.   
 
子 綦 曰: 夫 吹 萬 不 同, 而 使 其 
自 己 也，咸 其 自 取，怒 者 其 誰 
邪! 
ruddy, howling, sucking, crying, roaring, shouting 
and biting; they first sing softly and later the 
harmony grows louder.” 
 
“Gentle gushes produce small harmonies, and 
welling up produces great harmonies, yet when 
the tempest subsides these openings fall silent. 
Have you not seen this melodious movement, this 
cunning commotion?” 
 
Yòu replied: “I take it that the pipes of the land 
are just these openings that you speak of. And the 
pipes of man are just bamboo reeds. I dare to ask 
about the pipes of nature.” 
 
Qì explained: “When blown, all of these openings 
sound differently, and each shows attunement in 
its own way; in each case the tune chooses itself, 
but who does the blowing?”241 
 
This exchange is immediately followed by a comparison of great understanding, 
which is “elegant and easy-going” [閑閑], and petty understanding, which is 
“scattered and lazy” [閒閒].242 What Zhuangzi seems to suggest is that the most 
harmonious lives are those that adopt the broadest perspectives. Those with petty 
perspectives view the vibrations of others as a nuisance, while those with a broad 
perspective join in the refrain. As Scott Cook has stated it,  
… the angry cries of a myriad clashing individual entities might 
annoy us only if we recognize ourselves as one of their number, as a 
competitor whose meager voice gets drowned out in all the racket. 
If, instead, we were to step back for a minute and listen to the 
chorus from the standpoint of its unity… then we might come to see 
ourselves too playing whatever instrument is natural to us without 
trying to impose it upon others.243 
 
                                                 
241 My translation. 
242 “Great understanding is   , petty understanding is  ” … the pronunciation of these 
characters is the same [xián], as is the denotation [idleness] but the connotation and etymology  are 
slightly different. The former is derived from tree/wood [mù] and door/gate [mén], the latter comes 
from a combination of moon/moonlight [yuè] and mén. Thus, the connotation of the first may be 
“sturdy idleness” while the second could be read as “scattered idleness.” 
243 Cook, Scott. “Harmony and Cacophony in the Panpipes of Heaven,” in Hiding the World in the 
World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi. Ed by Scott Cook (SUNY, 2003) p. 68 
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The difference, then, is between seeing oneself as an isolated individual in a society 
or as a contributing member of a community. 
Community and Individuality 
 
Although we commonly use “society” and “community” interchangeably, I 
believe Dewey’s contribution to political thought can be boiled down to a difference 
between thinking in terms of society and thinking in terms of community. The 
etymology of each word supports a distinction. Society derives from the Latin 
societas and has connotations of order and friendliness, which are most apparent 
when we use the term to refer to organizations such as recreational clubs and 
academic groups. If we think of society in these terms, i.e. as “ordered friendliness,” 
we may begin to look at some features of our global era in a new light. By itself, 
ordered friendliness seems fairly innocuous. However, when considered in 
conjunction with the machinery and practices of consumerism, “ordered 
friendliness” may invoke some chilling images of our future.244 Community, on the 
other hand, is derived from communitas, also a Latin term, which means fellowship 
and sharing things in common. This seems to be just what Dewey had in mind in his 
elucidation of the Public.245 
                                                 
244 This is nowhere more apparent than in cyberspace. The advent of the Internet was touted as the 
first real step toward cosmopolitanism, the next great frontier. But, like frontiers before it, it has 
largely failed to live up to its promise, and has instead become a haven for new forms of corruption 
and exploitation. Even when the Internet is not being abused criminally, its effects on culture are, at 
best, diluting and, at worst, corrosive. Instead of bringing us together, it seems cyberspace has driven 
us further apart, with only the thin illusion of togetherness as a consolation. Under this rubric, 
friendship has been replaced by mere friendliness. Friends have become a commodity, pre-packaged 
in a convenient list that changes on a whim. 
245 It is likely that Dewey’s distinction between the Great Community and the Great Society was 
influenced by a similar one (made by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies) between 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. Though Dewey only ever mentioned Tönnies in relation to the latter’s 
scholarship on Hobbes, a 1949 letter from Arthur Bentley to Joseph Ratner can be found among 
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In 1927 Dewey released The Public and Its Problems, a series of lectures that 
were the fullest expression of his naturalized “instrumentalism” relevant to political 
thought. There, Dewey anticipated the need for moving from the nationalism of the 
“great society” towards the cosmopolitanism of “the great community” and 
developed what he saw as the philosophical groundwork leading to the latter. As he 
put it,  
[I]f the Great Society is to become a Great Community; a society in 
which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences 
of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of that word, 
so that an organized, articulate Public comes into being. The highest 
and most difficult kind of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, vivid and 
responsive art of communication must take possession of the 
physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathe life 
into it.246 
 
On Dewey’s view, the concept of a “public” must be driven by problematic 
situations facing a particular group at a particular time, and, because we have largely 
failed to understand this, “the public” remains an ill-defined and illusory notion. 
Dewey’s approach provides a means for the public to realize itself and move towards 
the establishment of a world community that is based upon a conception of human 
flourishing through “native intelligence” rather than on the philosophical 
abstractions of individual rights and freedoms.247  
The first chapter of Dewey’s text, which bears the title “Search for the Public,” 
begins with a discussion of the divergence of facts and theories regarding the nature 
of the political state. Dewey indicted political philosophers, on the one hand, for 
                                                                                                                                          
Dewey’s collected correspondence which alludes to the (often unnamed) influence Tönnies had on 
American political theorists of Dewey’s generation.  
246 Dewey, John. “The Public and its Problems.” The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953 – 
The Later Works. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984) Vol. 2, p. 350 [hereafter 
abbreviated as LW, 2] 
247 Cf. Savage, “Introduction: Pragmatic Instrumentalism,” for a fuller treatment of this difference. 
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beginning with a theoretical abstraction (the form of the Good, the social contract, 
Weltgeist, etc.) and interpreting whatever data they encounter in light of that ideal. 
He attacked political scientists, on the other hand, for the way they pass off their 
interpretation of data as brute fact. But, as he stated,  
The more sincerely we appeal to facts, the greater is the importance 
of the distinction between facts which condition human activity and 
facts which are conditioned by human activity. In the degree which 
we ignore this difference, social science becomes pseudo-science.248 
 
On his view, neither speculation nor analysis is adequate by itself because,  
 
 …the difference between facts which are what they are 
independent of human desire and endeavor and facts which are to 
some extent what they are because of human interest and purpose, 
and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be got rid of by 
any methodology.249 
 
Thus, Dewey thought it best to leave aside the notion of the state, and concentrate 
instead on the concept of the public.  
Dewey suggested that, rather than starting from the imagined cause of human 
actions and behaviors, we should begin with the acts themselves in order to get an 
understanding of political life. In this vein, he suggested that an any inquiry begun in 
earnest ought to start from “the objective fact that human actions have consequences 
upon others, that some of these consequences are perceived, and that their perception 
leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences and 
avoid others.”250 Accordingly, there are two types of consequences, those which 
affect only the parties involved in the action, and those that have collateral effects on 
others. This, he argued, was the germ of the distinction between private and public. 
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If you and I have a conversation, the consequences of which do not affect anyone 
else, then we may properly call this conversation a private one. But, if our discussion 
affects any other party, then our discussion is public. It is a commonplace in political 
theory to see this distinction, between public and private, conflated with that of the 
social versus the individual. Dewey believed that this was a mistake. On his view,  
Many private acts are social; their consequences contribute to the 
welfare of the community or affect its status and prospects. In the 
broad sense any transaction deliberately carried on between two or 
more persons is social in quality. It is a form of associated behavior 
and its consequences may influence further associations.251   
 
Another mistake that is often made regarding the public and the private is the 
assumption that public affairs should be equated with the socially useful or 
expedient. Public endeavors (such as war) can have disastrous social effects, just as 
private ones (like business) may benefit human association. Though this insight “has 
not carried us far, at least it has warned us against identifying the community and its 
interests with the state or the politically organized community,” it has warned us 
against conflating community with society.252 
Dewey’s argument was an ingenious one, and largely ahead of its time. Instead 
of attempting to define the state in theoretical or evidential terms, he instead looks 
toward the functions of human association. This functionalist approach is, of course, 
an outcropping of his naturalism. As we have seen, Dewey argued in earlier volumes 
like Experience and Nature that experience and nature were functionally contiguous 
with one another, that organisms were always immersed in commerce with their 
surrounding environment, and that our continual attempt to separate the human from 
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the non-human in experience was simply philosophical obstinance. In a similar way, 
on his view, a public is created, or emerges, from the consequences of associated 
living - an idea that still finds relevance in the work of thinkers like Jürgen 
Habermas and Ulrich Beck. As Beck put it in 2006,  
Although Dewey was certainly not thinking of global warming, 
BSE [mad cow disease] or terrorist attacks, his idea is perfectly 
applicable to world risk society. A global public discourse does not 
grow out of a consensus on decisions, but out of dissent over the 
consequences of decisions. Modern risk crises are constituted by 
just such controversies over consequences. Where some may see an 
overreaction to risk, it is also possible to see grounds for hope. 
Because such risk conflicts do indeed have an enlightenment 
function. They destabilise the existing order, but the same events 
can also look like a vital step towards the building of new 
institutions. Global risk has the power to tear away the facades of 
organised irresponsibility.253 
  
According to Dewey, there could be many publics, as many as there are actions 
that have the indirect, public type of consequence. In fact, one person may belong to 
several distinct publics at one time. Were human associated activity healthy, i.e. not 
pervaded with corruption and exploitation, the result would largely resemble a 
harmony – much like the stasis an ecosystem would reach if its species were 
perfectly balanced. But, Dewey realized that such a condition was not achievable on 
a permanent basis, whether in politics or ecosystems, nor would it be desirable even 
if it were, because of the dynamic and variable nature of these systems. Just as 
changes in species and environments keep the natural world in constant flux, 
population growth, migration, and technological advancement keep the political 
realm in continuous change. Simply put, Dewey’s philosophy still presupposed the 
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Enlightenment-era notion of social progress, but with a twist. Because he saw 
growth as both a means and an end, he rejected the idea of a final, utopian political 
end that had been espoused by Modern thinkers like Hegel and criticized by post-
Moderns like Adorno.  
Progress was not a necessary feature of the world for Dewey, but rather was a 
contingency that required careful and constant vigilance to ensure. As problematic 
situations continually arise, innovative solutions are continuously required. This was 
where Dewey’s naturalism and instrumentalism intersected, and though critics, 
influenced by Moore’s naturalistic fallacy or Adorno’s suspicion of technocracy, 
balked at his ideas, this marriage foreshadowed many concepts still viable today. 
John Teehan and Christopher diCarlo are two thinkers who have argued that 
Dewey’s thought was not as vulnerable to a Moorean critique as many surmised:  
For Dewey, we engage in moral inquiry because there is no clear, 
objective moral truth at hand. We investigate in order to better 
understand the conditions of human valuations and so be better 
equipped to understand and resolve those dilemmas which we must 
face… For Dewey, to claim “x” is “good” is not to commit the 
naturalistic fallacy of identifying a natural property with a moral 
evaluation. It is to judge that “x” will resolve the problematic 
situation.254 
 
According to Teehan and diCarlo, Moore’s Open Question, once such a Deweyan 
understanding is in place, is a poor question, wrongly asked: 
Once we have established that “x” resolves the dilemma to then ask 
if it is good is either redundant, or it is to ask for further evaluation 
of the proposed resolution—i.e. it is to ask “does x truly resolve the 
dilemma?” “does it resolve the dilemma in the short run but create 
greater long term problems?” “does it resolve the problem by 
frustrating other significant interests?” etc. These are all fair 
questions, indeed important questions. They do not imply, however, 
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that there is some fallacy lurking beneath the moral judgment, they 
merely seek to continue the process of moral inquiry in a meta-
ethically and epistemically responsible way.255 
 
Likewise, David Savage has argued against the line of attack that interprets Dewey’s 
instrumentalism as an endorsement of technocratic and commercial opportunism, 
claiming that Dewey’s major insight in this vein was that “theory is not separate 
from (or more noble than) practice but is itself derived from practice.”256 Dewey’s 
view was instrumental only insofar as it was functional and emergentist. Values were 
described as operative, not categorical or teleological, but such a description does 
not suggest that values are merely expedient for an individual. Instead, Dewey saw 
value as hypothetical and tentative and always open to revision toward broader 
application. His instrumentalism was always tempered by his fallibilism and his 
communalism. To put it in more contemporary terms, a Deweyan view of progress 
presupposes sustainability insofar as it always has an eye to what is best for the 
community, not the individual.   
Dewey agreed with many critics of his day, like Walter Lippman, who argued 
that society had become too complex for the average citizen to make informed 
choices. However, he disagreed with Lippman’s appeal to an intellectual elitism, and 
posited in its stead a splintering of society into smaller units. Dewey argued that the 
great community would be a composite of publics, with the latter term standing for 
any group facing a common problematic situation. In this way, he claimed, 
“Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community.”257 On 
Dewey’s view, one person would naturally self-identify with numerous communities 
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and institutions and the result would be a network of democratically participating 
citizens. As he wrote,  
From the standpoint of the individual, it [democracy] consists in 
having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and 
directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in 
participating according to need in the values which the groups 
sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of 
the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the 
interests and goods which are common. Since every individual is a 
member of many groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled 
except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in 
connection with other groups.258  
 
Even in 1927, Dewey recognized that technological advancement in particular 
posed a practical problem for the realization of his concept of the public and 
admitted that traditional philosophical theory could not have anticipated such a 
problem. He wrote,  
It seemed almost self-evident to Plato – as to Rousseau later – that a 
genuine state could hardly be larger than the number of persons 
capable of personal acquaintance with one another. Our modern 
state-unity is due to the consequences of technology employed so as 
to facilitate the rapid and easy circulation of opinions and 
information, and so as to generate constant and intricate interaction 
far beyond the limits of face-to-face communities.259 
 
Dewey claimed that the single most confounding feature of technology for political 
theorists was its resultant political integration. The attendant confusion he attributed 
to the wholesale acceptance of classical individualism. As he saw it, the concept of 
state as an ordered friendliness of discrete individuals arose, in part, because no one 
had the “faith that human beings released from the pressure of this system [i.e. 
localized community] could hold together in any unity.”260 The disjunct between 
                                                 
258 PP, LW 2:327-328 
259 LW, 2:306-307 
260 LW, 2:308 
 151
how classical liberal theory thinks about human association, i.e. via individualism, 
and the actual conditions of political integration, on Dewey’s view, is responsible for 
the submergence of the public. 
In spite of attained integration, or rather perhaps because of its 
nature, the Public seems to be lost; it is certainly bewildered… our 
political "common-sense" philosophy imputes a public only to 
support and substantiate the behavior of officials. How can the latter 
be public officers, we despairingly ask, unless there is a public? If a 
public exists, it is surely as uncertain about its own whereabouts as 
philosophers since Hume have been about the residence and make-
up of the self.261 
  
The unfitness of what passes for the public today, with respect to the concept of 
community from which it deviated, Dewey attested, is evident in the increase in the 
number of legal and extra-legal agencies since the industrial age. After all, the only 
way to maintain such a “Great Society,” understood as an ordered friendliness, on 
the global scale is through an increase in what classical liberals called the “rule of 
law.” 
Zhuangzi’s view of associated living reflects a similar emphasis on putting 
community first – as most Chinese schools of thought, particularly Confucianism, 
tended to do. In the preceding chapter, Zhuangzi’s philosophy was portrayed as a 
critical response to Confucian precepts. This, however, is only half the story. By the 
time Zhuangzi was writing, Confucianism was well on its way to becoming a system 
of ritual posturing and officious scholarship. Even thinkers more closely aligned 
with the Confucian tradition (particularly Mencius and Xunzi, who were 
contemporaries of Zhuangzi) sought to reform these aspects of Confucianism. From 
the text, it becomes apparent that Zhuangzi’s goal was not to overcome Confucius 
                                                 
261 Ibid. 
 152
completely, but rather to salvage what was worth salvaging and supplement it with 
insights from an ascetic tradition that was developing into the school of dào.  
When looking at the teachings of Confucius, it becomes obvious just how 
important community was to the early Chinese. On their view, community was a sort 
of web, wherein individuals participate in various connections with family, 
neighborhood and kingdom. The starting point of this web, according to Confucius, 
was known as rén [仁] (humanity or human-heartedness). Perhaps the best 
translation of rén would be “other-regarding” in the sense of having concern for 
others. Essential to the concept of rén is the notion of loving others. In the Analects 
we see Confucius, when asked about rén, say, “It is to love others.”262 But, 
Confucian love should not be confused with the Christian agapé or the Greek eros. It 
is better characterized as familial or neighborly love. This is important because, for 
Confucius, the individual is irreducibly social.  
According to Confucius, the best means for attaining such benevolence toward 
others is to “take one’s own familiar feelings as a guide.”263 This principle, which 
the Chinese called shù [恕], is often translated as “deference” or “reciprocity.” 
Etymologically, the character for Confucian shù is comprised of two parts. The 
upper portion is rú, which means “resemblance”, while the lower is “heart-mind,” or 
xīn. In a celebrated passage of the Analects, Confucius was asked, “Is there a rule 
which may serve as a rule of practice for all one’s life?” he responded, “Is not 
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reciprocity [shù] such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to 
others.”264  
Confucius tells of another more primordial virtue which can be considered the 
wellspring of rén. This wellspring is called filial piety, or xiào [孝], and could best 
be described as reverence towards one’s parents. Confucius believed that xiào and 
ren were closely linked, “Young men should be filial at home and respectful to 
elders when away from home.”265 Here, the importance of xiào to rén is like the 
importance of a root to a tree, securing the appropriate relationships of respect within 
the home is prior to securing respect within a community. However, xiào, despite its 
English translation, is not simply what is owed from a son or daughter. Rather, it 
involves both the idea that the parent will reciprocate what is due to the offspring, 
and the notion that obligation is not merely material. The first of these is illustrated 
in the Analects where Confucius is observed as saying, “Let a ruler be a ruler, a 
subject a subject, a father a father, and a son a son.”266 And, the latter is shown in the 
passage, “As far as present day filial piety is concerned, this means being able to 
provide sustenance; but even dogs and horses are able to receive sustenance. If 
reverence is not shown how does one know the difference?”267 Therefore, the idea of 
shù begins in the familial structure and is extended outward to larger contexts. If 
filial piety is the source of rén then it is important that it be practiced even after 
one’s parents have passed. Therefore, Confucius claimed, “When you serve them 
(parents) while they are alive do so in accordance with the rites; after they are dead, 
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when you bury them, do so in accordance with the rites and, when you sacrifice to 
them, do so in accordance with the rites.”268 This passage not only illustrates how 
Confucius believed that xiào could provide an uninterrupted source for rén, but also 
ties these two virtues in with the third major concept in the Confucian system, i.e. 
the principle of lĭ [禮].    
If xiào is the internal source of rén, then lĭ could be considered the external 
instantiation that discloses rén to others. As was the case with rén, Confucius 
broadened the term lĭ, which previously referred to sacrificial ceremony, to 
encompass manners, etiquette, customs, and rules of propriety. Because lĭ was first 
used to refer to the rules of sacrifice, it is typically translated as “ritual propriety,” 
yet it is more accurately understood as the observance, appreciation, and 
implementation of all conventions having to do with the interaction between two or 
more individuals, often of differing social status. It is often paired with the concept 
of yì [義], which means something like “righteousness” or “appropriateness” and is 
the virtue exercised in social situations like gift giving and mourning, whereas lĭ is 
more often used in the context of politics and government. According to Confucius, 
“The superior man in everything considers righteousness [yì] to be essential. He 
performs it according to the rules of propriety [lĭ].”269  
Another concept vital to a proper understanding of lĭ is that of “reverence,” or 
jìng [敬]. For instance, as Confucius put it in one passage, “High station filled 
without indulgent generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning 
conducted without sorrow – wherewith should I contemplate such ways?” Elsewhere 
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he wrote, “In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow than 
a minute attention to observances.”270 Which is to say, he believed that lĭ was not a 
practice of empty observances, but carried with it always a true representation of 
jìng. When combined with yì and jìng in this way, lĭ can be considered an outgrowth 
of rén. To flesh this out in even more detail, let us consider another pair of terms 
familiar to Confucianism, i.e. zhì [質] (substance) and wén [文] (culture). Peimin Ni 
has related these two terms to Aristotle’s concepts of matter and form, respectively, 
with regard to the conceptions of lĭ and yì. He writes,  
Appropriateness [yì] is the substance [zhì] of ritual propriety, and 
ritual propriety the refined form [wén] of appropriateness. …both 
appropriateness and ritual propriety combined should be the refined 
form [wén] in which and through which a human-hearted person 
[rén] manifests her humanity.271  
 
 
This further elucidates the connection between regarding others with benevolence 
and ritual propriety. Only when we are proficient in exercising lĭ will rén be 
manifested. The upshot of this is that rén and lĭ are one and the same virtue 
expressed in different ways, one internally the other externally. This can be seen in 
the twelfth book of the Analects, wherein one of Confucius’ disciples says,  “Culture 
(wén) is just as important as the stuff one is made of (zhì), and the stuff one is made 
of is just as important as culture. The skin of a tiger or leopard is no different than 
the skin of a dog or a sheep.”272 Therefore, the relationship between form and 
substance (wén and zhì) makes three things explicit in the Confucian system: 1) lĭ 
and ren cannot exist independently of one another, 2) exercising lĭ allows others to 
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see the ren of an individual, and subsequently, 3) it is only through lĭ that human-
heartedness and social roles are learned/communicated. 
This Confucian connection of action to benevolence and righteousness through 
ritual is precisely what Zhuangzi railed against. For him, ritual was a human artifice 
that hampered natural genuineness.273 As it is put in the eighth chapter,  
My definition of expertness has nothing to do with benevolence 
[rén] and righteousness [yì]; it means being expert in regard to your 
Virtue [dé], that is all. My definition of expertness has nothing to do 
with benevolence or righteousness; it means following the true form 
of your inborn nature, that is all.274 
 
For Confucius, the epitome of ritual propriety was the conduct of mourners at a 
funeral. Therefore, it should not be surprising that one finds several episodes in the 
Zhuangzi that depict funeral behavior contrary to the Confucian standard (which 
held that one should mourn family members for three years). In the eighteenth 
chapter, a story concerning the death of Zhuangzi’s wife is told. When a friend came 
to console him for the loss, he found Zhuangzi on the floor, merrily beating a tub as 
a drum and singing. Shocked, the friend asks Zhuangzi, “It should be enough simply 
not to weep at her death. But pounding on a tub and singing – this is going too far, 
isn’t it?”275 Zhuangzi disagrees and explains that it makes no sense to mourn an 
event that is part of nature’s transformation. As he puts it, “It’s just like the 
progression of the four seasons, spring, summer, fall, winter.”276  
In the sixth chapter, there is a story of four sages, which connects this notion 
with Zhuangzi’s view of community. It begins,  
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Master Ssu, Master Yu, Master Li, and Master Lai were all four 
talking together. “Who can look upon nonbeing as his head, on life 
as his back, and on death as his rump?” they said. “Who knows that 
life and death, existence and annihilation, are all a single body? I 
will be his friend.” The four men looked at each other and smiled. 
There was no disagreement in their hearts and so the four of them 
became friends.277   
 
Later when one of the sages developed a severe deformity, and another lay on his 
deathbed, they each told their friends that such changes were welcome: “Now they 
[yīn and yáng] have brought me to the verge of death, if I should refuse to obey 
them, how perverse I should be!”278    
Zhuangzi would have agreed with Dewey that ordered friendliness (especially 
the kind that is demonstrated in Confucian ritual) was not the most preferable way of 
living with others. The four sages mentioned above became friends because they 
recognized a very deep connection between them. In a story immediately following 
this one, Zhuangzi describes what true friendship consists in: 
Three men, Master Sanghu, Meng Zifan, and Master Qinzhang 
were talking with each other, “Who is able to be with others 
without being with others, be for others without being for others? 
Who is able to climb the skies, roam the mists and dance in the 
infinite, living forgetful of each other without end?” The three 
men looked at each other and smiled, none opposed in his heart, 
and so they became friends.279 
  
Just as in the previous story, one of the men falls ill and eventually dies. Confucius, 
hearing of this, sends one of his students to pay homage and finds the two friends 
singing in the presence of the corpse. When the student asks about the 
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appropriateness of such actions the two friends look at each other, amused, and ask 
“What does this man know of the meaning of ceremony?”280  
What Zhuangzi seems to suggest in this story is that friendship involves a type 
of doing without striving and a perpetual “forgetfulness” among those that immerse 
themselves in the dào of nature. The first notion reasserts the importance of wúwéi 
[無為] in Zhuangzi’s thought, the latter may suggest that embracing the 
transformations of nature and forgetting the self allows for the formation of a true 
community. To flesh this latter point out further, we must consider the connection in 
Zhuangzi’s “Inner Chapters” between the notion of forgetfulness and no-self, or, 
wújĭ [無己]. Repeatedly throughout those pages, Zhuangzi reminds us that the best of 
us will have no self, no utility [wúgōng, 無功], and no renown [wúmíng, 無名]. 
Likewise, he goes to great lengths to demonstrate that great understanding comes on 
the heels of forgetting the ways of the world and the self (as illustrated in the passage 
quoted earlier regarding the pipes of man, of the land, and of nature). For Zhuangzi, 
as Brian Lundberg puts it, “forgetting one’s physical self is linked to going beyond 
the ritual guidelines, in this case, the most sacred of all – the funeral rites. Forgetting 
thus functions as the technique par excellence for achieving spiritual realization and 
increasing awareness.”281  
For Zhuangzi, the notion of self as a discrete individual – even one tied to 
others in a network of social and moral ritual – is an impediment both to 
understanding and to true friendship. In the traditionally Western picture, “the ‘self’ 
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experienced as closed off from what is not self, in part, is a consequence of the 
personal anxiety connected with our cultural belief in ontological separation and 
estrangement from God.”282 Dewey balked at such a notion, just as Zhuangzi likely 
would have. It is important to mention here, that Zhuangzi’s advice about forgetting 
self should not be seen as equivalent to the Buddhist notions of selflessness, though 
this superficial similarity did aid in bringing Buddhism and Daoism together in 
subsequent centuries. Instead, Zhuangzi’s forgetfulness of self is more of a “getting 
out of one’s own way” by seeing the individual as inextricably entwined within 
one’s surroundings. Dewey held a similar view, which started to come into focus 
through his work in The Public and Its Problems. There, he claimed the individual… 
…finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and 
enriched by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and 
artistic associations. There is a free give-and-take: fullness of 
integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement, since 
the pulls and responses of different groups reenforce [sic.] one 
another and their values accord.283  
 
Later, in Individualism Old and New, Dewey carried this view to its logical 
conclusion and employed it to criticize what he described as the “rugged 
individualism” of the classical liberal tradition. Dewey laid out the problems 
surrounding rugged individuality thusly: 
Our material culture, as anthropologists would call it, is verging 
upon the collective and corporate. Our moral culture, along with our 
ideology, is, on the other hand, still saturated with ideals and values 
of an individualism derived from the pre-scientific, pre-
technological age. Its spiritual roots are found in medieval religion, 
which asserted the ultimate nature of the individual soul and 
                                                 
282 Jochim, Chris. “Just Say No to ‘No Self’ in Zhuangzi.” In Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. 
Edited by Roger Ames (SUNY Press, 1998) 
283 PP, LW 2:328 
 160
centered the drama of life about the destiny of that soul. Its 
institutional and legal concepts were framed in the feudal period.284  
 
In its place, Dewey suggested that a notion of the individual based on “spontaneous 
function” in a “communal life.”285 Such a life would, as Daniel Savage has pointed 
out, allow for a free creativity within a community, because it brought together 
objectivity and subjectivity. In his words, 
I admit that it is hard for me to understand why Dewey’s solution 
would strike anyone as controversial. Its basic premise seems 
simple and self-evident; pure objectivity necessarily excludes any 
creative contribution; pure subjectivity necessarily excludes the 
possibility of expression. On the one hand, to express one’s self 
artistically requires at least some objective components (material, 
language, common experiences or values) so that the work is 
capable of being communicated. On the other hand, for the 
expression to be creative, as opposed to imitative, some component 
of the work must be subjective (imagination, innovation, 
uniqueness, fantasy). 286 
    
This is very similar to how Roger Ames has characterized the operation of wúwéi in 
Zhuangzi’s thought – i.e. as “a productively creative relatedness.”287 
Understanding wúwéi as a type of selfless, interpenetrating, creative 
association held epistemic implications for Daoism that ran conversely to Confucian 
standards, as well. As Ames and Hall have explained it,  
In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zhong 忠) 
in deferential transactions (shu 恕) guided by ritually structured 
roles and relations (li 禮) that project one’s person outward into 
society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the 
community’s deference (junzi 君子) and a source of its 
spirituality.288     
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As we have seen, Zhuangzi advocated an alternate sort of deference – where one 
deferred to the vitality of one’s surroundings rather than the codified norms of 
tradition. This meant that knowledge, for him, was an affair that understood nature 
“on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort 
of thing from another.”289 This type of knowledge Zhuangzi called wúzhì [無知], 
which is sometimes translated literally as “non-knowledge.” In the previous chapter, 
the wúwéi comportment of the zhēnrén toward her surroundings was described as 
“mirror-like,” and it was particularly with regard to knowing that Zhuangzi made 
heavy use of this comparison. As he put it in the seventh chapter, Yīng dì wáng 
[應帝王], “The ultimate person employs his heart like a mirror; not chasing, not 
inviting; adapting and not storing; this is the reason he is able to flourish and not 
meet harm.”290 And in the thirteenth chapter: “The heart of the sage in stillness is the 
mirror of the heavens and earth, the looking glass of the universe.”291  
Those familiar with contemporary neo-pragmatism will no doubt be reminded 
of Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) by these passages. However, 
this superficial similarity should not mislead us. Zhuangzi would advocate neither 
Western correspondence theories of truth or representational theories of language 
(the two “mirrors” in Rorty’s attack). His point instead is that knowledge is reactive 
and adaptive and is therefore best left unshackled by convention and fixed standards. 
The accuracy of the image in Zhuangzi’s mirror is only of secondary importance in 
comparison to the immediacy of harmony a mirrored reflection can demonstrate. In 
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this way, Zhuangzi seems to be calling for a sort of spontaneous critical thinking 
(since creative thinking is the beginning of critical thinking) for oneself. Such a 
notion is something to which Dewey could assent, though he would have rejected 
any suggestion that there is any other kind of thinking. As he put it, “We talk about 
thinking for one's self. After all, the words ‘for one's self’ are superfluous or 
redundant. It is not thought unless it is for one's self.”292 
Zhuangzi believed that one of the best ways for achieving this type of “non-
active action” and “non-knowing knowledge” was to have what he called wúyù 
[無欲], i.e. non-desirous desire.” Just as with the other wu-forms above, the ostensive 
paradox in this concept is mostly due to the limits of Western translation. A better 
understanding of it would be as “deferential” desire or even “objectless” desire. 
Ames and Hall describe it as “shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to 
consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and enjoy” one’s surroundings.293 In a 
world of ever-changing events, Zhuangzi held, this was the only type of desire that 
would not be frustrated and could allow for the type of transformation required to 
stay in harmony with nature. This is what gives Zhuangzi’s philosophy that twinge 
of asceticism and agrarian anarchism. According to him, it is up to each of us to go 
beyond the limits and boundaries of civil society’s codes by rejecting convention.     
Dewey saw it only slightly different. Though he would have agreed that the 
habits of tradition could be subverted and improved upon through critical thinking, 
he argued that such a capacity could only be honed by experience, and the best way 
to ensure this was to reconstruct education around inquiry. Simply put, Dewey 
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believed that if the education of a populace could be reconstructed in such a way that 
its people could, through critical thinking, become the master rather than servant of 
their habits, then it would be possible to have true democracy, or what he called 
“democracy as a way of life,” a way of living that would be at once anarchical 
(because it is an-archaic) and cooperative, a way of life where our faith in some 
prime mover, be it intelligent or not, is replaced with a faith in each other. He wrote, 
some 12 years after his work in The Public and Its Problems, that… 
…democracy as a way of life is controlled by personal faith in 
personal day-by-day working together with others. Democracy is 
the belief that even when needs and ends or consequences are 
different for each individual, the habit of amicable cooperation - 
which may include, as in sport, rivalry and competition - is itself a 
priceless addition to life. To take as far as possible every conflict 
which arises-and they are bound to arise-out of the atmosphere and 
medium of force, of violence as a means of settlement into that of 
discussion and of intelligence is to treat those who disagree- even 
profoundly-with us as those from whom we may learn, and in so 
far, as friends. A genuinely democratic faith in peace is faith in the 
possibility of conducting disputes, controversies and conflicts as 
cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the 
other a chance to express itself, instead of having one party conquer 
by forceful suppression of the other-a suppression which is none the 
less one of violence when it takes place by psychological means of 
ridicule, abuse, intimidation, instead of by overt imprisonment or in 
concentration camps. To cooperate by giving differences a chance 
to show themselves because of the belief that the expression of 
difference is not only a right of the other persons but is a means of 
enriching one's own life-experience, is inherent in the democratic 
personal way of life. If what has been said is charged with being a 
set of moral commonplaces, my only reply is that that is just the 
point in saying them. For to get rid of the habit of thinking of 
democracy as something institutional and external and to acquire 
the habit of treating it as a way of personal life is to realize that 
democracy is a moral ideal and so far as it becomes a fact is a moral 
fact. It is to realize that democracy is a reality only as it is indeed a 
commonplace of living.294 
   
                                                 
294 “Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us” [LW vol. 14 p. 228] 
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Likewise, Zhuangzi believed that following wúwéi would allow people to attain a 
higher understanding and harmonious association with one another by allowing 
transformation to act through them. The result of these two views is nothing less than 
a life unlike anything any human being has ever witnessed. In fact, such a way of life 
would perhaps no longer even be human – it would have been transformed into 
something much different. This evolution of the human being into the truly 
democratic being is, I believe, what ties Dewey’s naturalistic ontology and his 
unshakable hope for our political future to Zhuangzi’s advocacy of wandering at 
ease along the ever-changing dào.  
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